

Suppressing the Wicked and Ensuring Order: Lucas Alamán's Burkean Political Thought in Postcolonial Mexico

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From the early days of Spanish American independence, thinkers and statesmen in Latin America reflected on what it could mean to be authentically Latin American in a way that was not dependent on their relations to Spain.¹ This topic has drawn interest recently, and perhaps most prominently, from postcolonial scholars such as Aníbal Quijano and María Lugones, who have turned a critical eye toward European modernity and its interconnection with colonialism—constructing the colonized while disrupting “the social patterns, gender relations and cosmological understandings of the communities and societies it invaded.”² The solution to such penetrating and disruptive phenomena provided by these thinkers is not the mere formal act of decolonization, the gaining of political and economic independence, for this is seen as merely an “evolution in the forms of domination.”³ From this perspective, political independence, and with it the entry into European modernity, suggests a retention of a problematic dichotomy between West and non-West.⁴ What is desired instead is not simply a period in which a once colonized people are not

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overtly or directly colonized—that is, a postcolonial period—but the desire to root out the corrupting colonial influence and find something authentic in the postcolonial experience.⁵

What is perhaps slightly less well known is the prevalence of such concerns dating back to the early days of Spanish American independence. The problem, as the Venezuelan statesman, teacher, and philosopher Andrés Bello wrote of America's severance with Spain, was that "we snatched the scepter from the monarch, but we did not rid ourselves of the Spanish spirit: our congresses obeyed, without knowing it, Gothic inspirations. . . . [E]ven our soldiers, adhering to a special code, which was in opposition to the principle of equality before the law, revealed the predominance of the ideas of the same Spain whose banner they had trampled."⁶ Addressing this became a recurring theme of Latin American thought.

In the newly independent Mexico of the 1820s and 1830s, a rich discourse emerged over how best to navigate the terrain between political independence and cultural continuity with Spain. Figures such as José María Luis Mora, Lorenzo de Zavala, and Lucas Alamán all wrestled with the question of how Mexico might be able to extricate itself from the shadow of Spain and its possibly defective institutions and culture without simply repeating their failure and servilely replicating the practices of others. This concern went hand-in-hand with larger questions regarding the shape of the Mexican nation—and indeed whether there was one in the first place.

While Mora and Zavala arrive at their positions from liberal perspectives, the philosopher, historian, and statesman Alamán (1792–1853), though not wholly hostile to liberalism, derived his argument from more conservative foundations. Beginning in the 1820s, Alamán found himself navigating a social and political world that had gone off track—partly the result of problematic transformations in Spanish political institutions. Yet Alamán does not embrace a manifestly critical disposition toward Spain and Europe as a whole. He instead positions himself as a careful and moderate reformer, skeptical of both the failures of the past and the idealistic promises for the future.⁷ He was, in short, a sort of postcolonial Mexican Edmund Burke.

The comparison is intentional and obvious in the sense that Alamán models his political disposition on the thought of Burke. The latter famously rejected the French Revolution, excoriating its adherence to abstract ideals, its tendency to dismiss lived and historical experience, its upheaval of virtue and deference to quality, and so on. But Burke held nuanced positions on political change. For one, he argues that there are such things as good revolutions—he repeatedly invokes the Glorious Revolution as one such example. Revolutions of this sort are good precisely because they cast off something corrupt, some deformation in the political development of a state, and revert to that which was successful in the past. Burke makes a similar claim in connection with the American Revolution. In Burke's interpretation, the American colonies were attempting to assert their privileges granted to them by virtue of their status as British citizens. The demands of the colonists refused, they had few options other than to resist British authority and return to that prior state of being wherein they possessed the rights and liberties that they rightly claimed. In France, too, Burke suggests that while there may have been some problems with the eighteenth-century French monarchy, the proper course of action was to revert to some previously successful social and political organization rather than plunging headstrong into an unknown future.

In each case, Burke highlights positive qualities that existed previously to which might be returned. For Britain, it was in part the inculcation of the manly sense of liberty that Burke identifies as good and just that sits at the core of the historical development of England. That both the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution had these principles to which they might return appears to be a happy coincidence. France too, while perhaps a bit less fortunate in not having been grounded in the same manly liberty, had a clear, stable historical foundation upon which their renewal might have been grounded. There is, however, a bit of a puzzle here. To what extent does Burke's "conservative" disposition toward political and social change depend on there being a positive—or at least stable—past to which we might return? There

is a distinction to be drawn between Burke's conservatism, which allowed for the slow evolution of political systems and societies while also conceptualizing a form of political change that could revert to the past, and the more reactionary political thought of postrevolutionary figures such as Joseph de Maistre and Juan Donoso Cortés. For Donoso Cortés in particular, by the mid-nineteenth century the cultural and spiritual past had been lost. Once the internal guide of religion had been cast aside, there was no going back.⁸ This leads Donoso Cortés to his infamous embrace, albeit an ambivalent one, of dictatorship.⁹

This brings us back to the question of Latin American postcolonialism: What would Burke say had he lived in a different place, under a different set of circumstances? That is, what would be a Burkean analysis of political and social change in a postcolonial setting, where tumult prevailed and there was arguably no stable past to which one might return? It is possible to find Burke's cautious approach to political and social change appealing and yet be unsure how it might be applied in more tumultuous circumstances. Alamán, indebted to Burke as he is, provides a perspective from which we might try to answer these questions. His political thought "is clearly grounded in a distinctively postcolonial, American setting, in which the question of establishing a government capable of providing stability for Mexico's diverse population takes first place."¹⁰ And his application of Burkean thought in a newly independent Mexico is instructive, particularly in his struggles to do so.

This article explores Alamán's rejections of the various political models utilized in early postindependence Mexico, in particular his dismissive disposition taken toward the institutions and principles of the 1812 Spanish Constitution. His view that the Cortes of Cádiz, and the 1812 Spanish Constitution they produced, held little promise for Mexico tends to be taken at his word. But as I argue here, Alamán seems to have underestimated the ways in which the 1812 Constitution might well have furthered Alamán's own social and political goals for Mexico, even if imperfectly. By adding context to his evaluation of the 1812 Spanish Constitution,

this paper underscores the difficulty of evolving one's own political understanding of the circumstances. This contributes to scholarship on both Burke and Alamán. Much has been written about Burke's thought on empire and colonialism.¹¹ In part because of his understandings of the organic growth of social and political institutions, Burke is often seen as skeptical of, though not necessarily hostile to, colonial projects. And while Burke's prescriptive political philosophy has been highly influential, particularly among twentieth-century American conservatives, it is less clear what utilizing Burke's ideas would look like from the colonial or postcolonial perspective. For his part, Alamán's importance as a political thinker in, and historian of, early independence-era Mexico is well known among scholars of the period. He features prominently in historical overviews of the period,¹² and his political thought has been explored at length.¹³ Alamán has also recently drawn attention from comparative political theorists and intellectual historians.¹⁴ But a richer account of the documents and ideas to which Alamán was responding allows for a deeper critical engagement with his thought.

The article begins by connecting Alamán to Burke. The section highlights Alamán's own statements regarding his debt to Burke while building a depiction of Burke's political and social thought. It then shows how Alamán's arguments regarding Mexican political failures of the 1820s reflect a particularly Burkean influence. The next section of the paper turns to the Spanish liberalism of the 1812 Constitution while identifying Alamán's critique of it. The article concludes by suggesting that Alamán's efforts to enact a Burkean politics in postcolonial Mexico was ineffectual. He seems to have been blind to the political possibilities of the 1812 Constitution, resulting in something of a missed opportunity for him.

Alamán and Burke on the Possibilities of Social and Political Change

In 1832, around a decade after staging a coup against the Mexican Empire, Antonio López de Santa Anna led another coup against

the First Mexican Republic. His revolt ultimately resulted in the deposal of Anastasio Bustamente (who himself had seized power only a few years before). The members of Bustamente's cabinet, among whom was Alamán, were charged with various crimes, including the murder of the former president, Vicente Guerrero.¹⁵ Alamán went into hiding but continued to defend himself. In his "Examen imparcial de la administración de General Vicepresidente D. Anastasio Bustamente, con observaciones generales sobre el estado presente de la República y consecuencias que éste debe producir,"¹⁶ Alamán sought to defend the actions of the administration—and of himself in particular. For while Alamán purports to provide an "impartial" analysis of the actions of the Bustamente administration, not only was he a part of that same administration but his role was so central that some referred to it as "Alamán's administration."¹⁷

In the text, one immediately finds the clear influence of Burke with an extended epigraph from *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Later, Alamán calls Burke "the man who has been able to comprehend better the tendency and outcomes of political movements in our era."¹⁸ Going further, Alamán asserts that Burke "has announced, with a spirit that might be called prophetic, the entire series of events that we have seen in our country and in foreign countries, and, as his observations are so relevant to our circumstances, what I take from his brilliant pen will enrich and support this paper."¹⁹ Beyond these overt declarations, Alamán's analysis consistently reflects his engagement with Burke, even if he does not always identify his debt directly. It is, therefore, worthwhile to review the broad contours of Burke's political thought.

Burke understands the political and social realms as fundamentally different, which affects his understanding of their malleability.²⁰ The political realm is characterized by several features. First, it is concrete rather than abstract. That is to say that the task of politics is to determine the common good and provide it to the best of one's abilities. Burke believed that in its most fundamental sense, the political realm is meant to provide for the procurement of the goods that are necessary to live. "Political problems,"

he wrote, “do not primarily concern truth or falsehood.”²¹ Perfection is pushed aside in favor of the limited, realistic good of the community. Politics should not concern itself with abstract concepts, such as universal rights, because such concerns are superfluous to the basic role to be fulfilled. It is not helpful to consider the idea of an abstract good when attempting to obtain the actual necessities of life. Instead, political questions deal with the practical pursuit of satisfaction. The emphasis is placed on the concrete (and imperfect) good of the community rather than the ideal and abstract rights of man. Consequently, abstract concepts such as “rights” or “liberties” should not form the basis of political actions. That is not to say that rights do not exist. They exist through the constitution as legal or prescriptive rights, simply not as universal natural rights. Rights, in short, exist through the government, not before it. This means that political decisions ought to be made with the well-being of the constitution in mind rather than the maintenance of rights themselves. If rights need to be sacrificed to preserve the constitution, so be it. Were rights to exist before the constitution, they would take priority even if the political community were to come to ruin through such a course. This would be unacceptable under a Burkean understanding of politics.

Government is the tangible form of the political. Political actions must avoid abstract discussions in order to come to a decision that will aid in the communal good of the state. The political world is made up of forces that are often incalculable. Rather than making clear and precise measurements, politicians are left to make judgments regarding the factors in their decisions. For these reasons, the political reason of Burke does not accept, *a priori*, abstract conclusions. Given the practical nature of political actions, to make decisions one must rely on *experience* rather than a generally applicable political philosophy. But as an extremely complex structure, the political realm is not easily understood no matter how much experience one may have.

To truly understand the political realm, one would require “even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life.”²² Because one can never have enough experience to adequately

understand political actions, we must use other tools to guide us, even if they are still imperfect. The guide available to us comprises political history and the form of government that has been passed down to us. Political systems are the result of hundreds of years of political development and as such represent the collective wisdom and experience of people throughout the ages. Government is said to be the “offspring of convention,” and “that convention must limit and modify” all actions taken in regard to the government.²³ Burke believes that it would be foolish to go against the collective wisdom of the past and radically alter a political system.

At the same time, Burke is not wholly opposed to political transformation, and his thought *does* allow for political evolution. That is, he does not demand blind adherence to whatever political form has been handed to us. Within Burke’s conception of the political, action may be taken to transform the political realm as long as it appears to be a reform consistent with ancient political traditions. Burke believes that “government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants.”²⁴ While it is difficult for people to make political decisions, actions can and should be made to benefit the community. Since the government is in place to provide for people, they have a “right” to expect that these wants will be provided for by the government. Government was developed through human wisdom for the needs of people, and it must therefore be possible to change the government to best provide for those needs. The “science of government” one would employ to make such changes requires drawing on the collective experience of those who came before you, which again indicates that it would be foolish to radically alter the function of government. Nonetheless, when a government no longer functions in a way that provides for human needs, it can be changed such that it is able to do so. Such a change should involve either a return to what had worked previously or, at the very least, a revision in line with long-established foundations. For it is “with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of

approved utility before his eyes.”²⁵ Political change may occur, but it must be mindful of the past.

The social realm is similar to the political in that it too is the result of a long process of development. According to Burke, this indebts us to those who helped develop both the social and the political. But the social, unlike the political, is not a product of human volition for Burke. Whereas government is the product of collected human wisdom, the social realm itself is beyond human wisdom, something that cannot be consciously directed. The social realm is more abstruse than the political because it does not have a similarly concrete goal. Instead, it is made up of conventions that are the laws of society. These conventions serve to limit and control the actions of individuals. In Burke’s conception of society, the will of the people is “controlled, and their passions brought into subjection.”²⁶ Consequently, people are controlled by society; they do not control it. The only sort of force that can subject the will of all people is a “*power out of themselves*,” something beyond the people.²⁷ Thus, society is not “subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to bridle and subdue.”²⁸ The very nature of the social indicates that people do not and cannot play an active role in its formation.

Society itself, under Burke’s conception, is formed by the opinions, prejudices, and conventions that people hold. As we are individuals conditioned by society, such prejudices provide us with a second nature. The veracity of these prejudices is irrelevant; they simply must be accepted by a group of people. This collective “second nature” forms the “foundation and bond of society.”²⁹ But such opinions are not the most fundamental aspect that forms a society and keeps it together. It is the commonly held moral beliefs that form the very foundation of civilization itself. Without these moral beliefs that function as a “controlling power upon will and appetite,” there could be no society.³⁰ These moral beliefs themselves are derived from religion, indicating that ultimately God is responsible for the creation of society. With a divine origin, society must necessarily be a representation of the natural order of the universe, and as such society is beyond human manipulation.

Combining the views that society is the product of a long development of opinions, prejudices, and conventionally held moral opinions, with the view that these are the product of divine will, we arrive at the conclusion that society ought not be consciously altered by people. To attempt to disrupt or undermine society would be to deny the long process it took to form it, much like rejecting a government entirely would be a denial of the collective experience of those who preceded us. But because society itself is a reflection of the divine and is beyond human intervention, it is impossible to change society and expect a positive outcome. This contrasts with the political realm. The political change Burke allows for may serve as a “step preparatory to the formation of something better, either in the scheme of the government itself, or in persons who administer it, or in both,” but it may not cast aside the foundations of the government.³¹ It is apparent that Burke believes that change of a political nature may be necessary and useful as long as it utilizes the lessons that have been accumulated through collective experience. Intentional social change, however, cannot succeed, as it is fundamentally impossible for people to consciously change society with a positive outcome.

Alamán’s “Examen imparcial” consistently reflects an intended application of this political and social ontology. The essay commences with the observation that “if, in all things, past experience is the surest guide for what is to come, in political matters it is almost the only rule that can be adopted with confidence.”³² Alamán insists that politics is a practical matter rather than a question of ideal theory. Citing Burke, Alamán indicates that as a practical science, the practice of politics is not something to be learned a priori. Nearly quoting Burke, Alamán then writes that to be a good practitioner of politics, one requires experience—more experience than even the most experienced individual can acquire—necessitating the study of history to guide one’s actions.³³

Before the rise of Bustamante, Alamán suggests, the Mexican Republic had faced “almost uninterrupted disturbances since the year 1826.”³⁴ The image provided is one of disorganization and discontent in the years leading up to 1830. Implicitly, Alamán

suggests that this justifies the coup d'état perpetrated by Bustamente against the government of Vincente Guerrero. Alamán further paints a rosy picture of what he and Bustamente achieved during their time in power. Following the January 1, 1830 rise of Bustamente, his administration "gave luster and splendor to the nation, rendering it esteemed and respected in foreign countries; . . . affirmed and increased its credit in those countries; . . . mended internal finances in a way that had not been seen since independence; . . . developed industry and created hope for a lasting prosperity, which nonetheless disappeared with the very administration that produced it, like those luminous meteors that shine in the obscurity of night for a few moments and then return to the same darkness from which they emerged."³⁵ All along, we are told that there was never a desire to overthrow the 1824 Mexican Constitution or its laws and that "duty, suitability, and public opinion equally compelled the government to submit to conserving and consolidating what existed."³⁶ Innovation would do nothing other than create "new and more disastrous convulsions."³⁷ Here, Alamán swims against the tide of the "revolutionary spirit" of the day that had "unfortunately . . . put down such profound roots."³⁸ His depiction of the Bustamente administration is meant to distance it from the French revolutionaries despised by Burke and position Alamán and Bustamente closer to those in the American Revolution or England's Glorious Revolution who simply sought to bring things back on track.

His insistence was that the path forward must draw on an account of what properly existed in Mexico. To follow ideal theory, to put in place political institutions derived from abstract ideology that did not properly fit the Mexican conditions, would be a sure path to failure. The conditions, however, were unstable at best. There were several problems facing Alamán and Bustamente, and Mexican political thinkers more generally, in the years following independence. Much like Burke, Alamán sees the construction of wholly novel political or social institutions as an invitation for disaster. At the same time, he finds himself confronted by circumstances and institutions that are themselves suboptimal.

A primary problem, from Alamán's perspective, was that the 1824 federal Mexican Constitution was modeled on the Constitution of the United States but had failed to account for the different historical and social circumstances of Mexico. Regardless of how similar were the specific laws and institutions created by the Mexican and US constitutions, Alamán asserts that they could never have produced the same results because they operated over "dissimilar elements."³⁹ The major difference was that in migrating to the American colonies, the colonists in the individual colonies adopted particular constitutions that were modeled on the British Constitution. The political authority they employed was derived from English government itself. In that sense, when the question of independence came, the issue was one of severing the bond of governance but not of altering the underlying political and social conditions. Alamán here echoes Burke's depiction of the American Revolution as simply asserting a claim to the rights of Englishmen. The revolution was not a radical departure from the past; rather, it was an attempt to bring Americans back onto their ancient track.

But this approach had deeper ramifications. The American Revolution, then, did not require any great postcolonial transformation. For the United States, independence meant simply replacing a governing power from across the ocean with one closer to home. While the specifics of the new US Constitution could be viewed as unique, they were grounded in stable social and political foundations. "All the legislators had to do," wrote Alamán of postrevolutionary United States, "was substitute a national union for [the previous] common bond of foreign rule, and this was done with the federal Constitution. This did not alter in any way the particular existence of the states."⁴⁰ That is, the fact of political independence did not alter "the habitual customs, the ordinary way of life of all individuals" in the nascent United States.⁴¹ As Alamán notes, Mexican "independence came by means very different from that of the United States, and while the United States were constituted from the very moment they found themselves free, we, destroying everything that existed before, found ourselves independent and in anarchy."⁴²

The relationship to liberty is a helpful illustration here. People in the nascent United States carried forward the same sense of liberty they had held as British citizens. Independence altered nothing fundamental, and "left existing everything that constituted the essence of the original constitution."⁴³ For Mexico, however, the populace "began to count the epoch of liberty" from the moment of independence without realizing what constitutes true liberty.⁴⁴ Their liberty was an anarchic one. In destroying everything that existed before, they saw the possibility "for the establishment of institutions absolutely different, or rather entirely opposite to everything that was known and had existed until then."⁴⁵ Thus, the liberty obtained was not one grounded in strong institutions. Alamán quotes Burke in saying that Mexico "should not have congratulated ourselves on [obtaining liberty] 'until [we were] informed how it had been combined with government, with public force, with the discipline and obedience of armies, with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue, with morality and religion, with the solidity of property, with peace and order, with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things, too, and without them liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and is not likely to continue long.'"⁴⁶ That is, in procuring independence, Mexico had repeated a number of the errors of the French Revolution.

Alamán turns to the means by which the administration was able to conserve and consolidate what existed. As it happens, the tools available to them were themselves deficient. The means to "conserve public order, suppress and contain unsettled and seditious persons, prevent the misappropriation of national wealth, and, in short, carry out the necessary functions of an authority that must be active, vigilant, and foresightful are derived from the division of powers that the Constitution established and from the powers that in this division are settled on the executive."⁴⁷ The Mexican Constitution was modeled on the US Constitution, but, warns Alamán, "it is a mistake to believe that the executive or our Republic is constituted in the same way as that of the United States, and another still greater mistake to think that that

Constitution, even were it copied exactly, would produce the same results operating over dissimilar elements.”⁴⁸ Alamán here astutely lays out the importance of social and cultural foundations for political institutions. Political institutions designed in exactly the same way but placed in different national and historical contexts will produce different results. The government created by the federal Mexican Constitution was too weakly organized to be able to fulfill its purpose—namely, “suppressing the wicked, protecting the good and peaceful, ensuring order, strengthening military discipline, and enabling the nation to enjoy the benefits of society, [the] primordial objective of all human institutions.”⁴⁹

The question, then, is what possibilities, legislation, or political options were open to Mexico in the moment. The successes of the United States and its constitution were not realistic models for Mexico to emulate. Attempts to copy the US Constitution were ill-fated, as there was a failure to understand the importance of the underlying customs that supported the political institutions in their functioning. This left the Federal Constitution impotent to address the problems facing it. The habits and customs of Mexico were more clearly Spanish in origin, which meant the conditions were such that Spanish institutions might seem better suited to the moment. But Alamán viewed this as posing its own problems.

Mexico's Tragic Inheritance: Alamán and the 1812 Spanish Constitution

Alamán was confronted with a puzzle: politics is about slow change, avoiding radical departures, and maintaining a foundation in the ancient political constitution, yet the conditions in nineteenth-century Mexico were not especially stable, having already witnessed radical departures from the past and a contested political and social history. By the time Alamán rose to political prominence, Mexico was at least two steps removed from what he deemed to be the true social and political foundations of the Mexican people.

In Alamán's view, the Latin American revolutions had been truly destructive. Rather than preserving the underlying social conditions, the Latin American—and particularly Mexican—

revolutions had ripped out the foundations of society, leaving little or nothing to which Mexico might return. While Alamán would later identify political independence as an event whose time had come, both he and Bustamante believed that the initial political shocks from 1808–1812 did more to destroy a sense of unity and only enflamed rivalries.⁵⁰ After independence, there was an element of “decolonization” present in the state of affairs, but not a positive one. Rather than a return to something novel or inherent in Mexico, having ripped out Spanish social foundations there was little left. The rebellion against Spain was not “undertaken with sound judgement,” as the political severance left Mexico ill-prepared for governance.⁵¹ In the stirring final chapter of his massive and influential *Historia de Méjico*, Alamán ponders, “[Mexico is] a nation that has gone from infancy to decrepitude without having enjoyed more than a glimpse of the freshness of youthful age or given any signs of life other than violent convulsions.”⁵² The revolutionary failures were such that it seems “there would be reason to recognize, with the great Bolívar, that Independence has been bought at the cost of all the goods that Spanish America enjoyed.”⁵³ For there are, he writes, “no Mexicans in Mexico” and there is no clear path out of the problems facing them.⁵⁴

But the political circumstances in Spain were also tumultuous in the first decades of the nineteenth century. In the same year as Miguel Hidalgo’s initial revolt against Spanish authority, and derived from the same moment of crisis, Spain began to take steps away from absolute monarchy, moving to constrain the power of the king. This process resulted in the liberal Constitution of 1812. While the 1812 Constitution itself functioned only in fits, it reflected the beginnings of a movement away from absolutism, becoming a hugely influential liberal political document during the first decades of the nineteenth century.⁵⁵ That is, not only did Mexico break away from Spain in the first decades of the nineteenth century but Spanish politics were similarly in a transitory moment.

Alamán was no more positively disposed toward the political developments in Spain than were his evaluations of Mexican

politics after independence. He suggests that the Spanish Constitution of 1812, itself merely “an imitation of the Constituent Assembly of France,” had provided the problematic spirit that was “transmitted into our federal Constitution.”⁵⁶ Having “transferred all authority to the legislature, creating, in place of the absolute power of the monarch, a power as absolute as the monarch but entirely arbitrary,” the Spanish Constitution had failed to properly distinguish the powers of the different branches of government.⁵⁷ It played the role of the “tacit by very effective model” for the Mexican Constitution.⁵⁸ There was, consequently, a “spirit of miserable and base intrigue inherited and learned from the Cortes of Cádiz in Madrid.”⁵⁹ In sum, the federal Mexican Constitution, having infused “the form of the United States Constitution with the complete spirit of the Constitution of the Cortes of Cádiz, destroying at their roots everything that existed, did nothing more than put the form of government in contradiction with all the sound legislation of the nation.”⁶⁰ Rather than being solely a question of independence from the metropole, the political circumstances required a reckoning with the underlying evolution in Spanish politics. Consequently, Alamán reacted not only to the advent of Mexican independence from the Spanish empire and the concordant turmoil as Mexico repeatedly stumbled in its opening steps but also to the social and political transformations taking place in Spain itself.

These circumstances were complex. In 1808, Napoleonic troops entered Spain under the pretext of marching on to Portugal. Simultaneously, Napoleon manipulated a situation where the Spanish monarchs abdicated the throne and were to be replaced by Napoleon’s brother Joseph. Perceiving this to have been, effectively, a French invasion, Spaniards rose up against French troops, beginning a struggle of resistance. Without the Spanish monarchs, Spain was politically directionless. Into this void stepped an ancient if rarely convened parliamentary body—the Cortes. Until 1815 and the return of Ferdinand VII, the Cortes laid claim to possessing the sovereign power of the state. In that time, the Cortes sought to reimagine the shape of Spanish governance, emphasizing the need

for a constitutional monarchy for conditions—such as those they were facing—wherein the king was unable to govern. Despite a general sense that Spanish politics needed to evolve, the members of the Cortes were far from unified in their answers to what ought to be done. The more conservative position, derisively labeled *serviles* by their opponents, tended toward a position of emulating the British model of a constitutional monarchy. This would have built on Spanish political foundations while instituting some limited restraints on monarchical power. Their primary opponents were the *liberales*, whose intentions were to create a written constitution with explicit limitations on the power of the king and an expanded role for the Cortes as a parliamentary body.

Over the course of two years, the members of the Cortes debated the appropriate course of action. Ultimately, the *liberales* carried the day, able to persuade ecclesiastic members to join them. While the *liberales* intended to weaken the institutional power of the Catholic Church, they were persuasive in their claim that liberalism and Catholicism were compatible and that their liberal constitutional model was the best method for retaining the religion's entrenched social relevance. In 1812, they produced in the coastal town of Cádiz a liberal constitution.⁶¹ The 1812 (or Cádiz) Constitution intended to move Spain forward into modernity, joining the other countries of western Europe in placing constitutional restraints on the monarchy. In this, they effectively ended the era of absolutism in Spain.⁶²

It would, though, be inaccurate to describe this as a truly radical reorientation. Although the *liberales* sought a meaningful transformation of Spanish politics, it would not be correct to identify them as a radical group akin to the Jacobins in France. The Cádiz Constitution reflected a mediation of different political interests. While the *liberales* achieved largely what they had hoped to in limiting monarchical authority, the intention was to do so in a way that was consistent with deeply rooted political and cultural practices in Spain. Among the most important figures in Cádiz was Francisco Martínez Marina, an Asturian priest who became a leading liberal voice in the Cortes.⁶³ His “Teoría de las Cortes,” which

circulated in 1812 before being published in 1813, argued that the principles of liberalism had long been entrenched in Spain and that the proposed constitution reflected these foundations.⁶⁴ This legacy, the argument claimed, could be found both in the writings of the Spanish Scholastics and in the formation of the Cortes as a pseudo-parliamentary body in the Middle Ages. That is, while Martínez Marina and other liberals did seek to undermine the absolutism that had prevailed in Spain, the intention was to do so in a way that would be consistent with Spanish history. Importantly, this included the establishment of Catholicism as the “only true faith” and the direction of the state to support Catholicism through its laws while prohibiting the expression of others. These Spanish liberals sought to create a nation of Catholics, a community of believers, unified in their spiritual orientation.⁶⁵ These questions were not localized to peninsular Spain, as Americans were simultaneously wrestling with similar questions of sovereignty in light of the king’s abdication.⁶⁶ A different faction prevailed between 1808 and 1810 in Mexico, where the historical constitutionalism of the royalist *gachupines* was closer that of the *serviles*.⁶⁷ But this should merely underscore that the political responses to the Napoleonic invasion in both Mexico and Spain existed along the same continuum.

Alamán, however, saw little more than an “untethered radicalism” in the Cortes of Cádiz.⁶⁸ Of the topics considered by Alamán, the Cortes and the constitution that it produced are of secondary interest to him. He acknowledges, however, in volume 5 of the *Historia de Méjico*, that it is “essential” to consider the Cortes and to “examine the system and general plan that proceeded from it.”⁶⁹ His evaluation is largely negative.⁷⁰ In his various accounts of the proceedings of the Cortes, Alamán goes out of his way to highlight what he saw as the presence of radicalism and to insist that the outcome the Cortes produced was radical as well. Among the initial group in 1810, Alamán is intentional in mentioning that there were a good number of youths who were influenced by eighteenth-century French philosophy, setting up his critique of the Cortes as being radical.⁷¹ Alamán believed the Cortes to have been a radical institution, suggesting that “rather than constituting themselves as

a body that safeguarded the rights of the throne, [its members] instead seized the entire plenitude of authority which had been used by the Spanish monarchs to the greatest extent of their power."⁷² In his view, it was this concentrated power, without limit or responsibility, that was the origin of the idea in Mexico that a constituent congress possesses absolute power, limited only by the will of its members.⁷³ These characterizations allow him to largely dismiss the Cortes, the 1812 Constitution, and the liberal political thought that prevailed there.

There are, nevertheless, some narrow equivocations wherein Alamán appears to come close to accepting some of the underlying aspects of what the Cortes sought to do. The two sides of Alamán can be seen in the following passages:

In [the Cortes] the most exaggerated ideas of reform and innovations predominated, and taking as a model the French National Assembly, they [i.e., the deputies] saw the most radical projects rearing up, not to remedy the many and grave evils of which the monarchy certainly suffered, but to tear it down to its foundations and to give way to a civil war, to the ruin and confusion into which that unhappy nation fell and of which it has been a victim for so long propagating through the same principles the same evils in the colonies, which on separating themselves from the metropolis kept possession of a tragic inheritance. . . . Distracted by brilliant theories, misguided by a lack of experience in the management of [such] affairs, entering in very difficult circumstances into an undertaking entirely unknown in Spain, passing from the most absolute government to the wide reaches of a liberty without limits, they committed grave errors, no doubt, but never from dishonest principles, never from greed or mean interests, and in the midst of these errors, they still worked with glory and great success to expel the foreign invasion . . . insuring at least independence, if not the happiness and liberty of the Spanish nation.⁷⁴

In this reaction to the Cortes, we see two sides of Alamán at war with each other. He acknowledges that while there may have been “errors,” there was an honest effort to provide for the happiness and liberty of the Spanish people. It was, in short, an attempt at cultivating a political evolution grounded in the preservation of existing social and political practices. Alamán, however, primarily categorizes the Cortes and its constitution as radical and, therefore, to be rejected.

Alamán’s Philosophical Malaise: Conservatism in an Age of Transformation

Toward the end of Eric Van Young’s intellectual biography of Alamán, he depicts a sense of missed opportunities and paths not taken. “A deep philosophical malaise,” writes Van Young, “plagued Lucas Alamán in the last years of his life. There is in the [*Historía de Méjico*] an elusive but detectable consciousness of possibilities foregone and potentials unfulfilled for his country.”⁷⁵ Considering the social and political tumult that Alamán had experienced, it may come as little surprise that he would have experienced a great deal of frustration. At the same time, one wonders whether Alamán carried with him a sense of regret. Indeed, whether he realized it or not, I suggest that Alamán’s rejection of the 1812 Spanish Constitution was effectively a missed opportunity for achieving much of what he desired to see in Mexico.

Given Alamán’s social and political ontology that mirrored those of Burke, he was relatively restricted in the prescriptions open to him in the wake of Mexican independence. Any governance needed to preserve that which had come before, avoiding stark disruptions. Sound legislation would be “coherent with the nation’s habits and customs.”⁷⁶ What he longed for was a return to that which was stable and good in Mexican history. Alamán’s task, then, was to reconstruct the Mexican nation, to give it the historical grounding that had been lost. He understands the origin of the Mexican nation to be found in the Conquest.⁷⁷ Admiration for the Conquest and the colonizing impulse of Spain could, perhaps, serve as a touchstone for nationhood. There was, then, much of his

work that was constructive. The twentieth-century thinker José Vasconcelos saw in Alamán a man who “believed in the race, believed in the language, believed in the religious community.”⁷⁸ The scholar Moisés González Navarro cites a newspaper article from 1938 that described Alamán as the “man most progressive, most obsessed by the project of accelerating Mexico’s progress.”⁷⁹

Alamán rejected the “highly negative mythifications of the colonial regime,” which reflected a “root-and-branch condemnation” of the Spanish colonial system.⁸⁰ As Van Young writes, “[T]o Alamán, . . . there had not been too much Spain in Mexico but too little.”⁸¹ Yet what had been good in the Mexican past had slowly dissipated. Alamán had “exalted the Spanish colonial period as a time of good government, prosperity, and social order,” but those days were as far removed as any.⁸² The goal then was about modernization—and not necessarily how to return to some lost, unretrievable, past. For example, he disliked the “antimodern viciousness of the Spanish Inquisition, often coupled with the backwardness of the educational system,” and thus these were aspects of the Spanish legacy that could be left in the past.⁸³

For Alamán, a political thinker in a Burkean mold, the question of how to govern was a tricky one. To what might Mexico return, particularly when Spain itself had departed from past political practices? It is true that Spanish social customs remained, and Alamán would have intended Mexico to return to them, to build off them—which is what makes his rejection of the politics of the 1812 Spanish Constitution so confusing in the specifics. This position may well have been an error, as much of what Alamán wished to see in Mexico was the intention of the 1812 Constitution.

Many of his complaints about the Cortes and the 1812 Constitution revolve around the way in which the Cortes functioned. He was disillusioned, for example, by the way in which representatives from the New World were elected, which was inconsistent with the 1812 Constitution itself.⁸⁴ But contrary to his suggestions, the Cortes did not govern through a seizure of power akin to that which was seen in the French Revolution. In the moment, there remained great uncertainty over the fate of the

Spanish monarchs, given the reality of an incursion of French troops. The Cortes were a governing body that took up a role amid a vacuum of power in a moment of crisis. Arguably, this was a necessary action in order to coordinate a response and to consider the future of the Spanish monarchy.

But moving beyond the circumstances of the convening of the Cortes, it is surprising that Alamán did not find more to like. Much of what Alamán desired has been identified in the foregoing discussion, including the conservation and consolidation of what already existed and the desire to modernize, to develop industry, and to lay the foundations for a lasting prosperity—and to do all this while drawing on a history that properly belonged to Mexico. We can further get a sense Alamán's preferences by considering the stated goals of the Plan de Iguala, which closely mapped onto Alamán's thought.⁸⁵ What Alamán emphasized in his depiction of the Plan de Iguala were the "three guarantees" it offered: "complete political independence from Old Spain, the unity of Mexico's inhabitants without regard to European or New World origin, and the exclusive practice of Roman Catholicism as the national religion."⁸⁶ The latter two guarantees were arguably aims of the 1812 Constitution. The first guarantee is not endorsed by the 1812 Constitution, but this merely makes the Plan de Iguala appear to be the more radical of the two documents.

Politically, Alamán's critiques revolve around the extent to which he believes the Cortes seized power from the king. But this seems to be an overstatement. The diverse set of interests in the Cortes largely sought to preserve the power of the king, with relatively few restraints placed on him. The king retained significant power in the 1812 Constitution, but he was limited in the sense that to exercise the power he required the Cortes.⁸⁷ Drawing partly on Alamán's own analysis, Jaime E. Rodríguez O. identifies a consistent claim to support the rights of Fernando VII as king and to protect the Catholic faith in various revolutionary documents in Mexico.⁸⁸ The 1812 Constitution, of course, made similar assertions. Further, the Plan de Iguala in 1821 again asserts these same foundations. This suggests that the 1812 Constitution very much

was a reflection of the social and political circumstances of the day. This *was* a political evolution that was less of a radical departure than Alamán insists. That Alamán rejects the comparatively moderate transformations of the 1812 Constitution leaves him appearing more reactionary than Burkean. Had Alamán been present in Cádiz, he likely would have sided with the *serviles* and their call for a moderate constitutional monarchy, and therefore one may understand his rejection of what resulted. But at the same time, Alamán appears prepared to accept the new political realities to a greater extent than reactionaries such as Joseph de Maistre or Juan Donoso Cortés.

On religion, the gap between Alamán and what appeared in the 1812 Constitution is small. He wished for a more genuine form of spirituality as the only possible thing holding together the Mexican people “in the face of a fraying national sensibility built on endless myths.”⁸⁹ In the writings of Martínez Marina, there was no tension between liberalism and Catholicism; rather, he saw the document as uniting the two.⁹⁰ The 1812 Constitution included in it an article proclaiming the Catholic religion to be the “one true faith” and preventing the exercise of other religions. Indeed, scholars have even described the liberalism in Cádiz as a “Catholic liberalism.”⁹¹ The intent was to ensure that there was a spiritual foundation shared by all across the transatlantic Spanish nation, creating a universal sense of belonging.⁹² This is almost precisely what Alamán sought. He desired to create a sense of nationhood, grounded in religion, which would reflect “an affective condition, a matter of loyalty, community, and imagination beyond the immediate apprehension of the senses.”⁹³

Perhaps above all, the form of liberalism that was emerging in Spain and Spanish America was distinctively Hispanic, building out of its historical foundations. And while the movement toward liberal constitutionalism in the first decades of the nineteenth century was a more radical departure from the past than, for instance, the American Revolution, it would also be unfair to suggest that it contained the radicalism of the French Revolution. This was a political system that was supported by portions of the

clergy, that upheld the centrality of Catholicism, that retained the power of the monarchy, while also vesting more power in the Cortes than had existed previously. There was certainly a way to read this event as one that, from Alamán's Burkean vantage point, ought to be cheered rather than rejected.

In the end, Alamán's reaction against the 1812 Constitution seems to be discordant with political reality, not a defense of it. It was an outgrowth of a distinctively Hispanic cultural and political history, one that sought to modernize the Spanish world without deviating from what were properly Spanish elements. In describing Alamán's political conservatism in a rapidly evolving world, Van Young suggests that this designation "rests on [Alamán's] antidemocratic ideas favoring political centralism and elite rule as well as on his stance in defense of the Roman Catholic Church, albeit not an unreformed Church."⁹⁴ Strikingly, this is what the Constitution of 1812 intended to offer: the sort of political evolution that Burke endorsed elsewhere.

Alamán's example indicates the difficulty of pursuing a Burkean approach to postcolonial politics. Even when, as in the case of Alamán, there was a desire to retain much of the Spanish influence in Mexico—avoiding the "root-and-branch" rejection of the past—there is a lack of clarity in how to do that. Already by the time of Mexican independence, the political situation in Spanish America had evolved beyond that which Alamán had found to be ideal. In rejecting the Cortes of Cádiz and the vision of constitutional monarchy captured in their 1812 Constitution, Alamán rejected what he understood to be an imperfect approach. Yet in doing so, he may also have missed the best option to retain the foundations that he so highly prized. Returning to the quote that provides the title for this article, it is possible that the 1812 Constitution and its embrace of Hispanic social foundations and grounding political traditions may have provided the best, if still imperfect, vehicle for "suppressing the wicked, protecting the good and peaceful, ensuring order, strengthening military discipline, and enabling the nation to enjoy the benefits of society, primordial objective of all human institutions."⁹⁵

Notes

1. See Leopoldo Zea, *The Latin-American Mind*, trans. James H. Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 37–131.
2. Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues,” *Postcolonial Studies* 17, no. 2 (2014): 118.
3. Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 224.
4. For an interesting discussion of this dichotomy as it relates to Latin America, see Leopoldo Zea, *The Role of the Americas in History*, ed. Amy A. Oliver, trans. Sonja Karsen (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992).
5. Regarding the latter, one might consider Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Spinsters, 1987); Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
6. Quoted in Zea, *The Latin-American Mind*, 37.
7. As Joshua Simon points out, Alamán was not alone among Mexican conservatives in rejecting a Spanish past while seeking a secure independence. See, Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution: Imperialism and Independence in American and Latin American Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 148–49.
8. Juan Donoso Cortés, “Discourse on Dictatorship,” in *Readings in Political Theology*, ed. R. A. Herrera (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2007), 60–62.
9. Donoso Cortés, 63–66.
10. Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution*, 149. For Simon, this means an embrace of what he calls “creole revolutionary ideology.” But while Simon emphasizes the Burkean influence on Alamán, it is downplayed when it comes to Alamán’s navigation of the postcolonial setting.
11. See, e.g., Richard Bourke, “Edmund Burke and the Politics of Conquest,” *Modern Intellectual History* 4, no. 3 (2007): 403–32; Uday S. Mehta, “Edmund Burke on Empire, Self-Understanding, and Sympathy,” in *Empire and Modern Political Thought*, ed. Sankar Muthu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 155–83; Jennifer Pitts, “Burke and the Ends of Empire,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke*, ed. David Dwan and Christopher Insole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 145–55; Daniel I. O’Neill, *Edmund Burke and the Conservative Logic of Empire* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016).

12. E.g., Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Divine Charter: Constitutionalism and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Rodríguez O., *“We Are Now the True Spaniards”: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
13. See, e.g., Moisés González Navarro, *El pensamiento político de Lucas Alamán* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1952).
14. Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution*, 128–67; Eric Van Young, *A Life Together: Lucas Alamán and Mexico, 1792–1853* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021).
15. Alamán steadfastly denied the accusation. For more, see Van Young, *A Life Together*, 483–97.
16. The Alamán source referenced will be the English translation from José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, “Impartial Examination of the Administration of General Vice President Don Anastasio Bustamante,” in *Liberty in Mexico: Writings on Liberalism from the Early Republican Period to the Second Half of the Twentieth Century*, ed. José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, trans. Janet M. Burke and Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2012).
17. See Alamán, “Impartial Examination,” 153n2.
18. Alamán, 155.
19. Alamán, 155.
20. Much of the following draws on the characterization of Burke’s thought found in Francis P. Canavan, *The Political Reason of Edmund Burke* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960).
21. Edmund Burke, “Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs,” in *Edmund Burke on Revolution*, ed. Robert A. Smith (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 165.
22. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. L. G. Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61.
23. Burke, 59.
24. Burke, 60.
25. Burke, 61.
26. Burke, 60.
27. Burke, 60.
28. Burke, 60.
29. Burke, 64.
30. Burke, 65.
31. Burke, 157.

32. Alamán, "Impartial Examination," 151.
33. Alamán, "Impartial Examination," 152.
34. Alamán, 153.
35. Alamán, 152.
36. Alamán, 155.
37. Alamán, 155.
38. Alamán, 152.
39. Alamán, 156.
40. Alamán, 156.
41. Alamán, 156.
42. Alamán, 156.
43. Alamán, 157.
44. Alamán, 157.
45. Alamán, 157.
46. Alamán, 157.
47. Alamán, 155.
48. Alamán, 156.
49. Alamán, 163.
50. Rodríguez O., "We Are Now the True Spaniards," 69–70.
51. Quoted in Van Young, *A Life Together*, 651.
52. Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808, hasta la época presente*, 5 vols. (México: Impr. de J. M. Lara, 1849), 5:904. The English translation is provided here: Alamán, "The History of Mexico (1849–1852)," in *Nineteenth-Century Nation Building and the Latin American Intellectual Tradition: A Reader*, ed. Janet Burke and Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007), 175.
53. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 5:904.
54. Alamán, 5:903.
55. On the 1812 Constitution's place in the larger history of liberalism, see Helena Rosenblatt, *The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 62–63.
56. Alamán, "Impartial Examination," 157.
57. Alamán, 157.
58. Alamán, 175.
59. Alamán, 176.
60. Alamán, 158.
61. The 1812 Constitution was an important statement of political principles for people in the Spanish-speaking world. An English translation can

- be found in Matthew C. Mirow, *Florida's First Constitution: The Constitution of Cádiz: Introduction, Translation, and Text* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012).
62. Javier Fernández Sebastián, "Liberalismo en España (1810–1850): La construcción de un concepto y la forja de una identidad política," in *La aurora de la libertad: Los primeros liberalismos en el mundo iberoamericano*, ed. Javier Fernández Sebastián (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2012), 265.
 63. I have written previously in more detail on the political liberalism of Martínez Marina. See Brendon Westler, "Between Tradition and Revolution: The Curious Case of Francisco Martínez Marina, the Cádiz Constitution and Spanish Liberalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 76, no. 3 (2015): 393–416.
 64. Francisco Martínez Marina, "Teoría de las Cortes o grandes Juntas Nacionales de los reinos de León y Castilla," in *Obras escogidas de Don Francisco Martínez Marina*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1968).
 65. José M. Portillo Valdés, "De la Monarquía Católica a la Nación de los Católicos," *Historia y Política* 17 (2007): 30.
 66. Alicia Hernández Chávez, "From Res Publicae to Republic: The Evolution of Republicanism in Early Mexico," in *The Divine Charter: Constitutionalism and Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico*, ed. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 37–38.
 67. Hernández Chávez, 38.
 68. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 700.
 69. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 3:1.
 70. In addition to the equivocation identified in a few pages, he has some other limited positive appraisals. In the appendix to volume 5 of *Historia de Méjico*, Alamán speculates as to what would have happened had those in Mexico decided to implement a plan similar to that found in the 1812 Constitution. Would a system of government that was more liberal, better constructed, more economic, and more closely linked to the age and mentality of Mexicans be appealing? Of course it would, he writes, particularly as one cannot "further perfect a moderate monarchy." Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 5:1035.
 71. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 3:2–3.
 72. Alamán, 3:5.
 73. Alamán, 3:6.
 74. Translation in Van Young, *A Life Together*, 700–701.
 75. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 702–3.

76. Alamán, "Impartial Examination," 158.
77. González Navarro, *El penamiento político de Lucas Alamán*, 87.
78. González Navarro, 99. The Vasoconcelos text is *Bolivarismo y monroísmo: Temas iboamericanos* (Madrid: Editorial Trillas, 2011), 12.
79. González Navarro, *El penamiento político de Lucas Alamán*, 98.
80. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 685.
81. Van Young, 652.
82. Van Young, 652.
83. Van Young, 687.
84. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 5:60 (1037).
85. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 696.
86. Van Young, 681–82.
87. Alamán, *Historia de Méjico*, 3:112.
88. This included Hidalgo's plan of revolution of 1810, in the Valladolid plan of 1809, and similar proposals in 1808. Rodríguez O., "We Are Now the True Spaniards," 119.
89. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 703.
90. See Westler, "Between Tradition and Revolution," 406.
91. José Antonio Maravall, "Sobre orígenes y sentido del catolicismo liberal en España," in *Homenaje a Aranguren* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, S.A., 1972); Karl Marx, "The Disappointment of the Masses," in *Revolutionary Spain*. Accessed September 20, 2024. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1854/revolutionary-spain/ch07.htm>.
92. Rodríguez O., "We Are Now the True Spaniards," 8.
93. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 651.
94. Van Young, *A Life Together*, 703.
95. Alamán, "Impartial Examination," 163.

