

Children's Citizenship and the Built Environment

Elly Long
*Princeton University**

That civic formation is an important part of a child's upbringing is hardly controversial. Contemporary democracies have a broad interest in supporting children on the path to becoming responsible, independent, and civic-minded adults. However, there is widespread controversy about how best to pursue this goal, as seemingly intractable debates about education policy, the parent-child relationship, and morality legislation evidence. One such area of controversy is the proper *site* of children's civic formation. For some, the primary site for such formation is the family, in which it is parents who are primarily (though not exclusively) charged with the moral and civic education of their children.¹ For others, including those who worry that too strongly safeguarding parental authority might compromise the inculcation of democratic values, the state is the primary site (and public schools the primary agents) for inculcating civic-mindedness.² A key question in these debates is whether we ought to conceive of the locus of children's preparation for public life as itself primarily public or private.

The purpose of this article is to address this question in a new way—not by taking one side or another in the debate as it currently unfolds, but rather by proposing what could be an ecumenical conception of how and where children's civic formation might proceed. This ecumenical approach sets aside the current terms of

*For suggestions and encouragement at various stages, many thanks go to Richard Avramenko, Philip Bess, Fr. Irenaeus Dunlevy, O.P., Molly McGrath, Phillip Muñoz, Veronica Roberts Ogle, Christian Schmidt, and a terrific audience at the 2023 Southern Political Science Association meeting.

debate that pertain to the primary agent of children's civic formation (family vs. public authority). I conceive of the proper site of this formation rather more literally. Specifically, I consider what sort of *built environment* might be conducive to forming children in preparation for public life. Following the lead of political theorists who highlight the importance of architecture and urban planning for conceiving of and cultivating citizenship,³ I argue, first, that debates about children's citizenship ought to attend to the built environment in which children learn about public life and, second, that in doing so the partisans of children's citizenship debates can find considerable common ground.

Responding to the question of whether the locus of children's civic formation is public or private, and by appealing to literature not only in political theory but also empirical political science, sociology, and urban planning, I argue that children's civic formation can be aided by a built environment that physically intermeshes the public and private, a mixed-use environment in which sprawl is kept to a minimum and children's home and family life exists in close proximity to public life outside the home.⁴ This vision allows for greater physical embeddedness in the political community, and it is also ecumenical. Such a built environment should be appealing to advocates of *public* authority in civic formation because it allows children extensive access to the public realm and the diverse citizenry that make it up. Such a built environment should be appealing to advocates of *parental* authority because it also allows the physical presence of parents and the family in the physical public realm, enabling parental influence in children's experience of life outside the home. Finally, both sides might find such an environment appealing for providing alternatives to screentime, including more accessible outdoor play and in-person connection with nearby peers.

This argument proceeds in four parts. The first part underlines the key concerns of partisans in the civic education debates—those I will call “congruence” theorists and their critics. The second part highlights the built environment as an unexplored topic in debates about children's citizenship, but one that has been fruitful and

growing in importance in discussions of citizenship in general. Moving forward with considerations about the built environment, the third part raises concerns about single-use zoning's potential impact on children's civic formation, including the implications of car dependence and the increased screentime that often results. The fourth part proposes an alternative vision by drawing on both classic and contemporary accounts of mixed-use zoning and its benefits for children. A perhaps ironic conclusion is this: while the suburbs are often taken to be the most suitable environment for children and families, the sprawling, single-use zoning that characterizes many American suburbs (though, importantly, not suburbs *per se*) is more detrimental than often realized. Therefore, questioning conventional wisdom about suburbia may actually yield unforeseen common ground in debates about children's citizenship. While this common ground certainly does not settle our political climate's many other heated debates about children's citizenship, any sliver of agreement on these matters should be welcome, particularly on one that can have as tangible benefits in the lives of our youngest citizens as the physical environments in which they grow up.

Congruence and Its Critics

Before proceeding with an ecumenical approach to civic formation debates, it is helpful first to consider more deeply the concerns of participants in these debates. While the thinkers discussed in this essay share the broad goal of raising up children who are responsible, of good character, independent of mind, and therefore able to positively contribute to civic life, they disagree sharply about the proper path for pursuing this shared goal. Presenting these disagreements here will allow us to consider them in later discussions of the types of built environments that best address them.

First to consider are the concerns of those who advocate that state authority should inculcate democratic values, including providing exposure to diversity and fostering autonomy. I follow Nancy Rosenblum and Rita Koganzon in labeling this approach "congruence."⁵ Congruence theorists seek to minimize the incongruity in

liberal states between adult authority, which is taken to stifle children's autonomy and exposure to diverse ways of life, and children's subjection to that authority. If democratic societies exist to uphold the freedom of all, children's subjugation to their parents (and perhaps also to their parents' restrictive values) is unjustified. Greater congruence between the autonomy of adults and children is needed. Therefore, for congruence theorists, civic education is "a process through which children rehearse their future autonomy, equality and liberty ... away from the dominating influence of parents."⁶

In giving public authorities primacy in children's civic formation, congruence theorists seek to uphold or inculcate two key values: exposure to diversity and children's autonomy. The importance of these values is readily apparent in the work of two representative congruence theorists, Amy Gutmann and Stephen Macedo. For Gutmann, civic formation requires educating "all educable children to be capable of participating collectively in shaping their society."⁷ To be capable of shaping our society requires exposure to diverse forms of life as well as critical thinking skills that can question received values and aid autonomous choice. For Gutmann, public education ought to foster tolerance of diverse viewpoints and therefore cannot "restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the good society."⁸ And, at times, this civic education may even require that the state "convert children away" from the undemocratic or intolerant views of their parents.⁹

Macedo's view of education, what he terms "civic liberalism,"¹⁰ aligns with Gutmann's views in important ways. For Macedo, "the core liberal civic mission" involves "inculcating toleration" through "exposure to diversity."¹¹ Liberal openness to diversity does not arise spontaneously, so the state must engage in a "positive, transformative enterprise" that forms citizens' respect for diversity.¹² The state (through public schools) is primary in executing these efforts. Parents must recognize the necessity of ceding some authority in this formative enterprise: "Each of us can reasonably be asked to surrender some control over our own children for the

sake of reasonable common efforts to ensure that all future citizens learn the minimal prerequisites of citizenship.”¹³ This allows children to gain a greater degree of autonomy,¹⁴ and it creates critical distance from the potentially restricting views of parents and other outside influences. Attaining such distance allows children “to think critically about our inclusive political ideals” and “make[s] sure that no authority imposes an intellectual tyranny on children, which would thwart their right to freedom.”¹⁵ At the root of the congruence theorists’ accounts of civic education is a desire to instill in children the critical thinking necessary for eventual civic participation, as well as a concern that granting too broad authority to parents may undercut this mission.

Critics of congruence theorists largely agree that children’s civic preparation and the development of their critical thinking is deeply important, but these critics disagree about the proper route to achieve these aims. For them, parental authority is primary for children’s civic formation, in part because of the special status of children. These critics argue in different ways that children, unlike adults, are not yet capable of self-mastery and therefore that congruence-pursuant proposals are misguided. Civic formation requires, not immediate critical questioning of values and inculcation of autonomy, but rather the gradual development of virtue or self-mastery—a process in which the family takes the lead.

Rita Koganzon most explicitly frames her account of parental authority against logic of congruence. She defends instead a “the logic of congruence” by drawing on Locke’s and Rousseau’s early modern defenses of parental authority against the potential tyranny of public opinion. For these thinkers, preserving the liberty of an anti-authoritarian state requires considerable parental authority over children. This way, parents can protect children “from the competing and corrupting sources of authority and guide them toward self-mastery and intellectual independence, allowing them eventually to face the omnipresent social pressure of society on their own.”¹⁶ Public opinion and social pressures may easily sway children who haven’t cultivated sufficient self-mastery, so civic formation—especially formation in the family—is needed to

prepare children for a life of citizenry that can cut through these pressures.

Melissa Moschella takes a somewhat distinct approach, framing her discussion in terms of parental rights and drawing not on early modern sources but on Aristotle and Aquinas. Nevertheless, she reaches related conclusions. As Moschella reads Aristotle, ethical decision-making “is inseparable from moral virtue,” meaning that “following the dictates of reason and even being able to reason correctly about ethical matters requires disciplining one’s desires and appetites.”¹⁷ The type of autonomy-oriented civic formation proposed by congruence theorists inadequately attends to this Aristotelian insight as applied to children, whose desires and appetites are still in development. As a result, education leading children to “critically distance” themselves from the views of parental authorities does not produce autonomy so much as it fails to habituate them to the moral virtues that aid true critical thinking. The critical thinking necessary for citizenship is better inculcated, Moschella argues, by parents’ efforts to instill a moral scaffolding “that even adolescent children need to guide their still-immature practical reasoning.”¹⁸

From this brief survey, we see that one core component of these debates is whether the locus of children’s civic formation is primarily the public or private sphere. Further, arguments favoring the public sphere tend to argue in defense of the public’s role in inculcating openness to diverse forms of life as well as the autonomy to pursue these forms of life, whereas arguments favoring the private sphere tend to argue in defense of the family’s role in inculcating moral virtue as the foundation for critical thinking and living freely. While both sides hope to see children grow up to be independent and responsible contributors to democratic life, they identify different means that best assist children on this path.

Citizenship and the Built Environment

In their considerations of the public and private spheres, scholars of children’s citizenship tend not to consider the physical or architectural dimensions of the public and the private.¹⁹ Political

theorists concerned with citizenship more broadly, however, have recognized the importance of architecture and the built environment for cultivating citizens, fostering forms of association, and negotiating between the public and the private. These theorists recognize that the built environment “inevitably has a political dimension: it is deeply connected to the dynamics of association and dissociation,”²⁰ and they analyze the relationship between the built environment and politics in different ways.

Some theorists have turned to considerations of the built environment when investigating how to enable the activity of protests and “democratic performance” on a grand scale. John Parkinson, for example, notes that many “theorists of the public sphere” don’t adequately appreciate the way political procedures “depend on being ‘grounded’ in activity, performance, and physicality.”²¹ Drawing on eleven capital cities around the world, he aims to remedy this lack by discerning which spaces enable democratic performance, turning to physical sites such as spaces of deliberation in assemblies, spaces of protest, and memorials. Jan-Werner Müller echoes many of these ideas, suggesting that squares and wide streets can facilitate the democratic performance of movements and protests.²² Other theorists have examined how the built environment might foster, not large-scale democratic action, but more everyday encounters with a diverse citizenry. Susan Bickford, drawing on the work of Jane Jacobs and Richard Sennett, takes up such a task. For Bickford, the built environment can cultivate a recognition or appreciation of difference: for “literally bringing people together in a variety of ways through their daily experience makes a difference in how they think politically ... in terms of the awareness of different perspectives that must be taken into account.”²³ Whereas Bickford sets her sights on public city spaces, Nancy Rosenblum sets her sights nearer to the private sphere and the built environment surrounding the home. For Rosenblum, certain basic features of the built environment have implications for an ethic of “neighborliness” she deems an important “substrate of democracy.”²⁴ Fostering proximity to others through the built environment enables certain practices of basic decency and of

“ordinary give and take” with neighbors.²⁵ Following these theorists, I take attentiveness to the built environment to be important for considerations of citizenship generally; and extending the insights of these theorists, I take the built environment to be important for considerations of children’s citizenship specifically.

However, in response to potential objections, it is important to highlight up front the limitations of such an approach. One concern about considering the effects of the built environment on children’s civic formation is that such an approach might lapse into spatial determinism, which sees the built environment as overly influencing behavior or even as a mechanism of social engineering. Indeed, one might fairly criticize some theorists’ analyses of the effects of the spatial environment as perhaps too deterministic in this way.²⁶ One might argue, following Margaret Kohn, that having the “right” built environment is at best a partial solution to cultivating healthy practices of citizenship and that analyses of the built environment’s effects are misleading absent other considerations of political economy and broader democratic processes.²⁷

With Kohn, I agree that the built environment is far from a silver bullet for cultivating citizenship. However, this does not mean that the built environment is irrelevant for civic formation. One can acknowledge the built environment as important for fostering civic formation while at the same time recognizing its limitations. Recent work in empirical political science, for example, suggests that even the sheer fact of geographic proximity (or lack thereof) to diverse groups affects attitudes toward those groups and policies that could affect them.²⁸ Within the scope of urban-planning theory and practice, proximity is a rather minimal consideration that is, given this recent political science literature, nonetheless of considerable importance. Although limited, and though leaving other contentious matters of civic formation on the table, considerations of the built environment are nonetheless relevant.

Rosenblum relatedly argues that we need not accept spatial determinism to see that certain conditions in the built environment are especially helpful when considering citizenship and our

relations to one another. In her own account of neighborliness, she argues that “distance and boundaries are limiting conditions for the exercise of the norms of good neighbor. The soft power of neighbors ... depends on proximity.”²⁹ For Rosenblum, the ability to interact with others in proximity is a bedrock condition for cultivating healthy interpersonal dispositions and practices. Using the standard of proximity, she suggests that many “suburban areas where houses are far apart and sequestered on large lots” in which “neighbors have little or no contact day to day” do not adequately enable her vision of neighborliness.³⁰

Following Rosenblum's lead while making an argument somewhat distinct from her own, I argue here that some contemporary urban-planning practices—specifically the sprawl and single-use zoning—can curtail children's civic formation in certain important respects. A considerable urban-planning literature already enumerates the effects of sprawl on adults and children alike. What follows draws on this literature in conjunction with literature on the sociology of childhood to connect the issue of sprawl with children's civic formation specifically. If we take seriously arguments in political science suggesting that early childhood experiences affect adult civic dispositions and practices,³¹ examining the common practice of single-use zoning, which typifies much of suburbia, is clearly important for questions of children's citizenship.

Sprawl: Car- and Phone-based Childhoods

While the target of this section is single-use zoning and not suburbia itself, much of the literature in urban planning and sociology discusses single-use zoning within the context of suburbia specifically.³² Therefore, although suburban life will often be explicitly referenced here, what is said could apply just as well to urban and small-town settings characterized by single-use zoning. Further, there are of course numerous examples of healthy civic life for children in American suburbs, as classic works such as Herbert Gans's *Levittowners* and D. J. Waldie's suburban memoir *Holy Land* strikingly show.³³ My aim here is simply to describe implications that single-use zoning and its resulting sprawl have for children's

civic formation. (In this essay, “sprawl” refers to developments that typically lack in density, strongly separate residential zones from public and commercial zones, and are designed more for the ease of automobiles than for the ease of pedestrians.)

The sprawl that typifies much of America’s built environments can be thought of as a physical manifestation of some broader realities of modern family life, particularly the lives of children. As Christopher Lasch argues in his landmark *Haven in a Heartless World*, the home is often taken to be a respite from the “outside” world, psychologically as well as physically. What results is the tangible isolation of family life from the life of the public sphere. This isolation need not be taken for granted, however, but can instead be understood as “the product of human agency”—namely, planning practices prioritized by our public policy.³⁴ As legal scholars have shown, the sprawling, single-use zoning so common today was not inevitable, nor was it the simple result of market preferences. Rather, it came about as the result of tax, transportation, and housing law that facilitated sprawl and made other development patterns difficult or even illegal to achieve.³⁵ Such planning practices, and the physical separation of public and private they ingratiate, have implications for families’ and especially children’s experiences with public life outside the home and therefore for children’s civic formation. The next sections consider two of these implications: (1) the inaccessibility of the public sphere for children, largely because of our dependence on cars; and (2) the rise and effects of the phone-based childhood. Each set of implications is discussed in turn and then weighed against the concerns of the congruence theorists and congruence critics presented earlier.

Inaccessibility and “Car Hell”

As discussed, sprawl is characterized by single-use zoning, whereby public and commercial uses, on the one hand, and residential uses, on the other, are geographically separated. What tends to result are residential zones, often filled with large-lotted single-family homes, built at a driving distance away from churches, parks, restaurants, shopping, and other areas where citizens from different walks of

life might intermingle. Because of the physical separation of the home from other spheres of life, these outside spheres are largely inaccessible to those working primarily in the home, as well as to pedestrians and those without cars or otherwise unable to drive.

Feminist scholars have long bemoaned this physical separation of public and private life. Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique*, for example, catalogued the felt incompleteness of suburban women in a way partly tied to the built environment of postwar suburbs. While Friedan's work called for women's greater personal and professional actualization, it was also a call for greater incorporation into a community life from which the women Friedan interviewed were physically separated. Friedan desired for women a "sense of being complete and fully a part of the world— 'no longer an island, part of the mainland.'"³⁶ Women were not only professionally separated from the world outside the home but physically separated as well. Urban historian Dolores Hayden draws on Friedan's work, arguing that residential development ought to be rethought so that women have greater physical accessibility to the workplace and other spheres outside the home.³⁷

Turning to the case of children, one can notice a related form of physical separation and the inaccessibility of the public realm.³⁸ Many observers have commented on children's limited mobility and the inaccessibility of public life that comes with (a) single-use zoning and the physical separation of private and public coupled with (b) children's inability to drive. For example, James Howard Kunstler sees this combination of factors resulting in an unfortunate state of affairs in which "[c]hildren are stuck in [a] one-dimensional world."³⁹ On Kunstler's account, because of sprawl and its physical separation of uses, one cannot carry out ordinary life without a car. This effectively "disables" those who can't drive, including "children under the legal driving age, some elderly people, and those who cannot afford the several thousand dollars a year that it costs to keep a car."⁴⁰ For this reason, he sees children as the "biggest losers" of sprawl. Their inability to drive deprives them of the ability to independently traverse from the private to public sphere. When they leave the home for school or other activities, they do so

only without “personal sovereignty,” instead chauffeured by the parent, “usually Mom.”⁴¹

Other sociological work on the social impact of cars supports the conclusion that sprawl and its dependence on the car often renders the public realm inaccessible to children. Amy Best’s study of teen car usage in San Jose, California, is one example of this work. Best notes that the rise of the car has helped lead to a decrease in American civic life generally.⁴² The generally felt lack of public life, though, is particularly salient for children and teenagers. Because of San Jose’s lack of public transportation and the sprawling environment, “kids increasingly need cars.”⁴³ However, because kids cannot drive until the legal minimum driving age, and because many families cannot afford cars for children, the increased reliance on cars poses a problem for children’s access to life outside the home. As Best puts it,

Postponing the license essentially works to limit teens’ access to public spaces, keeping kids close to family and home. Without the means to get somewhere, wherever that where may be, teens usually spend their free time at home. But the consequence is that many young people feel stranded.⁴⁴

Because of this widespread lack of walkability and bike-ability, journalist and author Timothy Carney has recently argued, many parents and children are confined to what he terms “Car Hell.”⁴⁵ If a child’s school, friends, or activities are not easily accessible by foot or bike—as is very often the case—there is no choice but to take the car and endure the traffic and “buckling and unbuckling and re-buckling and re-unbuckling.”⁴⁶ Even though “[y]ou may live in a suburb where kids can ride their bikes safely, shout over the fence to the neighbor kids, and gather in self-organized pickup games,” these are increasingly rare and often expensive. More likely, “a kid is either being driven somewhere to some planned event by Mom or Dad, or he is sitting at home playing Roblox on the iMac.”⁴⁷ In Carney’s estimation, “Most suburban parents know Car Hell, and

any suburban parent who doesn't live in Car Hell thanks God for this."⁴⁸

Aside from the unpleasantness of Car Hell, unwalkable environments affect children by making it more difficult for them to access what have been termed "third places"⁴⁹—informal public gathering places such as parks, cafés, corner stores, and other spaces that operate as informal hubs that bring locals together outside the home and office. Ray Oldenburg, who coined the term *third place*, notes that these places usually excel at bringing together diverse groups, such as the youth and elderly as well as members of opposing political parties.⁵⁰ Elizabeth Corey makes a similar point when describing Kim's Diner, a third place she and her daughter frequent for breakfast. "At Kim's," Corey explains, "patrons are not sorted by class, race, and political outlook," and there you are "as likely to encounter someone with a face tattoo as you are to meet a perfectly coiffed society lady in her sixties." By bringing together citizens of different walks of life, a third place "facilitate[s] a kind of civil relationship."⁵¹ However, third places can do this only when they are accessible; Oldenburg himself notes they function best "within walking distance of the communities they serve."⁵² For children especially, such sites of potential civic exposure and formation are largely inaccessible if only reachable by car.⁵³

Taking these observations together, one need not be a spatial determinist to see that the physical separation of private and public, coupled with dependence on the car, creates certain barriers to children's access of the public realm.⁵⁴

Media Influence and the "Phone-based Childhood"

When the world outside the home is unwalkable and therefore largely inaccessible to children, children are more likely to stay at home.⁵⁵ Many scholars in sociology and psychology have shown that with this time at home, children turn to screens, which wield considerable influence on children's social lives, behavior patterns, and readiness for life as adults.

An older body of scholarship on television has suggested that children's limited mobility beyond the home renders them captive

audiences to child-targeted TV advertising. In her 2005 study of children's relationship to consumer culture, Juliet Schor argues that children have become a primary target of advertisers: "Children have become conduits from the consumer marketplace into the household, the link between advertisers and the family purse."⁵⁶ What results is an unprecedentedly materialistic experience of childhood in which children "are the household members with the most passionate consumer desires" whose "social worlds are increasingly constructed around consuming, as brands and products have come to determine who is 'in' or 'out,' who is hot or not, who deserves to have friends, or social status."⁵⁷ This experience of childhood marked by consumerism is also marked, so Schor shows, by depression and anxiety, even as advertisers claim to sell children freedom and empowerment through participation in the market.⁵⁸

With the advent of the smartphone, however, scholars such as Jean Twenge and Jonathan Haidt have sounded the alarm that children are even more captive to media that in turn influences their behavior, consumer or otherwise. Twenge calls those born after 1995 the "iGen," arguing that this cohort's experience of the world and themselves has been indelibly shaped by the iPhone and other technology offering unimpeded access to the internet.⁵⁹ Haidt similarly argues that this group—Gen Z and succeeding generations—is characterized by a "phone-based childhood," whereas previous generations experienced a more "play-based childhood" of outdoor, in-person experiences with peers. "[I]n the transition to phone-based childhood," Haidt explains, "the designers of smartphones, video game systems, social media, and other addictive technologies [have] lured kids into the virtual world."⁶⁰

Haidt echoes older scholarship's concerns about children stuck at home as captive audiences to targeted advertising. However, he argues these concerns are heightened by the capabilities of new technology: "The advertising-driven business model turns users into the product, to be hooked and reeled in. Personalization makes social media companies far more powerful than companies were in pre-digital ad-driven industries such as newspapers and

broadcast TV.”⁶¹ While adults are already susceptible to such advertising, children, whose cognitive capacities are still developing, are especially vulnerable.

Still, susceptibility to advertising and potentially heightened consumerism are not the only negative effects of the phone-based childhood. Many scholars have argued that the phone-based childhood has increased risks for poor mental health among children. Social media and other forms of online connection include greater pressures to conform and seek approval from others, particularly in the quantifiable forms of “likes” and “shares.” Haidt goes as far as to argue that “[s]ocial media platforms are ... *the most efficient conformity engines ever invented*.”⁶² A child's failure to attract the quantifiable approval of peers online often results in feelings of isolation and struggles with mental health, particularly in the case of girls.⁶³ Further, scholars have associated one of the features of the phone-based childhood—reduced time spent in unstructured, in-person play—with lower mental health and feelings of efficacy. Psychologist Peter Gray has argued that in-person play with peers increases children's overall sense of well-being as well as skills necessary for life as an independent adult.⁶⁴ Haidt even suggests Gray's work on free play has implications directly for civic formation: “Over time, [children engaged in play] develop the social skills necessary for life in a democratic society, including self-governance, joint decision making, and accepting the outcome when you lose a contest.”⁶⁵ When this type of play is inaccessible because of unwalk- or unbike-ability in the surrounding environment and children are therefore confined to home, they are more likely to turn in isolation to screens and thereby miss out on the mental benefits of in-person time with peers.

Children's Citizenship Concerns

Having examined the impact of single-use zoning on children, including the effects of car- and phone-based childhoods, we can now consider how the partisans of children's citizenship debates might find some common ground in their responses to these phenomena. Both congruence theorists and congruence critics

have reasons to object to the effects of sprawl and single-use zoning on children on the grounds of inadequate civic formation for children. Although each position objects for different reasons, these differences can nonetheless result in shared conclusions about the sort of built environment that may better aid children's preparation for public life.

Recall that congruence theorists such as Gutmann and Macedo are especially interested in enabling children's autonomy and exposure to diversity. In their view, children's preparation for civic participation in diverse democracies is best facilitated by exposure to one's fellow citizens and the many ways of life they inhabit. Further, exposure to different ways of life, coupled with maintaining a critical distance from the views of family, allows for the development of autonomy as a child learns to choose a way of life for themselves.

On the basis of these concerns, congruence theorists might worry that the physical inaccessibility of the public sphere associated with single-use zoning and a strict public-private separation could hamper children's exposure to diverse groups and forms of life in their day-to-day experience. Sprawl's considerable reliance on the car to connect different use zones, coupled with children's inability to drive and the unaffordability of cars for many families, means that children must spend much of their free time at home and must be chauffeured to leave home. With so much time spent at home, a congruence theorist might argue, children may be exposed to only a limited range of values. Children are unable, without the assistance of adult chauffeurs, to access the third places that might expose them to community members different from themselves, individuals they may not otherwise encounter. Further, congruence theorists may well be concerned that when children turn to screens because they cannot walk or bike through their neighborhoods, they are less likely to engage in in-person play that teaches them independence and how to get along with diverse peers in the surrounding community.

Critics of congruence such as Koganzon and Moschella, in contrast, are interested in protecting parental authority over civic

formation as well as enabling children's gradual and parent-led moral development in pursuit of eventual self-mastery. For Koganzon's early modern thinkers, parental authority is needed to shield children from the tyrannical influence of public opinion, while for Moschella's Aristotelian theory such authority is needed for the habitual development of virtue and practical reasoning.

On the basis of these concerns, congruence critics might worry that the strict physical private-public separation inhibits parental and familial influence in spheres outside the home. With such a strict private-public separation in the built environment, the family and its attendant authority is wholly relegated to the physical manifestation of the private sphere, the single-use residential zone. Further, congruence critics may reasonably worry about the effects of the phone-based childhood, including influence from the media and pressures to conform to others. Just as the congruence critics (particularly Koganzon) seek to gradually nurture children's self-mastery by militating against the disempowering influence of public opinion, so too may they wish to militate against the dominance of screens that makes children a captive audience to social media and advertisers. Perhaps unexpectedly, the home-centeredness that sprawl and "Car Hell" often result in may actually allow the infiltration of outside influences on children's decision-making. For these reasons, congruence critics may also be skeptical of sprawl, of the single-use environments that characterize much of suburbia, as the proper site of children's civic formation. While these reasons are distinct from those of the congruence theorists, the congruence critics nevertheless reach similar conclusions about the suitability of sprawl for affording children experiences to develop civic preparedness.

Therefore, while partisans of debates about children's citizenship disagree about the proper authority and content of children's civic education, they can find some common ground concerning the type of site or built environment in which such civic education ought to take place. Both congruence theorists and congruence critics have reasons to challenge the strict physical separation of private and public spheres associated with single-use-zoned sprawl.

Both sides, in other words, have been shown to share potential common ground through their opposition to certain features of sprawl. What is left to be seen is what positive vision might unite children's citizenship partisans as well. As discussed in the following, final section, such a positive vision would include not a strict public-private separation, as is the case for sprawl, but a physical intermeshing of the public and private spheres through walkable, mixed-use zoning.

Children's Citizenship in Mixed-Use Environments

This positive vision must admittedly be left somewhat undeveloped, both because the present essay is primarily one of political theory and not urban planning and because many urban-planning experts themselves recognize that no planning solution alone is a silver bullet that can ameliorate social ills.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, without falling into overconfidence in planning solutions or spatial determinism, we can sketch a general vision that addresses some shortfalls of sprawl with which congruence theorists and congruence critics would take issue.

To sketch this vision, I turn for inspiration to Jane Jacobs, herself a skeptic of overplanning and totalizing solutions in urban development.⁶⁷ The target of Jacobs's classic polemic, against which she sketched her own urban-planning vision, was not primarily suburban sprawl but "orthodox" urban-planning practices of such figures as Robert Moses, who upended traditional neighborhoods in big cities in favor of extensive highways, abstract spaces, separations of uses, and an inhumane immensity of scale. Against orthodox planning, Jacobs sketches a mixed-use vision of city life, drawing especially on the example of her beloved Greenwich Village. In Jacobs's vision, the public and the private are thoroughly intermeshed, with home and work existing in close proximity and family life taking place as much in the streets as in the home.

In her discussions of neighborhood vitality, Jacobs argues that such vitality is aided by hosting a variety of functions coupled with short blocks, allowing for ample small streets to enable encounters

and mingling among residents and visitors, unhampered by heavy traffic. For Jacobs, the “combinations or mixtures of uses, not separate uses, [are] the essential phenomena.”⁶⁸ A diversity of businesses, cultural centers, and residences in a district or neighborhood generates connectedness and continuous activity—compared, for example, with single-use business districts, which are “almost deserted by seven o’clock of an evening.”⁶⁹ And short, small streets enable casual encounters with friends and strangers who either live in the neighborhood or visit for one of its several other purposes.

Mixed-use neighborhoods of this sort, Jacobs argues, cultivate a kind of public trust among diverse neighbors and visitors who walk along the street or sidewalk. This type of trust “cannot be institutionalized.” Rather,

[t]he trust of a city street is formed over time from many, many little public sidewalk contacts. It grows out of people stopping by at the bar for a beer, getting advice from the grocer and giving advice to the newsstand man, comparing onions with other customers at the bakery and nodding hello to the two boys drinking pop on the stoop, eying the girls while waiting to be called for dinner, admonishing the children, hearing about a job from the hardware man and borrowing a dollar from the druggist, admiring the new babies and sympathizing over the way a coat faded.⁷⁰

For Jacobs, such casual yet genuine encounters are much more difficult without mixed-use zoning and the intermeshing of workplaces and residences, of public and private spheres. Further, such daily encounters are especially difficult for women and children living in single-use residential areas for whom visits to shops and parks cannot take place casually, with considerable ease, and close to home.⁷¹ Finally, the public trust of the sidewalk is difficult to achieve in an environment planned mainly around and resultingly dominated by cars.

Although Jacobs is a helpful resource for evaluating mixed-use zoning and its impact on children, two qualifications are worth noting here. First, in drawing on Jacobs, I am not advocating for city neighborhoods as the best or only viable built environment. Quite the contrary, I draw on her in the hopes that her vision of public-private intermeshing can be extended beyond the likes of Greenwich Village. After all, an intensely urban environment such as Manhattan may be neither feasible nor desirable as a homeplace for many. Jacobs has been criticized for viewing her principles as viable only in a select set of urban neighborhoods.⁷² However, others have sought to think with Jacobs against Jacobs—to apply Jacobs’s mixed-use vision in locations outside Jacobs’s own preferred set.⁷³ Indeed, many groups within the field of urban planning, such as the Congress for the New Urbanism, have advocated for mixed-use zoning as a principle for city, suburban, and small-town life alike.⁷⁴ It is in this spirit of transplantability that I draw on Jacobs in our present investigation of the built environment as an aid in children’s civic formation.

Second, thinkers across political divides have found many of Jacobs’s ideas about urban planning appealing, suggesting they may profitably be turned to in our present debate about children’s citizenship. Such liberal theorists of citizenship as Iris Marion Young have explicitly taken inspiration from Jacobs’s urban, mixed-used vision in ways that congruence theorists would likely support (as discussed further).⁷⁵ However, these urban design principles have garnered appeal from different philosophical persuasions as well. Other thinkers, such as Philip Bess, have argued for mixed-use design principles from an explicitly Aristotelian standpoint with which congruence critics (perhaps especially Moschella, an Aristotelian-Thomist) could find much in common.⁷⁶ Bess also presents a “conservative case” for these planning principles,⁷⁷ which others similarly defended in a long-running series in *The American Conservative*.⁷⁸ The wide support that mixed-use design principles have received suggest that they may have ecumenical appeal, both in general and in the debates about children’s citizenship. Turning directly to these debates, I argue in the final pages of

this essay that we can see that in Jacobs's vision of public-private intermeshing, in which family life in the home exists in close proximity to public life outside the home, there is much to like for both congruence theorists and congruence critics.

On the one hand, congruence theorists may be especially attracted to the exposure to diversity that Jacobs's vision of street life enables. For Jacobs, one implication of a diversity of uses is a diversity of users, so to speak—that is, diverse people who inhabit or visit the neighborhood for the different uses to be found there. And the small streets and reduced car traffic for which she advocates allow for ample encounters with these diverse inhabitants and visitors. In the words of Iris Marion Young, who draws on Jacobs for her own vision of citizenship, such an encounter is “heterogeneous, plural, and playful,” and Jacobs's sidewalk is “a place where people witness and appreciate diverse cultural expressions that they do not share and do not fully understand.”⁷⁹ Because congruence theorists see exposure to diversity as an important component of children's civic formation, Jacobs's vision of vibrant and diverse street life would likely be appealing. Unlike sprawling environments that render exposure to diverse forms of life outside the home rather inaccessible to children, Jacobs's mixture of uses and proximity of home to workplace and various third places render such exposure much more accessible in children's day-to-day life. A walkable, mixed-use environment of a Jacobsian sort, as opposed to a car-dependent built environment, would enable the exposure to diversity that congruence theorists see as essential to cultivating democratic dispositions in children.⁸⁰

On the other hand, congruence critics may be especially attracted to the extension of familial influence outside the home that comes with Jacobs's public-private intermeshing. In sprawling environments, the private and public spheres are harshly separated, with family life largely relegated to the private sphere. As Carney puts it, “Suburban sprawl, television, the car ... have taken something absolute crucial and wonderful—the nuclear family—and isolated it in an environment where it lacks the requisite support.”⁸¹ But in Jacobs's vision of proximity of home and life

outside the home, parental influence is extended outside the home because of the ease with which parents can traverse the physically integrated spheres of public and private. Marshall Berman celebrates Jacobs's vision as "the first fully articulated woman's view of the city since Jane Addams" because of a synthesis "at once lovingly domestic and dynamically modern."⁸² Jacobs is domestic in her "celebration of family and neighborhood" and emphasis on the importance of family life, and she is modern in her incorporation of family life into the life of the city, in which "both parents work in small and easily manageable units close to home" and "children can discover and grow into a world where there are two sexes and where work plays a central role in everyday life."⁸³ Family life (and along with it parental authority) is not restricted to the house or apartment but is similarly lively in life outside the home. Children's life outside the home can therefore be monitored and influenced by parental authority as well. Congruence critics might therefore find much to praise in Jacobs's vision of domesticity that is not restricted to the purely domestic.

Finally, both congruence theorists and congruence critics could likely be attracted to the increased availability of in-person interaction (and the reduced reliance on screens) that walkable, mixed-used environments could provide for children. As Haidt explains,

If we want children to meet each other face-to-face and interact with the real world—not just screens—the world and its inhabitants have to be accessible to them. A world designed for automobiles is often not one that children find accessible. Cities and towns can do more to be sure that they have good sidewalks, crosswalks, and traffic lights. They can install traffic calming measures, and they can change their zoning to allow more mixed-use development. When commercial, recreational, and residential establishments are more mashed up together, there is more activity on the street and more places that children can get to on foot or by bike. But when the only way for a

kid to get to a shop, park, or friend's house is by "parent taxi," more kids will end up at home on a screen.⁸⁴

The ability to access friends and third places without a car allows for increased free play of the sort Peter Gray recommends for mental and emotional flourishing.⁸⁵ Greater in-person interactions of this sort also allow for the building of what Jacob calls "public trust": "a feeling for the public identity of people, a web of public respect and trust, and a resource in time of personal or neighborhood need."⁸⁶ Such public trust and feelings of public identity militate against an overly isolated experience of self and world that screens often create. With less boundedness to the home and more integration with life outside the home, children can similarly develop greater public trust and identification with others in a shared location. Congruence theorists might see this as cultivating the greater awareness and understanding of others that their version of citizenship requires, as opposed to an individualism that detracts from such civic-mindedness. Congruence critics, meanwhile, might see this minimization of outside media influence salutary in minimizing its disempowering effects on the desires of children, which ought to be habitually directed toward virtue and self-mastery.

In sum, we do well not to conceive of the locus of children's civic formation as only either public or private, for as this essay's discussion of sprawl has suggested, such a rigid separation of public and private yields results that partisans on both sides of children's citizenship debates would likely find unacceptable. Rather, we do better to see the locus of children's civic formation in terms of a physical *integration* of the public and private spheres. Further, we can make progress in our conception of children's citizenship by turning our attention to its proper site in a literal manner, specifically by attending to the types of built environments that would be helpful for cultivating such citizenship. While congruence theorists and congruence critics hold striking disagreements regarding civic formation (which this essay has made no attempt to resolve), there is yet common ground to be found about children's citizenship and the built environment.

Notes

1. Rita Koganzon, *Liberal States, Authoritarian Families: Childhood and Education in Early Modern Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021); Melissa Moschella, *To Whom Do Children Belong? Parental Rights, Civic Education and Children's Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
2. Stephen Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
3. See, e.g., Duncan Bell and Bernardo Zacka, eds., *Political Theory and Architecture* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020); John R. Parkinson, *Democracy and Public Space: The Physical Sites of Democratic Performance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4. By "public," I here refer to spheres outside the home where fellow citizens might be encountered, among them parks, churches, shops, zoos, and other informal gathering places.
5. Nancy Rosenblum, "Democratic Families: The Logic of 'Congruence' and Political Identity," *Hofstra Law Review* 32 (2003): 145–70; Koganzon, *Liberal States, Authoritarian Families*, 6.
6. Koganzon, *Liberal States, Authoritarian Families*, 5.
7. Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 39.
8. Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 41.
9. Gutmann, *Democratic Education*, 121.
10. Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 5.
11. Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 201.
12. Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 10.
13. Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 202.
14. Macedo takes care to clarify that his commitment to autonomy does not take the form of a "comprehensive philosophy of autonomy" in which autonomy is promoted as the ideal way of life or as a comprehensive doctrine. Rather, he is committed to autonomy in a more limited sense: only that children can "make informed decisions about their future without being straitjacketed by their parents, their religious community, or anyone else." Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 208.
15. Macedo, *Diversity and Distrust*, 238.
16. Koganzon, *Liberal States, Authoritarian Families*, 11.
17. Moschella, *To Whom Do Children Belong?*, 134.
18. Moschella, *To Whom Do Children Belong?*, 142.

19. With exceptions. Elizabeth Cohen, e.g., notes that the physical location of children in the home can preclude their awareness of citizens who are different from them: "Without exposure to a world outside of the home, children may not even be aware that there are other ways of life." Elizabeth F. Cohen, "Neither Seen nor Heard: Children's Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies," *Citizenship Studies* 9, no. 2 (2005): 233.
20. Jan-Werner Müller, "What (If Anything) Is 'Democratic Architecture'?", in *Political Theory and Architecture*, ed. Duncan Bell and Bernardo Zacka (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 21–22.
21. Parkinson, *Democracy and Public Space*, 24.
22. Müller, "What (If Anything) Is 'Democratic Architecture'?", 31.
23. Susan Bickford, "Constructing Inequality: City Spaces and the Architecture of Citizenship," *Political Theory* 28, no. 3 (2000): 370.
24. Nancy L. Rosenblum, "The Soft Power of Neighbors: Proximity, Scale, and Responses to Violence," in *Political Theory and Architecture*, ed. Duncan Bell and Bernardo Zacka (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 136. For Rosenblum's fuller articulation of the ethic of neighborliness, see Nancy L. Rosenblum, *Good Neighbors: The Democracy of Everyday Life in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
25. Rosenblum, "The Soft Power of Neighbors," 136.
26. E.g., in his discussion of nonurban environments, Michael Thompson argues for a rather tight "connection between space and consciousness" whereby one's "spatial organization" shapes one's "internal sense of moral order" and "distinct attitudes and beliefs." One may reasonably doubt that urban planning and architectural practices shape fundamental belief systems this deeply, and this essay makes no attempt at such an argument. Michael J. Thompson, "What Is Antiurbanism? A Theoretical Perspective," in *Fleeing the City: Studies in the Culture and Politics of Antiurbanism*, ed. Michael J. Thompson (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 9–10, 14.
27. Margaret Kohn, "Making Superstar Cities Work: Jane Jacobs in Toronto," in *Political Theory and Architecture*, ed. Duncan Bell and Bernardo Zacka (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020), 181–96.
28. Ryan D. Enos, *The Space between Us: Social Geography and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
29. Rosenblum, "The Soft Power of Neighbors," 122.
30. Rosenblum, "The Soft Power of Neighbors," 122.
31. See, e.g., John B. Holbein, "Childhood Skill Development and Adult Political Participation," *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 3

- (2017): 572–83; Matthew Tyler and Shanto Iyengar, “Learning to Dislike Your Opponents: Political Socialization in the Era of Polarization,” *American Political Science Review* 117, no. 1 (2023): 347–54.
32. Though, notably, what counts as “suburbia” is difficult to define, with many scholars distinguishing between different forms of suburbia. E.g., Bernadette Hanlon calls for scholars to distinguish new suburbs, which lie farther from metropolitan centers and tend to display economic privilege, from older “inner-ring” suburbs, which have come upon hard times. Bernadette Hanlon, *Once the American Dream: Inner-Ring Suburbs of the Metropolitan United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010). See also Nancy A. Denton and Joseph R. Gibbons, “Twenty-First-Century Suburban Demography: Increasing Diversity yet Lingering Exclusion,” in *Social Justice in Diverse Suburbs: History, Politics, Prospects*, ed. Christopher Niedt (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013), 13–30.
 33. Herbert Gans, *The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); D. J. Waldie, *Holy Land: A Suburban Memoir* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005). For a helpful revisitation of Gans’s classic work, see Maria Kefalas, “Looking for the Lower Middle Class,” *City & Community* 6, no. 1 (2007): 63–68.
 34. Christopher Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), xx; cf. 146.
 35. See, e.g., Chad D. Emerson, “All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven Unsustainable Growth,” *Tennessee Law Review* 75, no. 3 (2008): 411–52.
 36. Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique: 50th Anniversary Edition* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013), Kindle ed. loc. 5820 of 8353. Cited in Erika Bachiochi, *The Rights of Women: Reclaiming a Lost Vision* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), 161.
 37. Dolores Hayden, *Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984).
 38. Interestingly, Cohen compares children’s confinement to the private sphere to women’s status under coverture. Cohen, “Neither Seen nor Heard,” 222.
 39. James Howard Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere: The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-Made Landscape* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 115.
 40. Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere*, 114.
 41. Kunstler, *The Geography of Nowhere*, 115.

42. Amy L. Best, *Fast Cars, Cool Rides: The Accelerating World of Youth and Their Cars* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 6.
43. Best, *Fast Cars, Cool Rides*, 119.
44. Best, *Fast Cars, Cool Rides*, 112.
45. Timothy P. Carney, *Family Unfriendly: How Our Culture Made Raising Kids Much Harder Than It Needs to Be* (New York: HarperCollins, 2024), 56.
46. Carney, *Family Unfriendly*, 57.
47. Carney, *Family Unfriendly*, 64.
48. Carney, *Family Unfriendly*, 57.
49. For the classic account of third places, see Ray Oldenburg, *The Great Good Place: Cafés, Coffee Shops, Community Centers, Beauty Parlors, General Stores, Bars, Hangouts, and How They Get You through the Day* (New York: Paragon House, 1989).
50. Ray Oldenburg, "Our Vanishing 'Third Places,'" *Planning Commissioners Journal* 25 (1996–97): 7–8.
51. Elizabeth C. Corey, "Breakfast at Kim's," *First Things*, May 2021, <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2021/05/breakfast-at-kims>.
52. Oldenburg, "Our Vanishing 'Third Places,'" 10.
53. This is especially a problem given the segregation along race and class lines that persists in many residential environments. On this subject, see Chloe N. Thurston, *At the Boundaries of Homeownership: Credit, Discrimination, and the American State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Setha Low, *Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
54. For related conclusions, see also Karen Villanueva et al., "How Far Do Children Travel from Their Homes? Exploring Children's Activity Spaces in Their Neighborhood," *Health & Place* 18, no. 2 (2012): 263–73.
55. E.g., one study finds that children who can walk or bike to a playground are six times more likely to visit it than children who must be driven there. Deborah R. Young et al., "Playground Location and Patterns of Use," *Journal of Urban Health* 100, no. 3 (2023): 504–12.
56. Juliet B. Schor, *Born to Buy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture* (New York: Scribner, 2005), 11.
57. Schor, *Born to Buy*, 11.
58. Schor, *Born to Buy*, 17. For an earlier account of advertising to children, see also Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World*, 20.
59. Jean M. Twenge, *iGen: Why Today's Super-connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy—and Completely*

- Unprepared for Adulthood—and What That Means for the Rest of Us* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017).
60. Jonathan Haidt, *The Anxious Generation: How the Great Rewiring of Childhood Is Causing an Epidemic of Mental Illness* (New York: Penguin, 2024), 51.
 61. Haidt, *The Anxious Generation*, 230.
 62. Haidt, *The Anxious Generation*, 59 (emphasis in original).
 63. Haidt, *The Anxious Generation*, 143–72.
 64. Peter Gray, David F. Lancy, and David F. Bjorklund, “Decline in Independent Activity as a Cause of Decline in Children’s Mental Well-Being: Summary of the Evidence,” *Journal of Pediatrics* 260 (2023); Rohit Mehta, Danah Henriksen, and Punya Mishra, “‘Let Children Play!’: Connecting Evolutionary Psychology and Creativity with Peter Gray,” *TechTrends* 64 (2020): 684–89.
 65. Haidt, *The Anxious Generation*, 52.
 66. Michael Sorkin, e.g., takes aim at overcircumscribed plans and “urban design’s Platonic city form.” Michael Sorkin, “The End(s) of Urban Design,” in *Urban Design*, ed. Alex Krieger and William S. Saunders (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 179. See also James S. Russell, “Privatized Lives: On the Embattled ‘Burbs,” in *Sprawl and Suburbia: A Harvard Design Magazine Reader*, ed. William S. Saunders (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 91–109.
 67. Sorkin, “The End(s) of Urban Design,” 157–59.
 68. Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Random House, 1961), 138.
 69. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 150.
 70. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.
 71. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 63.
 72. Kohn, “Making Superstar Cities Work.”
 73. Sorkin, e.g., both criticizes Jacobs’s choosiness and hints at the possibility of her broader applicability: “[Her] focus on a circumscribed set of U.S. environments and disdain for the idea of new towns unfortunately helped retard the investigation of how her unarguable ideas about the good city might inform other realizations.” Sorkin, “The End(s) of Urban Design,” 159.
 74. Congress for the New Urbanism, “Charter of the New Urbanism,” *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society* 20, no. 4 (2000): 339.
 75. While Young seeks to distance herself from the “liberal” label, I follow Tebbel in reading her politics of difference as nevertheless in essence

- a liberal theory. See Adam James Tebble, "What Is the Politics of Difference?," *Political Theory* 30, no. 2 (2002): 259–81.
76. Philip Bess, *Till We Have Built Jerusalem: Architecture, Urbanism, and the Sacred* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), xxiv.
 77. Bess, *Till We Have Built Jerusalem*, 189–92.
 78. "New Urbanism," *The American Conservative*, July 7, 2023, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/category/new-urbanism-5>.
 79. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 241.
 80. Bess, too, argues for mixed-use zoning in the name of access to greater diversity. Bess, *Till We Have Built Jerusalem*, 182.
 81. Carney, *Family Unfriendly*, 88.
 82. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 322, 323.
 83. Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air*, 323.
 84. Haidt, *The Anxious Generation*, 242.
 85. For a related point, see Lenore Skenazy, *Free-Range Kids: How Parents and Teachers Can Let Go and Let Grow* (Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass, 2021).
 86. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, 56.

