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Ambition and Its Perils in Plutarch's *Life of Caesar*

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In *his Life of Caesar*, Plutarch paints a portrait of political ambition on the grandest scale. But what he means to show with this portrait remains mysterious, for his opinion of Caesar and his understanding of Caesar's motivations are difficult to discern. Perhaps, as Jules Gleicher suggests, Plutarch intends to make a simple example of Caesar, warning of what happens when the desire to rule becomes all-consuming. Perhaps, despite recognizing Caesar's bravery and strategic brilliance, he aims primarily to criticize this "quintessentially political man" for letting "a single fundamental moral choice"—the choice always to maximize his own interests—dictate his actions.[1] If this is the case, Plutarch's portrayal of Caesar's desires reflects what Ariel Helfer describes as the contemporary conception of political ambition: "a zealous, even ruthless desire for gain or advancement . . . a willingness to misuse political power and public trust for selfish ends."[2]

I agree that Plutarch's judgment of Caesar is ultimately critical. I argue, however, that the *Life* illuminates a great complexity within Caesar's ambition. On the one hand, Plutarch shows that Caesar saw himself as his people's champion: as a hero who,

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possessed of supreme power, would use it to punish vice, reward virtue, and bring justice to those who had been unfairly denied it. On the other, he shows that Caesar held the unexamined belief that he deserved (and, therefore, must receive) constant, unparalleled honor and power in return for his service—and that his pursual of these prizes ultimately failed to benefit his people, instead occurring at their expense. Caesar refused to confront this tension, for doing so would have forced him to reevaluate the heroic self-image to which he was so deeply attached. And it was this refusal, Plutarch indicates, that led to his eventual downfall. In the *Life*, then, Plutarch invites us to consider the ambition that drives a figure like Caesar. He demonstrates that this ambition involves intense, intertwined desires to serve one's people and to benefit oneself. He demonstrates that it involves a great temptation: the temptation to believe that the good of one's people will always align with one's own, that it will always be possible to prioritize both, and that noble actions will always lead to future rewards. And he highlights the dangers of accepting this belief without reflection.

Studies have shown that ancient political thinkers such as Plato and Xenophon offer similar teachings on ambition and leadership.[3] My research, by providing evidence that Plutarch should be included in this discussion, furthers recent scholarly efforts to reestablish his works as worthy of investigation not just by classicists but also by political theorists.[4] Moreover, it puts forth a novel analysis of Caesar's ambition as described by Plutarch. Many of the existing works on Plutarch, if they do more than mention the *Life of Caesar*, focus on its style and method rather than on Plutarch's portrayal of Caesar's motivations.[5] Although two articles on the *Life*—Gleicher's aforementioned piece and another by Bradley Buszard—take up the latter theme to a significant extent, my argument diverges from each of theirs to illuminate new aspects of Plutarch's teaching.[6] Gleicher, as I have indicated, allows for a less nuanced depiction of this teaching than I do. Buszard, like Gleicher, stresses Caesar's "unrelenting lust for conquest and achievement" but treats both the *Life of Caesar* and its parallel, the *Life of Alexander*.[7] Noting that Plutarch criticizes Caesar's

ambition more harshly than Alexander's, Buszard presents a compelling reason: that Caesar resisted philosophic education—that is, he resisted the training needed to engage in difficult examination of himself and his limits—and he did so in a way that Alexander did not, which, in Plutarch's view, made him more likely to act with unthinking arrogance. But because he does not dissect Caesar's ambition, Buszard does not explain why Caesar avoided reflecting on his own desires or what problems such reflection might have exposed. I offer an explanation in this article, the bulk of which constitutes close textual analysis of key scenes in the *Life of Caesar* (with reference, usually in the footnotes, to other *Lives* and other ancient commentaries on Caesar, including those of Suetonius, Sallust, Cicero, and Caesar himself). Although a general study of ambition in the *Lives* lies beyond the scope of my discussion, this article makes some broader observations about what the *Life of Caesar*, especially in comparison with the *Life of Alexander*, can teach us about the attractions and pitfalls of supreme political power. Finally, the article concludes with some suggestions for future research.

The Rise of Caesar

The *Life of Caesar* begins unexpectedly in that the first person Plutarch mentions directly is not Caesar himself but his wife, Cornelia. Cornelia, Plutarch explains, was the daughter of Cinna, who was an important ally of the populist leader Gaius Marius.[8] When Lucius Cornelius Sulla—Marius's archenemy and champion of the elites—seized total control of Rome in 82,[9] therefore, he tried to make Caesar divorce Cornelia, not wanting someone so politically prominent to maintain such obvious connections to Marius. Yet Sulla, who had succeeded in making himself dictator of Rome, failed either to cajole or to threaten young Caesar into divorcing his wife. Clearly, Caesar could not be moved as easily as the ordinary person—but why? What gave him the strength to resist Sulla's command?

Plutarch claims that this strength stemmed from Caesar's virulent hatred of Sulla, which Plutarch traces back to Caesar's separate

connection to Marius. Marius, it turns out, was Caesar's own cousin. Although the ambitious Caesar also felt politically snubbed by Sulla—a feeling that surely contributed to his resentment—Plutarch identifies Caesar's familial solidarity as "the cause" of his hatred, suggesting that it was primarily this solidarity that allowed him to stand firm against Sulla's coercion.[10] This identification, along with the decision to mention Caesar's wife before Caesar himself, links Caesar most strongly to family affairs. Although we are not used to thinking of Caesar primarily as a family man, perhaps Plutarch is implying that by shifting our perspective, we can gain greater insights into who Caesar was as a statesman.[11]

Plutarch continues to highlight Caesar's family connections as he discusses Caesar's initial impact on his people. His first major political act, in 77, was to impeach the consul Dolabella for "misgovernment of his [Greek] district." When many of the Greeks then "supplied [Caesar] with testimony," he "repaid their goodwill" by helping them prosecute another of their politicians for corruption. Although Plutarch stresses that Caesar considered himself more of a general than an orator, he states that Caesar was "also said to be by nature the best at political speeches" and that he won widespread admiration for his "speech concerning advocacy." Moreover, after the people granted Caesar a military tribuneship in 68, his first act was to give a public address in praise of Marius's deceased wife, Julia, and his second was to show images of Marius in Julia's funeral procession. This latter act was particularly daring, since Sulla had banned all such displays after seizing the dictatorship, and some political elites disapproved of Caesar's boldness. The people, however, loudly praised Caesar, especially since he made another unconventional decision: to pronounce a funeral oration over Cornelia when she died (at that time, it was customary to give such orations for old women, but not young ones). This third untraditional deed awakened the people's sympathies "so that they were fond of him, as a man who was gentle and quite full of moral character."[12]

Caesar continued to break with custom as he honored Marius further. As Plutarch describes, Sulla's party had held complete

control of Rome since Marius's deposition, while Marius's party had been crushed and disbanded. After being elected aedile in 66, however, Caesar not only charmed the general public with a host of feasts and performances—Plutarch says he spent such large amounts of money on public works, games, and theatrical events that "each [member of the people] sought new offices and new honors with which to repay him"[13]—but also had elaborate pictures of and honors for Marius secretly placed in the Capitol one night. Upon seeing this display, some people accused Caesar of trying to make himself tyrant, since he was "setting up again honors that had been buried by laws and decrees." This flouting of the law, they argued, was meant as a test of the people's loyalty—a trial run that would reveal whether they loved Caesar enough to reject their old orders and follow his commands. The Marians, by contrast, felt safe enough to show themselves in the Capitol for the first time in years, weeping with joy and praising Caesar as "the man who was, above all others, worthy of his kinship with Marius." Although many senators expressed suspicion of Caesar, he managed to convince them that his intentions were pure, which made his supporters admire him all the more.[14]

Through this discussion, Plutarch stresses that Caesar gained support by persuading his followers that he was acting on motives higher than self-interest. First, he showed them unparalleled generosity; as Plutarch reveals, the money and entertainment Caesar lavished on his people so far eclipsed that of his predecessors that his subjects forgot everything their previous leaders had done.[15] But, second, he took a personal interest in their grievances, often addressing them at political risk to himself. By showing the same kind of familial solidarity to his people that he showed to his wife, Caesar convinced them that he primarily cared, not about his own advancement, but about their good.

From the beginning of the *Life*, however, Plutarch prompts his readers to wonder whether Caesar's devotees were correct in this belief. As the narrative unfolds, Plutarch describes Caesar's ascent to high priest in 63 and praetor in 62. After being given command of Spain, Caesar traveled there with his army, conquering hostile

tribes, establishing peace among warring cities, and enriching himself, his troops, and Rome. These deeds secured for Caesar the highest office in the land: the consulship. As soon as he returned to Rome in 59, therefore, Caesar "took on an act of administration that deceived everyone except Cato": He ended the ongoing feud between Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful men in the city.[16] By reconciling them and using their combined influence for his own gain, Caesar, "by an act that could be called one of humane kindness, got away with changing the government unnoticed." At this point in the narrative, Plutarch makes a rare, explicit statement of his own opinion, underscoring the ultimate harm caused by Caesar's actions. He says that although most people think the eventual enmity of Caesar and Pompey caused the civil wars that later occurred between their opposing factions, these wars had an earlier catalyst: the statesmen's friendship. Initiating this friendship helped Caesar depose the existing aristocracy, which gave him and Pompey total authority—an authority that neither statesman would ultimately be content to share.[17] Although Caesar's quiet revolution "could be called" an act of kindness to the people, then, Plutarch clearly signals that it was not really one. He signals that, in fact, it set the stage for the horrors of civil war, despite how it may have seemed to the people in the moment.[18]

But, in the moment, it seemed spectacular to them, for Caesar instantly "proposed laws that were fitting not for a consul but for a most overbold tribune of the people," stating his intention to distribute land to the plebeians at a generous rate. The other senators' opposition to these measures, Plutarch says, gave Caesar "the motive he had long needed" to bypass them and appeal straight to the people for support. Leaving the senate building, Caesar affected to throw himself on the people's mercy, telling them the hubris and harshness of the senators had driven him there. With Crassus on one side of him and Pompey on the other, he asked the plebeians if they approved of his laws. When they said they did, he exhorted them to support him against his opponents, which they vowed to do. This incident constituted Caesar's first direct petition to the people at the expense of the nobles, and understandably, the

former were thrilled, while the latter were deeply worried.[19] What dark intentions, they wondered, lay behind Caesar's enchanting words?

The Caesar Effect

It is certainly possible to attribute dark intentions to Caesar, for from the beginning of the book Plutarch highlights his craving for unparalleled honor. One expression of this craving arose soon after Caesar withstood Sulla's injunction to divorce Cornelia. When Caesar learned that Sulla, out of resentment and fear, was contemplating having him killed, he went into hiding. During this time, he traveled around the country and eventually got captured by pirates. These pirates, not knowing who he was, commanded him to pay twenty talents for his freedom. Caesar, laughing in their faces, said he would give them fifty. Here, Plutarch shows Caesar exhibiting great pride in his status and in his name, as well as a desire to demonstrate the magnificent unconcern for money that would make that status clear.[20]

While waiting for his men to secure the ransom, Caesar also showed a magnificent unconcern for whatever threat the pirates might pose to him. He told them to be quiet when he wanted to sleep, exercised with them, and read them poems and speeches of his own invention. If the pirates did not marvel at these writings, Caesar called them "uneducated barbarians" and, laughing again, threatened to hang them. The pirates were taken with him, assuming he talked this way out of "a certain simplicity and childishness." But when the ransom came through, Caesar took immediate action against the pirates, imprisoning them, securing their money, and eventually crucifying them all, "just as he had told them beforehand on the island [that he would do], seeming to be joking."[21]

This chilling incident reveals much about Caesar's character. First, he was not at all fearful; he seemed confident that he would not be harmed, though what exactly he thought would protect him—his fame, his men, his own strength and wit, or a combination of these things—was unclear. Second, he believed he was owed a large measure of honor, and he would not hesitate to

retaliate against those who refused to give it to him. Despite his playful manner, he was deadly serious about what he thought he deserved.

Plutarch builds on these implications with another anecdote about Caesar's Spanish campaign. While crossing the Alps, the men passed a "small barbarian town." The soldiers mocked this town, sarcastically asking whether the grand kinds of political contests that occurred in Rome could possibly occur here. Caesar, "being serious," replied, "I would rather be first among these people than second among the Romans." Just as with the pirates, Caesar was not joking, and this time, he was not even pretending to joke; he saw his abilities and his status as too gravely important for that. Later on in the journey, he grew even more solemn, astonishing his men by bursting into tears while reading the history of Alexander the Great. When the soldiers asked Caesar why he was crying, he replied, "Does it not seem to you to be worthy of grief that while Alexander, when he was at such an age, was already ruling so many, nothing so brilliant has yet been done by me?" Here, Caesar not only refused to laugh at himself but also bewailed his situation.[22] Building on the scene with the pirates, Plutarch now shows more clearly how deeply Caesar desired excellence and recognition. He shows Caesar feeling these desires so intensely that they sometimes rendered him unable to control his emotions, even before men whose respect he surely prized.

Such stories amplified the suspicions of Caesar's fellow nobles, many of whom were refusing to accompany him to senate meetings by the time he returned from Spain. But Plutarch says that when Caesar embarked on his Gallic campaigns in 58, it was "as if he had seized upon another beginning and entered onto some other path of life and new deeds." This statement is noteworthy, for it is somewhat of a "new beginning" for Plutarch as well: Suddenly, he begins to praise Caesar more lavishly than before. He suggests that Caesar was a better soldier and general than any of those who preceded him, at least among the Romans: He claims Caesar's military achievements eclipsed those of men like Scipio, Sulla, Marius, and "even Pompey himself," emphasizing that Caesar not only fought

more battles, killed more and stronger enemies, and acquired more land but also showed more "reasonableness and mildness" toward his prisoners and more generosity toward his own men.[23] Soldiers who seemed ordinary or lackluster under other commanders became "irresistible" under Caesar, inspired to fight boldly both by his example and by pride in the army as a whole. Plutarch gives a few examples of these soldiers, but one in particular is striking: the example of Granius Petro, who got captured by Scipio while sailing a ship of Caesar's around Africa. After executing Granius's men, Scipio offered to spare Granius himself, "but Granius, saying that it was the custom with Caesar's soldiers not to receive but to give deliverance, killed himself with a blow of his sword."[24]

This was the kind of "purpose and love of honor" that Plutarch says "Caesar himself stirred up and cultivated" within his soldiers. Caesar was able to do so, first, because he rewarded them in an "unsparing" and just way, showing that he was not trying to enrich himself through his conquests but that he used the money "as a common prize for manly virtue . . . and that he had as great a share in the wealth as he gave to the deserving among his soldiers." Caesar also entered into every danger that his men had to face and undertook every difficult task that his men had to bear. As Lucas de Blois puts it, Caesar "shared their exertions, and cared for their well-being. . . . His style of leadership, personal and from the front, and his willingness, when necessary, to expose himself to danger must have impressed them."[25] Plutarch explains that Caesar's "love of danger" did not surprise his soldiers, since they were well aware of his "love of honor"; his ability to shoulder great physical burdens, however, astonished them, since he was a slender man with various health problems. Yet, despite these problems, Caesar was able to push himself "beyond his body's power." He exercised constantly, excelled at horsemanship, and almost always confined his periods of sleep to times when he and his men were traveling. Even when he was resting, Caesar stayed in motion.[26]

These descriptions of Caesar the general—and, as we recall, he thought of himself as a general first and a politician second—reveal more about his character and his effect on others. With the pirates,

we saw Caesar punishing those who did not give him the honor he thought he deserved. Now, we continue to see Caesar craving that honor so much that he regularly reached beyond his physical limits in order to win it. This capacity made him appear more than human, able to transcend the needs and weaknesses of his body to the extent that they almost did not matter. Caesar's desire for honor also drove him to transcend—or at least push aside—the fears that most people would feel upon entering a battle. Moreover, Plutarch does not say Caesar was simply indifferent to danger; he says he loved it and, by stating that his soldiers "were not amazed at his love of danger because of his love of honor,"[27] suggests that the former stemmed from the latter.[28] For Caesar, risking his life in battle was a clear way to gain what he so deeply desired.

As Caesar demonstrated during his Spanish campaign, he longed to be "first"[29]—to win victories that would establish him as an unquestionable conqueror. The battlefield, where feats of unparalleled courage would undoubtedly rocket Caesar to the top, offered ample opportunity for such advancement. But although his constant conquests and exhibitions of bravery elicited awe from his soldiers and fear from his foes, Caesar inspired more than fear or even awe in these people. He made them want to lose themselves in service to the noble cause that, in their eyes, he symbolized. He made them want to emulate his courage and magnanimity. And with the attention he paid to their benefit, he awakened in them a grateful hope that he would consistently reward those virtues.[30] Caesar awakened this hope by convincing his followers, through his generosity, self-denial, and acknowledgment of the deserving, that selfishness and bias would never cloud his judgment—even concerning those who fought against him. In the words of Suetonius, "He judged his men by their fighting record, not by their morals or social position," and "Caesar loved his men dearly. . . . By these means he won the devotion of his men as well as making them extraordinarily brave."[31] When Caesar's people saw him defying established laws, they believed he was doing so, not out of willfulness or greed, but out of deference to a higher and more personal standard of justice than those laws could approximate.

This belief held even when, in 49, Caesar made his most shocking move yet: crossing the Rubicon in an effort to triumph over Pompey and achieve sole power over Rome. Plutarch writes that after Caesar crossed the Rubicon, it was as if "the laws of the city were confounded together with the boundaries of the district." The upheaval was so great that it did not merely seem that people were hurrying through the streets; it seemed that the cities themselves had risen from the earth and were running back and forth. People were no longer "easily obeying a leader or listening to reason," for "conflicting passions and violent uproars prevailed everywhere." Some were rejoicing in Caesar's takeover, while others, including Pompey, were seized with an all-pervasive fear. Although his army outnumbered Caesar's, Pompey had now lost his fellow citizens' trust, and terrified and confused, he deserted Rome and ordered the senate to follow him. The consuls and most of the senators, therefore, also fled the city "without even having sacrificed, which is the custom before departure," haphazardly grabbing whatever they could find of their belongings. Even some of Caesar's supporters in the senate, who approved of his actions, took leave of their senses in the moment and went with Pompey.[32]

Caesar did not hesitate to take advantage of the turmoil he had created. As he marched to Rome, he commandeered every one of Pompey's levies he could find. It did not take him long to build up an army that he deemed strong enough to attack Pompey himself, but Pompey, unwilling to face Caesar, sailed away from Rome before Caesar could overtake him. Since Caesar had no ships with which to pursue his rival, "he turned back to Rome, having in sixty days and without bloodshed become master of all Italy."[33]

Caesar the Benefactor

Although Caesar shed no blood during his takeover, he readily demonstrated his willingness to do so during the first moments of his rule. He did speak to the remaining senators in a "reasonable and affable manner," even asking them to begin the process of reaching a settlement with Pompey. Yet Caesar's agreeable tone fell on deaf ears, either because the senators still feared Pompey or

because they doubted that Caesar meant what he said.[34] When the tribune Metellus tried to stop Caesar from accessing the city's reserve funds, therefore, Caesar assumed a more aggressive air. Metellus claimed that taking money from these funds was illegal, and Caesar replied that "arms and laws have not the same season":

> But if you have a difficulty with what is being done, get out of the way now, for war has no need of free speech; but when I, having come to an agreement, lay down my arms, then, being ready, you will lead the people. And I say these things surrendering my own just rights; for you are mine, both you and all those of the factions against me whom I have captured.[35]

Caesar then ordered the treasury door to be broken down. Once again Metellus tried to stop him, and this time Caesar threatened to kill him, saying Metellus had to recognize that "it is more troublesome for me to say it than to do it." Hearing these ominous words, Metellus finally departed in fear, and no one else opposed Caesar in his preparations for the fight against Pompey.[36]

Caesar's speech to Metellus is striking and complicated. At first, he indicated that during this crucial time, he had purposely cast law aside. He implied that at this moment, his power was total and his judgments regarding each situation were final. When he needed to enforce them, he would do so, not by appealing to established law, but by referring to the armies that he could mobilize at whatever time and for whatever reason he liked. When viewed alongside Plutarch's description of Rome after Caesar crossed the Rubicon, this part of the speech shows how he demolished the laws such that chaos reigned—a chaos that, it seemed, only Caesar himself could mitigate.

For Caesar also told Metellus that "arms and laws have not the same season"—suggesting that he would eventually restore some sort of law—and acknowledged that he would give up "just rights" of his own in sparing Metellus. Now, it could be argued that these words were strategic, meant to placate Metellus and the others and

to trick them into thinking Caesar was still law-abiding at heart. It seems unlikely, however, that Caesar would have felt the need for such measures now that "you are mine, both you and all those of the factions against me whom I have captured." The power was unquestionably his, and, as he demonstrated, threatening his opponents with force had proved more than effective. It seems more plausible, then, that Caesar really did believe he was relying on that force only for now. He believed he had "just rights" that he was surrendering in this hour of need, which means he had some conception of a standard of right. In other words, Caesar indicated here that in seizing Rome, he had an end in mind besides the mere accumulation of more power: the creation of a new order that, precisely because it came from Caesar himself, would accord more fully than the old one with the requirements of what he thought was true justice.

In the next phase of his rule, Caesar did seem more focused on the justice he could enact than on anything else. Having secured the money he required, he traveled to Spain, where he subdued all the armies and provinces that Pompey had previously held.[37] Caesar was subsequently made dictator by the senate, during which time he recalled exiles to Rome, returned civic rights to the children of those whom Sulla had punished, forgave many people's debts, and performed "a few other administrative acts of such a sort." During the eleven days of his dictatorship, therefore, all Caesar's notable deeds must have been seen by those who benefited from them as restorative justice. Moreover, though enough years had passed since Sulla's reign that the children of those he had harmed were now adults—and Caesar had gained enough power and support that he had surely stopped needing the Marians—the old indignation at Sulla clearly still lingered in Caesar's heart, driving him to keep bestowing on Sulla's victims the justice that, he felt, they had been unfairly denied. Having used his stint as dictator to implement these acts of retribution and to help the downtrodden, Caesar then relinquished sole power temporarily in order to continue his campaign against Pompey.[38]

After a long and difficult fight, he won this war.[39] Yet Caesar did not gloat over his victory or use force against those he had conquered—quite the opposite. When he was presented with the head and seal-ring of Pompey, who had fled to Egypt and been killed there after realizing he had lost, Caesar accepted the ring, but he turned away from the head in affliction. He cried over the ring, then extended kindness and favors to all the friends of Pompey whom he had captured. As Plutarch relates, Caesar then wrote to his friends in Rome that "he would enjoy this greatest and most pleasant thing from his victory, always to save those of the citizens who had fought against him."[40] He made a similar statement upon hearing that one of his greatest political enemies, Cato, had committed suicide after realizing how great Caesar's power had grown: "Cato, I begrudge you your death; for you also begrudged me your deliverance."[41]

With these anecdotes, Plutarch continues to reveal the complexity of Caesar's ambition. For Caesar, gaining the best possible victory over Cato did not mean simply conquering him; it meant conquering him and then magnanimously saving him, thereby earning his undying gratitude. His crying over Pompey may indicate that Caesar felt the same way about him—that he recognized, with bitter frustration, the missed opportunity to make his archenemy feel obligated to him for the rest of his life. For it was Pompey's death that prompted Caesar to tell his friends that the "greatest and most pleasant thing" he derived from victory was not the power he gained or the money he collected but the feeling he got from relenting toward the people he had conquered, rewarding them for their courage rather than punishing them for their inability to win. Plutarch's descriptions suggest that Caesar craved what his vanquished adversaries, who were not expecting to be saved, would surely give him: overflowing, admiring gratitude for his beneficence.[42]

Another telling passage, in directly preceding Caesar's final battles with Pompey, may also shed light on Caesar's emotional reaction to Pompey's death. In this anecdote, Plutarch shows Caesar contending with a violent storm off the coast of Brundisium,

which he was trying to reach by boat. The captain of the boat, unable to make headway, ordered the sailors to turn around. But Caesar took the man by the hand and said, "Come, noble man, be bold and fear nothing; you carry Caesar and Caesar's fortune, sailing together." Although these words inspired the sailors to forget the storm and try even harder, the weather ultimately made it impossible for them to follow Caesar's command, and he was forced "very unwillingly" to admit that the captain had been right.[43]

With this story, Plutarch continues to highlight a characteristic of Caesar that first appeared in the scenes with the pirates: the overweening confidence that, despite great adversity, he would somehow be protected. This confidence allowed him to face danger after danger tirelessly in the fight against Pompey, pushing himself and his men so hard that they began to resent him. They wondered if Caesar would ever realize that he "command[ed] mortals," grumbling that "it is not possible even for a god to constrain the season of winter and the occasion of a wind at sea; but this man takes risks just as if he were not pursuing enemies but fleeing."[44] Caesar had no problem believing that he could make his soldiers transcend not only their physical limits but also the limits nature imposed on their expedition.

As the scene in the storm shows, of course, "Caesar's fortune" was not as certain as he thought; no higher power ended up changing the forces of nature to help him.[45] Caesar may have felt, however, that the risks he was taking gave him the right not only to honor and gratitude but also to security. As Cassius Dio writes about this event in his *Roman History*, "Indeed [Caesar] had such great spirit and such great hope, either from some prophetic power or otherwise, that he felt firm trust in his safety, even against appearances."[46] Perhaps he trusted that for someone as admirable and deserving as he believed himself to be, it was not really possible to fail. And perhaps part of his sadness over Pompey's death lay in its evidence that although Pompey, like Caesar, had been notably courageous and generous to his people, those virtues had not been enough to save him in the end. If Caesar had some awareness of the fact that courage and magnanimity do not guarantee security,

he surely did not want to confront it outright; it might be called one of the intangible "enemies" that he fled by pursuing his tangible ones in ever more daring ways. Here, Plutarch implies that Caesar's tremendous confidence—the confidence that was so dazzlingly inspiring to his people—rested on grounds that were shakier than they appeared.

The Decline of Caesar

And, soon enough, Caesar began to make it harder for himself to maintain his cherished position. After fighting a war in Egypt, he made another expedition into Spain against the sons of Pompey, who were now threatening him with large armies. This war was the last one that Caesar undertook and, of course, won—but his triumph "grieved the Romans as nothing else had done." All Caesar's other triumphs had commemorated his defeats of kings and generals from other countries, but this one commemorated his destruction of the sons of someone who, despite his defeat and ignominious death, had been one of Rome's foremost citizens. It was ignoble, the Romans thought, for Caesar to celebrate such a deed, "glorying in things whose one defense before both gods and men was that they had been done out of necessity."[47] At this point, Plutarch is no longer saying the nobles had one opinion of Caesar while the people had another; he simply says "the Romans" were beginning to distrust Caesar, implying that he had gone too far even for his own followers. This moment therefore marked the turning point of Caesar's career.

What made the people, who had looked on so many of Caesar's shocking actions with such great favor, start to change their opinion of him now? As Plutarch says, they could see no justification for Caesar's conquering of Pompey's sons except that it "had been done out of necessity." Plutarch thus reemphasizes that until now, Caesar's supporters had seen him as noble—as someone whose deeds, both despite and because of their unlawfulness, had had a legitimate "defense before both gods and men": the defense that Caesar, in prizing the good of his subjects above his own, was acting in accordance with a higher moral standard. Yet, as Caesar's

conquests multiplied to include more of his own countrymen, the people began to suspect that his seemingly noble deeds were, at bottom, nothing more than necessary tactics to expand and secure his power. And it was true that Caesar, now dictator for life, had long stopped being accountable to anyone else; his reign, says Plutarch, "was admittedly a tyranny."[48]

At the same time, Plutarch claims that after being appointed dictator for life, Caesar "showed himself blameless" and that "at any rate, it does not seem unreasonable that the temple of Clemency was voted a thank-offering on account of his gentleness." In his usual fashion, Caesar pardoned many of his opponents and even granted honors and titles to some of them. He gave feasts and grain to the people, colonies to his soldiers, and promises of further honors and titles to the other nobles. Caesar even ordered the old statues of Pompey, which had been torn down after his defeat, to be reerected.[49] As Plutarch states, he "aroused hope in all" with his generosity and his promises, "since he ardently desired to rule over willing subjects."[50] Yet Plutarch also reveals that Cicero, upon hearing of Caesar's order, said that "having set up Pompey's statues Caesar maintained his own."[51] Plutarch thereby returns to the question of what ultimately motivated Caesar's constant beneficence.

Plutarch goes on to say that Caesar practiced this beneficence in order "to surround himself with goodwill as the noblest *and at the same time* the securest safeguard."[52] With this remark, Plutarch makes his most explicit suggestion yet that the desires for noble action and personal gain were intertwined in Caesar's heart.[53] As Plutarch has indicated, Caesar saw himself as his people's champion: He often risked his life for Rome, and he took many political risks as well, defying established law to create what he thought was a more just order for his subjects. He sought to demonstrate perpetual magnanimity, for he wanted his people to obey him, not out of fear, but out of thankful love. Yet Caesar also believed his deeds merited security: safety from harm and even death, as well as the honor that would secure for him the status he craved. Caesar longed to be "first,"[54] and he could not stand the thought of

relinquishing or sharing that position. And, as Plutarch has also indicated, the fulfillment of this desire was coming more and more frequently at his people's expense.

Plutarch shows that Caesar, entranced by his heroic vision of himself, avoided facing the fact that his people's good could conflict with his own—and asking whose good he would prioritize when it did. The clearest instance of this avoidance occurred right before Caesar's crucial crossing of the Rubicon. This moment, Plutarch demonstrates, was not an easy one for Caesar. He lingered for a long time at the riverbank, debating within himself and changing his decision with every passing minute. He also discussed his confusions with his friends, "considering what great evils the crossing would lead to for all human beings, and how great an account of it they would leave to posterity." This is, in fact, the one scene in the *Life* in which Plutarch shows Caesar not only reflecting on something for a sustained period of time but also relating his thoughts to others to solicit their opinions. Yet it was after this last point—the consideration of how great and lasting their fame would be—that Caesar abandoned all reflection, suddenly acting "with a certain spirit, as if casting himself out of reasoning toward the future." He said, "Let the die be cast"—the phrase with which, Plutarch claims, people usually prefaced "their embarking into difficult and daring fortunes"—and quickly crossed the Rubicon, riding at full speed into the city of Ariminum in order to defeat Pompey and complete his conquest of Rome.

At the end of this description, Plutarch presents an arresting anecdote: that on the night before crossing the river, Caesar had the "unlawful dream" that he was having incestuous relations with his mother.[55] As Bernadotte Perrin and Frederick Brenk note, Plutarch diverges from his historical predecessors, Suetonius and Dio, by placing the dream here rather than during Caesar's quaestorship in Spain in 67, almost two decades before the crossing of the Rubicon in 49.[56] Brenk suggests that this deviation allows Plutarch to "dispense with the sole, propitious interpretation given [the dream] by Suetonius and Dio—mastery over one's country."[57] Although this interpretation is still "possible," Plutarch's new

placement opens up another possibility: that the dream represented not only Caesar's intense desire for mastery over his country but also his misgivings about what that desire might cause. In Plutarch's telling, Caesar did momentarily recognize that his ascent to supreme power, which involved a shattering of long-held conventions, could harm his people. This recognition deeply disturbed him, for it conflicted with his view of himself as his people's hero. And Caesar, who did not want such a conflict to exist, could not live with this disturbance. Refusing to let himself reflect further, he charged forward, eternal glory at the forefront of his mind.[58]

Plutarch shows that Caesar paid a high price for this refusal. Once he became dictator for life, the incompatibility of his own good and his people's grew clearer with each passing day. Plutarch writes, "His *eros* for the kingship produced the most manifest and deadly hatred toward him." For the people, this *eros*—this longing so intense that it could be described as love—was a "first cause" of hatred; as we have seen, most of them had wholeheartedly supported Caesar until now, when they began to wonder if selfish motives lurked behind his generous deeds. For others who had been waiting for a reason to oust Caesar, this was it. Yet there were still some who wanted to hail Caesar as king and who tried to find omens suggesting that they should. This behavior, Plutarch relates, "grieved" Caesar, indicating that although he clearly desired and held sole power, the title of king, with all the grim connotations it carried in republican Rome, still bothered Caesar more than it attracted him.[59] Plutarch suggests that Caesar did not see himself as the kind of king the Romans abhorred—that he still imagined himself, not as a tyrant, but as a noble and heroic leader.[60] His efforts to resist being called king, however, were not enough to placate the now-suspicious people, who eventually "turned toward Marcus Brutus" and his fellow conspirators. According to Plutarch, some writers say that when Caesar was finally assassinated, he fell against Pompey's statue and soaked it with his blood, making Pompey seem victorious over his old rival.[61]

Conclusions

This dramatic death notwithstanding, it initially seems that the conspirators did Caesar more of a favor than a disservice. Plutarch relates that Caesar's murder filled both the senators and the people with "confusion and helpless fear," not with satisfaction. In an attempt to lessen the turmoil and mollify everyone, the senators voted not only to distribute prizes to Brutus and his men but also to grant Caesar divine honors. When it transpired that Caesar had left each Roman citizen a generous gift in his will, however—and when the people caught sight of Caesar's mangled body—they "no longer held themselves to order or discipline," building bonfires in the forum and vowing to burn down the houses of the conspirators.[62] In death, Caesar attained the status of both a god and a martyr. His murder, combined with his final act of beneficence, reawakened the honor and gratitude of the previously wavering people.

Yet Plutarch goes on to suggest that there was still something lacking in Caesar's accomplishments. He writes that "of the power and domination that he pursued all his life through such great dangers, and barely achieved, of this he reaped no fruit but the name only, and a glory looked upon with envy by the citizens."[63] With this statement, Plutarch makes the honor that Caesar garnered, even after his death, seem hollow—entailing a great reputation, to be sure, but one that brought its possessor no real reward. As Plutarch has shown, however, Caesar believed there was much more to that reputation than an empty name. He thought the generosity and courage that brought him such honor would establish him as the champion of willing, loyal subjects. He thought these virtues would protect him from harm and lodge him securely at the height of supreme power. And he was unwilling to confront the problems with his heroic vision of himself, as well as the fact that his virtues could not guarantee his safety. Plutarch therefore highlights not only the ephemerality of the goods Caesar craved but also the resistance to self-examination and, more specifically, to the examination of his own limits that kept him from recognizing their true character.

It is difficult not to associate this resistance with Caesar's lack of interest in philosophy, especially when viewing the *Life of Caesar* in light of its parallel, the *Life of Alexander*. Plutarch does, of course, identify key similarities between the two rulers, discussing Alexander's desires to surpass others in beneficence and to reward the deserving,[64] his impulse to face ever-greater dangers for the sake of his kingdom,[65] and his belief that his noble deeds merited protection and unparalleled honor.[66] As Plutarch writes, "Being ambitious to overpower fortune through boldness and might through excellence, he supposed nothing unattainable for the daring and nothing secure for the cowardly."[67] Yet Plutarch indicates that this belief exerted less of a hold over Alexander than it did over Caesar. He claims that although Alexander sometimes played on ideas about his divine lineage for political purposes, "it is clear that he was neither affected nor deluded . . . by the belief in his divinity."[68] By contrast, he was "very affected," during a Persian campaign, by the inscription on Cyrus the Great's tomb—which read, in part, "I am Cyrus, who procured for the Persians their empire. So do not begrudge me this little earth that covers my body"—because it made him recall the role of "uncertainty and change" in human affairs.[69] Plutarch also shows Alexander, on an earlier expedition to Persia, "keeping silent and deliberating with himself for a long time" before a statue of Xerxes, debating whether his ambition led to more good or ill.[70] Like Caesar, Alexander lacked a full understanding of his own limitations; but unlike Caesar, Alexander showed some willingness to reflect on those limitations and, in turn, on the dangers of letting ambition supersede reflection entirely. As Buszard suggests, Alexander's attraction to philosophy may have had something to do with this, for Plutarch often stresses both this attraction and Alexander's admiration for his teacher, Aristotle (as well as other Greek thinkers like Homer and Diogenes).[71] Conversely, Plutarch never even hints at a similar inclination in Caesar.[72] Through this comparison, then, Plutarch reemphasizes the crucial role of self-reflection in illuminating the tensions within grand political ambition, tempering its excesses, and creating a more prudent and deliberate leadership. And he

must find this theme worthy of great attention, since the *Alexander-Caesar* pairing is his longest one.

I argue that by focusing in such detail on the temptations and problems of political ambition, Plutarch presents a serious political teaching in the *Life of Caesar*, one that becomes even clearer when the *Life* is taken together with its parallel. At the same time, I recognize that further research is needed to elucidate the portrayal of ambition in the *Life of Alexander* and to elaborate on the theme of ambition in the *Alexander-Caesar* pairing. Moreover, much work remains to be done on this theme as it appears in the *Lives* overall. Given Plutarch's evident interest in examining the attractions and pitfalls of supreme political power, additional studies of ambition in the *Lives*—studies that explore both Plutarch's portraits of leaders who, like Caesar, craved unrivaled honor and those of leaders who did not—are necessary. With the increase of such scholarship will come a better understanding not only of Plutarch's teachings on ambition and leadership in each *Life* but also of his political thought as a whole.

Notes

1. Jules Gleicher, "On Plutarch's *Life of Caesar*," *Interpretation* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 265–81, see esp. 265 and 278.
2. Ariel Helfer, *Socrates and Alcibiades: Plato's Drama of Political Ambition and Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Penn UP, 2017), 1.
3. See, e.g., Helfer, *Socrates and Alcibiades*; Robert Faulkner, *The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2007); Lorraine Smith Pangle, "Xenophon on the Psychology of Supreme Political Ambition," *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 2 (February 2017): 308–21; Robert C. Bartlett, "How to Rule the World: An Introduction to Xenophon's *The Education of Cyrus*," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 1 (February 2015): 143–54; and Dana Stauffer, "The Education Cyrus Missed," *Political Research Quarterly* 76, no. 2 (2023): 814–24.
4. See, e.g., Hugh Liebert, *Plutarch's Politics: Between City and Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2016); and Clyde Ray, *Defining Statesmanship: A Comparative Political Theory Analysis* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).

5. For examples of works that reference the *Life of Caesar* only in passing, see Philip A. Stadter, "The Proems of Plutarch's *Lives*," *Illinois Classical Studies* 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 275–95; T. E. Duff, *Plutarch's "Lives": Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999); Christopher Pelling, "Do Plutarch's Politicians Never Learn?," in *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works, Volume I*, ed. Lukas de Blois et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87–105; Christopher Pelling, "What Is Popular About Plutarch's 'Popular Philosophy'?," and Philip A. Stadter, "Competition and Its Costs: φιλονικία in Plutarch's Society and Heroes," in *Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics*, ed. Geert Roskam and Luc Van Der Stockt (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven UP, 2011), 41–59 and 237–59 respectively; and Liebert, *Plutarch's Politics*. For examples of works that focus on its style and method, usually in comparison with those of other *Lives*, see C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 74–96; C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Adaptation of His Source-Material," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100 (1980): 127–40; Christopher Pelling, "Plutarch's 'Tale of Two Cities': Do the *Parallel Lives* Combine as Global Histories?," in *Plutarch's Lives: Parallelism and Purpose*, ed. Noreen Humble (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2010), 217–37; and Jeffrey Beneker, "Thematic Correspondences in Plutarch's *Lives* of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus," in *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works*, *Volume II*, ed. Lukas de Blois et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 315–27.
6. Bradley Buszard, "Caesar's Ambition: A Combined Reading of Plutarch's 'Alexander-Caesar' and 'Pyrrhus-Marius'?," *Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974–2014)* 138, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 185–215.
7. Buszard, "Caesar's Ambition," 185.
8. For full discussions of the rivalry between Marius and Sulla (taken up by Marius's son after his death), as well as the civil wars it caused, see Tom Holland, *Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic* (New York: Anchor Books, 2005); Gareth C. Sampson, *The Collapse of Rome: Marius, Sulla and the First Civil War* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2013); and Mike Duncan, *The Storm Before the Storm: The Beginning of the End of the Roman Republic* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2017)—and, of course, Plutarch, *Gaius Marius*, in *Lives: Demetrius and Antony, Pyrrhus and Gaius Marius*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1920), 463–601; and Plutarch, *Sulla*, in *Lives: Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Lysander and Sulla*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1916), 323–444.
9. Unless otherwise noted, all dates are BCE.

10. Plutarch, *Caesar*, in *Lives: Demosthenes and Cicero, Alexander and Caesar*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1919), 441–611, see esp. 1.1–2. Translations from Greek texts are my own, although the cited translations have provided me with some helpful guidance. *Caesar* references are to chapter and section number.
11. Shakespeare makes the same suggestion. The first word Caesar speaks in *Julius Caesar* is his wife's name (at this time, he is married to Calpurnia, the daughter of the consul Piso), and the first concern he raises regards his superstitions surrounding Calpurnia's fertility. See William Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Julius Caesar*, ed. William Montgomery (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 1.2.1–11.
12. Plutarch, *Caesar* 3.1–5.2.
13. Plutarch, *Caesar* 5.5.
14. Plutarch, *Caesar* 6.1–4.
15. Plutarch, *Caesar* 5.5. See also Sallust, *The War with Catiline*, in *The War with Catiline. The War with Jugurtha*, trans. J. C. Rolfe (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 2–150, see esp. 49.3–4; and Suetonius, *Divus Julius*, in *The Twelve Caesars*, trans. Robert Graves (New York: Penguin, 2007), 1–43. Suetonius writes on p. 28 that Caesar also showed this kind of generosity to the nobles and people of other countries, doing so to such an extent that "everyone was amazed by this liberality, and wondered what the sequel would be."
16. For further details on this rivalry, see Plutarch, *Pompey*, in *Lives: Agesilaus and Pompey, Pelopidas and Marcellus*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1917), 115–326.
17. Plutarch, *Caesar* 12.1–13.3.
18. Cf. Plutarch, *Pompey* 47.1.
19. Plutarch, *Caesar* 14.1–3.
20. Plutarch, *Caesar* 1.2–2.1.
21. Plutarch, *Caesar* 2.1–4.
22. Plutarch, *Caesar* 11.1–3.
23. Plutarch, *Caesar* 15.1–3.
24. Plutarch, *Caesar* 16.1–4.
25. Lukas de Blois, "Caesar the General and Leader," in *The Landmark Julius Caesar: Web Essays for the Complete Works* (New York: Anchor Books, 2017), 102–9, see esp. 107.
26. Plutarch, *Caesar* 17.1–4. See also Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 57–59.
27. Plutarch, *Caesar* 17.2.
28. Plutarch, *Caesar* 20.4–5.
29. Plutarch, *Caesar* 11.3.
30. For further evidence of the gratitude that Caesar inspired, see Cicero, *Selected Letters*, trans. P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), Letters 77, 93, 109, and 126.

31. Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 65 and 68; see also 73–75. For further discussion of the rewards Caesar gave his men, as well as his personal knowledge of his soldiers' names and deeds, see Julius Caesar, *Gallic War*, in *The Landmark Julius Caesar: The Complete Works*, ed. and trans. Kurt A. Raaflaub (New York: Anchor Books, 2017), 1–307, see esp. 2.15.3–26.2; Keith Fairbank, "Caesar's Portrait of 'Caesar,'" in *The Landmark Julius Caesar: Web Essays for the Complete Works*, ed. and trans. Kurt A. Raaflaub (New York: Anchor Books, 2017), 214–33, esp. 215–216; Julius Caesar, *Civil War*, in *The Landmark Julius Caesar: The Complete Works*, ed. and trans. Kurt A. Raaflaub (New York: Anchor Books, 2017), 307–491, see esp. 9.39.3–4, 11.53.5, 11.71.1, and 11.99.1; and with de Blois, "Caesar," 105–7.
32. Plutarch, *Caesar* 33.1–34.2.
33. Plutarch, *Caesar* 34.3–35.2.
34. Plutarch, *Caesar* 35.2–3.
35. Plutarch, *Caesar* 35.3.
36. Plutarch, *Caesar* 35.4.
37. Plutarch, *Caesar* 36.1.
38. Plutarch, *Caesar* 37.1. See also Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 43: "In his administration of justice he was both conscientious and severe."
39. Plutarch, *Caesar* 39–42.
40. Plutarch, *Caesar* 47.1–2. See also Cicero, *Selected Letters*, Letter 100.
41. Plutarch, *Caesar* 54.2.
42. See Caesar, *Gallic War* 1.53.5–7, 2.14.4–5, 2.28.2–3, 2.31.3, and 8.44.1; with Fairbank, "Caesar's Portrait," 217–18. Fairbank writes on p. 217 that "pervasive emphasis on his clemency in the *Gallic War* suggests that it was both a character trait and the result of political calculation. . . . [Caesar's generosity and leniency] were probably based on a natural disposition."
43. Plutarch, *Caesar* 38.1–4.
44. Plutarch, *Caesar* 37.3–4.
45. For a discussion of Caesar's potential religious beliefs (which ultimately remain mysterious), see David Wardle, "Caesar and Religion," in *A Companion to Julius Caesar*, ed. Miriam Griffin (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 100–112. For the thought that some higher power spoke through Caesar's actions and influenced his fate, see Cicero, *Selected Letters*, Letters 45 and 67, as well as Caesar's alteration of the calendar as described in Plutarch, *Caesar* 59. See also Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 77: "The omens will be as favorable as I wish them to be."
46. Cassius Dio, *Roman History: Books 46–50*, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1917), 41.46.4.
47. Plutarch, *Caesar* 56.1–4.
48. Plutarch, *Caesar* 57.1.

49. Plutarch, *Caesar* 57.2–58.1.
50. Plutarch, *Caesar* 58.1; cf. 20.2 and 21.4. See also Cicero, *Selected Letters*, Letter 113: "With Caesar, petitions based on friendship carry more weight than those involving special pleading."
51. Plutarch, *Caesar* 57.4.
52. Plutarch, *Caesar* 57.5, emphasis mine.
53. See Sallust, *The War with Catiline*, 54.1–6. In this crucial passage, Sallust mentions Caesar's "benefactions and lavish generosity," "gentleness and compassion," and "forgiving" and "easygoing" nature, as well as the "refuge for the unfortunate" that he provided. He then writes, "Finally, Caesar had made up his mind to work hard, to be alert; he devoted himself to the affairs of his friends at the neglect of his own; he refused nothing that was worthy of being given; he craved a major command, an army, a fresh war in which his merit might be able to shine forth." This passage also illustrates how, for Caesar, the aforementioned desires blurred together.
54. Plutarch, *Caesar* 11.2.
55. Plutarch, *Caesar* 32.5–6.
56. Bernadotte Perrin, footnotes to *Caesar* 523; Frederick E. Brenk, "The Dreams of Plutarch's Lives," *Latomus* 34, no. 2 (April–June 1975): 336–49.
57. Brenk, "Dreams," 346.
58. See Buszard, "Caesar's Ambition," 194–99.
59. See Christopher Pelling, *Plutarch*: *"Caesar,"* trans. with introduction and commentary (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 445.
60. Cf. Plutarch, *Caesar* 60.5.
61. Plutarch, *Caesar* 60.1–66.7.
62. Plutarch, *Caesar* 67.1–68.1; see also Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, 3.2.
63. Plutarch, *Caesar* 69.1–2.
64. Plutarch, *Alexander*, in *Lives: Demosthenes and Cicero, Alexander and Caesar*, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1919), 223–441, see esp. 30.1–3, 34.1–2, 39.1–3, 41.2–5, 59.2–3.
65. Plutarch, *Alexander* 11.1–4, 40.2–3, 41.1, 42.3–6.
66. Plutarch, *Alexander* 42.2, 58.1–5, 60.1–3.
67. Plutarch, *Alexander* 58.1–2.
68. Plutarch, *Alexander* 28.1–3.
69. Plutarch, *Alexander* 69.2–3.
70. Plutarch, *Alexander* 37.3.
71. Plutarch, *Alexander* 7.1–8.4, 14.1–3, 17.5, 26.1–5, 64.1–65.4.
72. Buszard, "Caesar's Ambition," 194–99.