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Hypocrisy and Democratic Leadership in Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*

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Hypocrisy, as Dennis Thompson has argued, is the most common charge against politicians in liberal democracies.[1] Democratic citizens have a particular fervor when it comes to catching their leaders in acts of deception and often revel in the crucifixion of political leaders caught lying, cheating, and stealing. Politicians who fail to practice what they preach are especially susceptible to democratic disdain. Set apart as a distinct and particularly contemptible category of deception, as Judith Shklar has argued, "hypocrisy remains the only unforgivable sin."[2] Nevertheless, hypocrisy can and often does play an essential role in democratic politics by allowing representatives to build support for policies, please diverse constituencies, and overcome political gridlock.

While some theorists caution that hypocrisy can undermine accountability and trust in government, others consider it an inevitable and even useful feature of democratic politics.[3] In this paper, I follow in this latter vein and explore the advantages of hypocrisy in democratic governance. Though pervasive hypocritical behavior among elected representatives can damage public trust, rampant anti-hypocrisy can be equally dangerous, as Shklar warned, leading to "an unending game of mutual unmasking."[4] By contrast, the

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strategic use of hypocritical speech among political actors can facilitate democratic negotiations and be used as a tool to overcome ideological impasses.

To explore this model of democratic rhetoric, I look to one of the most beloved figures of the American founding, Benjamin Franklin. Known as a printer, inventor, scientist, humorist, diplomat, and statesman, Franklin was among the most democratically oriented thinkers of his day.[5] Through his *Autobiography* and other works, Franklin provides a guide to the art of democratic statesmanship, which includes a role for the judicious use of hypocrisy. Franklin's writings suggest that the obsession with and prosecution of hypocrisy is misplaced, and when properly used, hypocrisy can serve democratic ends.

Franklin's support for American democracy connects to his lifelong project for moral perfection. Though he observed that many people fell short of moral and democratic ideals, he did not believe this was inherent to the human condition. Virtue is an art, Franklin contended, and he developed a plan that would allow Americans to elevate themselves through the habitual practice of virtuous behavior. He was careful, however, to encourage a form of virtue that departed from classical and Christian ethics in strategic ways. He counseled a nuanced form of virtue that allowed room for the judicious use of vice in order to achieve a greater good for both individuals and the public. In particular, Franklin contended that the appearance of virtue could be as useful as virtue itself. His project does not aim to make every individual morally perfect but to help individuals in obtaining those traits that will best facilitate their lives as democratic citizens. Franklin's work serves both as a guidebook for political actors who seek support for their political projects as well as citizens who look to hold those actors accountable.

This paper connects Franklin's approach to hypocrisy with contemporary debates over sincerity in public affairs. In an era of "truthiness" and #fakenews, concerns raised about leaders' hypocrisy appear at best ineffective and at worst quaint. By exploring Franklin's approach to using hypocrisy as a political tool, this study also raises the normative question of if and how citizens

should resist hypocritical expressions from political leaders in order to preserve democratic norms. To explore this use of hypocrisy in democratic politics, I begin by exploring debates over classifying hypocrisy as a vice, the challenges hypocrisy poses to democracy, and the dangers posed by insisting on candor.

Hypocrisy and Democracy

The term *hypocrisy* has its roots in Greek theatre from acting a part in a play and is historically rooted in religious deception, particularly claims of religious piety from those who are especially impious. A hypocrite is one who wears a mask of virtue and convinces the audience that the mask is real. Hypocrisy is distinct from more general acts of dissimulation or deception, for it is possible to deceive without being a hypocrite. The course of human interaction requires a certain level of dissimulation, and this practice of polite manners and courtesy makes human relations possible and even pleasant.

There are two common and related ways of understanding individual hypocrisy in politics. The first is when an individual says one thing but does another, or, as Suzanne Dovi frames it, political hypocrisy is "the disparity between the statements of public officials and the actions they take on behalf of their state."[6] A second way to understand hypocrisy is the willful deception of the public by pretending a virtuous character. As Shklar and Thompson note, this moral hypocrisy involves a pretense about one's "motives and intention."[7] While outward inconsistencies are much easier to establish, often political debates over hypocrisy focus on uncovering the intentions driving a political act.

Sometimes the incongruity is easy to spot, such as when an elected representative preaches the importance of cutting financial largess but lavishly spends money on a staff retreat. In other instances, a representative's intentions may be strategic, making it harder for the public to distinguish between hypocrisy and routine political dealings. For instance, state representatives may selectively champion or oppose projects in other parts of the state as a way to build coalitions in their home districts. What may appear to

one observer as political skill or shrewdness may appear to another as mendacity or subterfuge. Debates over actions and intentions escalate charges of hypocrisy and often the two are difficult to untangle. However, after reviewing both approaches in the following pages, I show the advantages of focusing on actions rather than intentions.

Charges of hypocrisy in politics are particularly rampant because it is difficult and perhaps impossible to sort out true intentions from professed beliefs and actions. In contemporary American politics, citizens routinely suspect politicians of deception and hypocrisy, and public trust in government remains at all-time low levels. For example, in a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, large majorities of those surveyed (over 76%) agreed that elected officials care only about their careers, are influenced by special interests, are unwilling to compromise, are out of touch, and are dishonest. A majority (52%) also say that elected officials are to blame for these problems, not the institutions themselves.[8]

Although many of these charges may be fair, democracies place elected officials in a tenuous position. While citizens want politicians to be honest, uncompromising, and principled, by its very nature, democratic politics requires elected leaders to make compromises with other political actors in order to achieve their goals. Given that compromise is the essence of democratic politics, politicians are susceptible to the charge that they have professed allegiance to one set of principles yet acted against them in order to meet their political goals.

Some political commentators contend that hypocrisy is simply part and parcel of democratic government and therefore is not worth worrying over. As Ruth Grant has argued, "What we learn about politics is that, because society requires trust but men are not trustworthy, deceit is inevitable. And because society requires morality but men are not always moral, hypocrisy is inevitable."[9] In similar veins, Judith Shklar has argued that hypocrisy is an ordinary vice that is essentially a by-product of liberal values, and David Runciman has declared that hypocrisy is "practically ubiquitous" in democratic societies.[10]

If this view is correct and hypocrisy is ubiquitous and inevitable, then what is the fuss about? Why not collectively throw up our hands and pray for the serenity to accept the things we cannot change in democratic politics? At least two problems may arise if hypocrisy is left unchecked: first, deception of this sort may make it difficult for citizens to hold their elected leaders accountable, and second, it may lead to dangerous levels of distrust. To make informed decisions, citizens must evaluate their representatives' rhetoric, promises, and actions. As Thompson has argued, hypocrisy is "a species of deception, and no vice is more dangerous to democracy than deceit. . . . To hold their leaders accountable for any decision or policy, citizens must have truthful information about what leaders and their opponents have done and intend to do."[11] While it is unrealistic to expect citizens to have complete information about their representatives' sincere intentions, they will find it difficult to hold their representatives accountable if they are routinely misled about their representatives' reasons for supporting or opposing particular policies.

Equally problematic is that by its very nature hypocrisy causes individuals to question one another's intentions and to suspect some level of deception is afoot. On a political level, this can lead to general distrust of political actors and democratic institutions. It is difficult for a citizen to know if a politician is truly honest or merely a con artist, and if charges of hypocrisy are rampant, citizens may be inclined to accept the latter view even in cases where it is unwarranted. Of course, some level of skepticism is necessary for a democracy to function well. The public must keep a vigilant and skeptical eye toward their representatives in order to hold them accountable.

Too much trust in government can itself lend to tyranny, but too little can leave the public disaffected. A constant suspicion of hypocrisy may breed not only skepticism of other's intentions but also outright cynicism that makes citizens unlikely or perhaps unwilling to engage in politics. If that is the case, hypocrisy can be an actual danger to the success of democratic politics, given that citizen participation is required for democracies to function well.

As Alan Kennan has argued, "For many spectator citizens, the unmasking of the hypocrisy of the politically engaged and powerful acts not only as a way to justify their own political inactivity but also as a means of claiming a small amount of apparent power: to write off the entire field of political action as hopelessly contaminated with power and self-interest is to assert that at least one isn't a sucker."[12] When citizens choose to disengage because of their belief that they cannot trust their representatives, it is right to conclude that hypocrisy poses a threat to democratic ends.

Although hypocrisy may make it difficult to hold politicians accountable and can cause citizens to become disaffected, moving too far in the other direction is also dangerous. Seeking to expel hypocrisy from democracy poses as significant of a threat to democratic politics as hypocrisy itself. This threat takes two forms: first, the value of sincerity in politics is vastly overrated, and second, it causes citizens to misplace their concerns about politicians.

While deception can undermine individuals' ability to make informed political decisions, an overdose of candor can make democratic politics impossible. Although sincerity is a virtue, democracy does not require that politicians fully reveal their intentions nor fully disclose all information. Shklar has persuasively argued that too much candor can be destructive:

> The paradox of liberal democracy is that it encourages hypocrisy because the politics of persuasion require, as any reader of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* knows, a certain amount of dissimulation on the part of all speakers. On the other hand, the structure of open political competition exaggerates the importance and the prevalence of hypocrisy because it is the vice of which all parties can and do accuse each other. It is not at all clear that zealous candor would serve liberal politics particularly well.[13]

Skhlar recognizes that the distinctions between insincerity and hypocrisy break down as political tensions build. Like an escalating game of school yard taunts, what begins with one side accusing the

other of insincere motives spirals into increasingly severe tit-for-tat charges of hypocrisy. As citizens watch these polarizing clashes, the nuanced political reasoning behind a vote or speech is lost. Rather, as Thompson puts it, citizens "confirm their impression that the motives of all politicians are suspect."[14] In short, anti-hypocrites dangerously conflate insincerity, masked motivations, and hypocrisy in a way that drives cynicism. By making allowances for hypocrisy, individuals may be encouraged to keep their vices private while publicly practicing virtue and focus more on practicing what they preach rather than fixating on intentions and motivations.

In part, public virtue requires people to engage with one another in a way that respects the customs and norms of social discourse, even if they profoundly disagree with one another. Keith Bybee has argued that the democratic norm of courtesy best describes this approach to politics. Courtesy is critical because it "makes it possible for passionate, conflict-prone individuals to achieve social peace, letting individuals who want to be good (and yet who are usually only capable of appearing to be good) turn the pretense that they are better than they are into a practical means of getting along."[15] Courtesy, as Bybee describes it, allows for hypocrisy, as individuals may give the appearance of virtue while concealing their true feelings.[16]

Courtesy is not only powerful but also habitual. When parents counsel their children to be polite, they are telling their children to hide their true feelings and participate in the norm of shared respect; they do not expect their children to change their feelings, only their outward expression. Likewise, this same set of public manners carries over into the realm of politics and helps to make democratic deliberation and compromise possible when disagreements arise. While candor may be appropriate in some venues, sometimes it is best politically to practice the maxim that if one does not have something nice to say, it is best to say nothing at all. When silence is impossible, some well-mannered dissimulation is the next best thing. At a minimum, this can keep a conversation going and facilitate deliberation, whereas candor might bring deliberation to a halt.

A second charge against those leading the anti-hypocrisy crusades is that their fears are misplaced and perhaps even dangerous. In political disputes, the temptation exists to charge an opponent with hypocrisy rather than address the root of the disagreement on reasonable terms. Accusations of hypocrisy can have a powerful emotional appeal, but they do little to further actual political discussion. Such accusations can lead to a focus on catching a politician saying one thing and doing another, distracting voters from asking the more important question, "Was that the right thing to do?" Far more troublesome is that once one is charged with hypocrisy, disproving the claim may be difficult, for how can we search the human heart and know the true intentions of another person? To avoid this problem of evaluating human intentions, Hannah Arendt has argued, the public and private spheres should be kept separate: "The search for motives, the demand that everybody display in public his innermost motivation, since it actually demands the impossible, transforms all actors into hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to poison all human relations."[17] Attempts to uncover true intentions and ferret out the hypocrites can quickly turn into a witch hunt.

Certainly, Arendt is not arguing that hypocrisy is a virtue nor that the public must unequivocally tolerate it, only that the war against hypocrisy is fruitless. Because it is impossible to know one's true motivations, once the suspicion of a particular motive occurs, all that person's motivations are now suspect. Furthermore, even if the war against hypocrisy succeeds, what is left? In Arendt's estimation, the war on hypocrisy can have tragic consequences, as she claims it was just such a war that "transformed Robespierre's dictatorship in the Reign of Terror."[18] Ultimately, charges of hypocrisy focused on insincere intentions are tools of distraction that can skirt meaningful political discussion. Taken to the extreme, anti-hypocrisy can engender as much distrust and disaffection as hypocrisy itself. Because accusations of feigned motives often accompany charges of inconsistencies between professed beliefs and actions, citizens are left with the impression that no one should be trusted.

Resigning ourselves to the inevitability of hypocrisy undermines both accountability and trust; attempts to eradicate hypocrisy from politics make passionate disagreement unnecessarily difficult and misdirects citizen's attention away from more severe vices. However, we need not choose between extremes. A moderate compromise would tolerate some hypocrisy between political statements and actions as a means to facilitate democratic decision-making in the time-honored tradition of polite manners, courtesy, and feigned modesty. Among the most fervent apologists for this type of political hypocrisy is Benjamin Franklin, who offers a jovial, yet sophisticated defense of the necessity of hypocrisy to good democratic governance. As Shklar has noted of Franklin, "[H]e was a shrewd calculator who took it for granted that the politics of persuasion required hypocrisy, but that did not discourage him."[19] An unwavering supporter of traditional civic virtues, including industry, moderation, and benevolence, he defends the proposition that the appearance of virtue is practically as crucial as virtue itself. By examining his view of the role of virtue in democratic life, we gain a better sense of how hypocrisy can serve politics without undermining its integrity.

Benjamin Franklin: Hypocrisy, Vanity, and Community Engagement

Although Franklin was known for many achievements in his life, his *Autobiography* solidified his role in the American imagination as a leading champion of self-improvement. Among his fans, the *Autobiography* inspired a surfeit of self-help plans for gaining influence and increasing productivity.[20] Critics lampooned Franklin's recommendations as shallow, calculating, and self-serving.[21] Beneath the seemingly endless examples of Franklin's own great works, some scholars argue Franklin developed a more nuanced and layered prescription for human conduct directed toward elevating behavior toward service.[22] As Douglas Anderson quipped in defense of Franklin's project, "If this understanding of human obligation reflects an accountant's bourgeois morality, then the modern world could use many more such moral accountants."[23]

Though tensions exist between Franklin's self-interest and the public-spirited gentleman he portrays in the *Autobiography*, he attempts to reconcile these through what Tocqueville would later call self-interest rightly understood.[24]

Other scholars view Franklin as an ironic thinker, especially in the *Autobiography*, but they have still found him a serious, if somewhat unconventional, moral thinker. Franklin decentered God and religious dogma from his conception of virtue, leading Hiram Caton to refer to Franklin's approach to morality as Hobbism for the people.[25] Ralph Lerner called Franklin's attempt to promote virtue through self-control a gamble, given there were no eternal consequences motivating compliance, noting, "It is less important that they [his readers] suspect the void in Franklin's heaven than that they center their thoughts on forming personal habits of industry, responsibility, and civility."[26]

While many scholars have recognized Franklin's departure from traditional religion, Jerry Weinberger proposes a radical reinterpretation of Franklin's works. He argues that Franklin was a lifelong atheist who rejected moral principles and was involved in public affairs primarily as a form of amusement. Franklin used esoteric writing to hide clues to his true beliefs in order to protect his public reputation.[27] Whereas Weinberger draws out interesting inconsistencies in Franklin's arguments, Kevin Slack offers a persuasive alternative, arguing that though Franklin took an ironic approach to traditional Christian virtues, he used Shaftesbury's commonsense theory to "subject our behavior to the ordering activity of reason, guided by a love of wisdom."[28] Thus, Franklin centered human reason as the authority to motivate virtuous behavior.

Franklin's approach to virtue, reason, and service are laid out in the *Autobiography*, and his public and private writings show he took a lifelong interest in the promotion of virtue. He argued that in order for a democratic people to be happy in their personal, social, and political lives, virtue was necessary. Moreover, he believed an education in virtue was essential to making democratic governance work, and he believed his own life could serve as an example for others to follow. As Steven Forde puts it, "[T]he

Autobiography is the closest Franklin ever came to presenting an argument that service to others is fully compatible with one's own self-interest. And it is not so much an argument as a drama."[29] However, Franklin's understanding of virtue, happiness, and the attainment of both requires careful examination to reveal how he came to see hypocrisy as a potentially useful tool in accomplishing his many public service projects.

As a precocious youth, Franklin claims, he conceived of a "bold and arduous" plan for moral perfection. The idea was simple for Franklin; he knew the difference between right and wrong; he needed only to train himself to "do the one and avoid the other."[30] Later in life, he planned to undertake a "great and extensive project" of publishing a work devoted exclusively to his ethical theory entitled *The Art of Virtue*. This book would have served as a guide for all those wishing to live a good life, but Franklin claims his numerous other endeavors prevented him from completing the work. As Christopher McClure argues, he may have purposively never completed the work.[31] Nevertheless, he included a shortened version of the plan in his *Autobiography*, and it is perhaps the most well-known section of the book.

The promotion of the common good is Franklin's ultimate objective, and this is what led him to conceive of writing a manual on how to live a happy, active, and virtuous life. For Franklin, human nature is such that individuals are inherently inclined to seek their own interests, which they often miscalculate. Franklin explains the need for his project of virtue in a letter to Lord Kames (1760): "Most people have naturally *some* Virtues, but none have naturally *all* the Virtues. . . . To *acquire* those that are wanting, and *secure* what we acquire as well as those we have naturally, is the Subject of an Art."[32] Even if one wants to develop his or her virtue further, there will be failures and frustration.

Franklin developed a detailed program for moral perfection. Initially, he chose twelve virtues, which he listed by name, and provided a short precept for each. His method for practicing this art included a week-long devotion to each virtue, a process he would repeat four times per year while keeping records of the

faults he committed each day. In this way, Franklin believed he could cultivate a habit of virtue by becoming conscious of and eliminating his faults so that this practice would eventually lead to moral improvement. As Lorraine Pangle notes, the virtues he omits are as telling as those he includes.[33] He ignores traditional Christian virtues (faith, hope, and charity) as well as aristocratic virtues (wisdom and courage).

Franklin carefully arranged his selection of virtues so that the accomplishment of one virtue would assist in the accomplishment of the next. For example, he proposed to first perfect the virtue of *Temperance* in order to provide the clarity of mind necessary to master the subsequent virtues. *Silence* followed, which allowed Franklin to gain knowledge from others more easily but would require patience and dedication. Although his plan was demanding, it has rarely been regarded for its moral rigidity.[34] Indeed, some of his virtues allow for permissive behavior. For example, Franklin defines *Moderation* thus: "Avoid Extremes. Forbear resenting Injuries so much as you think they deserve." This definition allows the practitioner a great deal of leniency in determining exactly what one deserves. Perhaps Franklin's most creatively contrived virtue is that of *Chastity*, which he assigns the following precept: "Rarely use venery but for health or offspring, never to dullness, weakness, or the injury of your own or another's peace or reputation."[35] Departing from a strict Christian understanding of chastity, Franklin's definition poses no practical prohibitions. The virtues he includes and the instructions he attaches to each reveal what some scholars have identified as Franklin's utilitarianism.[36] Here it is most apparent that Franklin does not busy himself with traditional concerns about morality; rather, his virtues are tools to achieve different ends.

Most emblematic of Franklin's approach is the virtue of *Sincerity*. He prescribes that to practice sincerity, one should "use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly; and if you speak, speak accordingly."[37] Note that Franklin does not prohibit outright lying—only *hurtful* deceit. Practically, he prescribes that one should only speak if doing so is not offensive or hurtful; otherwise,

it is better to be silent or engage in some level of dissimulation. As Pangle argues:

> Franklin never pressed the exceptional case; he shows no attraction to the view of Thucydides and Machiavelli and Hobbes that the real truth about the human condition is found in extreme situations that put all virtue to the test. Franklin's distance from Kant is clear from the definition he gives to sincerity in his own program of self-improvement. . . . Franklin would not have hesitated an instant, if confronted by a Nazi at the door, to lie about the Jews in his basement. If asked whether honesty would still be a virtue if it generally proved disadvantageous in the long run to those who practiced it, he might well say not; he might indeed say that our whole understanding of virtue would then need to be rethought. But he would regard the question as academic.[38]

For Franklin, candor for its own sake, or the sake of religious dogma, is overly glorified, both personally and politically. Rather, Franklin's understanding of when to use candor or deceit is governed by the usefulness of the tactics. Franklin's charge to avoid hurtful deceit encourages the norm of common courtesy. As A. J. Leo Lemay outlines, this includes the "common cant of polite deceit" such as "What a beautiful baby!"[39] But Lerner recognizes that Franklin "means more than to allow for those little white lies we please to call 'tact.' For as his whole life demonstrates and as his avowed method encourages us to conclude, the promotion of good works toward one's fellows in face requires the use of artifice and concealment."[40] Artifice is necessary for democratic politics to work.

Crucial for Franklin is that one need not have fully mastered a virtue to benefit from its effects. The appearance of virtue can be just as useful as virtue itself. Franklin describes this in his discussion of the virtue of *Humility*. In constructing his list of virtues, Franklin had initially included only twelve, but at the urging of a friend who insisted that he was often thought to be proud,

Franklin added *Humility*. He includes this as the last virtue, indicating he anticipated it to be the most difficult to master, and he gives it the shortest precept: "Imitate Jesus and Socrates."[41] His suggestion that it is even possible to perfect himself to the extent that he can masterfully imitate two of the Western world's most well-known figures is at minimum boastful and is certainly far removed from the idea of humility and is delightfully ironic. He acknowledges *Pride* as one of the most challenging natural vices to overcome and also as a personal weakness: "Even if I could conceive that I had completely overcome [*Pride*], I should probably be proud of my humility."[42] He openly admits that he had little personal success in achieving *Humility*, but he did have great success with achieving the *appearance* of being humble. Furthermore, he is content with achieving only the appearance of virtue.

Franklin staunchly recommends avoiding polarizing opinions generally, and he goes so far as to counsel never contradicting anyone.[43] When young, Franklin was known to be quarrelsome, to the point where his friends would avoid him. After an intensely blunt friend pointed out the problem to him, Franklin immediately mended his ways, resolving never again to directly contradict anyone or express a fixed opinion of his own. Franklin claims the practice became so habitual that no one heard him utter a dogmatic expression in over fifty years. Instead, he suggests, "when another asserted something that I thought an error, I denied myself the pleasure of contradicting him abruptly and of showing immediately some absurdity in his proposition; and in answering, I began by observing that in certain cases or circumstances his opinion would be right, but in the present case there appeared or seemed to me some difference, etc. I soon found the advantage of this charge in my manner; the conversations I engaged in went on more pleasantly."[44] The level of self-restraint required never to contradict anyone directly would challenge almost anyone, but Franklin insists that such skills can be acquired through habit and are worth pursuing in order to gain influence. Moreover, his approach requires changes only in outward behavior. The appearance of virtue is good enough.

Franklin's insistence that obtaining the appearance of virtue can be as beneficial as virtue itself is not as suspicious as it may at first seem. Franklin conceived virtue as something that could be gained through deliberate practice. To cultivate the habit of virtue, a person needs many opportunities to fail spectacularly at obtaining virtue. Franklin would have wholeheartedly endorsed the "fake it until you make it" mindset, and even if one never entirely makes it, it is still worthwhile to fake it. Whereas some would consider faking virtue to be an act of hypocrisy—publicly making a claim to morality one does not have—Franklin thinks doing this is part of the process of learning to become virtuous, as he understands it.

The habit of virtue, for Franklin, is not meant to be undertaken for its own sake, and because virtue is not an end of itself, he is willing to endorse the appearance of virtue as well as its achievement. Indeed, his virtues "explain and enforce [a larger] doctrine, that vicious actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden because they are hurtful."[45] At its most basic level, being virtuous protects individuals from pain and suffering. However, the benefits of a virtuous life are more significant than merely avoiding pain: "That it was, therefore, every one's interest to be virtuous who wished to be happy even in this world; and I should, from this circumstance, . . . have endeavored to convince young persons that no qualities were so likely to make a poor man's fortune as those of probity and integrity."[46]

Although his endorsement of probity and integrity may appear ironic, much evidence suggests that he is sincere. As a narrative drama, Forde argues, that "[i]f we agree that the life presented there was a happy life, that service to others was part of that happiness, and that such a life is within our reach, we have all the proof we need of the compatibility of virtue and happiness, and all the motivation we need to emulate Franklin."[47] The great benefit of living a virtuous life is happiness. Those who do not attempt to improve their morality are discontented and frustrated in their endeavors to improve their conditions, but those who make a habit of virtue will know, as Franklin puts it, the felicity of life.

Individual happiness is important to Franklin, but he emphasizes that the practice of individual virtue facilitates public happiness.

He encourages a greater public spirit and willingness to engage in public service. In the spirit of humility, the most prominent example Franklin provides of this larger project of contributing to the public good is his own life. He filled the *Autobiography* with examples of his contributions to the common good. He demonstrates how his desire to improve his happiness served to improve the lives of the public as well. McClure argues, "He did not struggle with the supposed conflict between egotism and altruism because he came to understand that this was a false dichotomy. Doing good to others, Franklin learned, was the surest way to make oneself happy."[48] His projects for organizing the first subscription library, the first volunteer fire department, and improvements to the streets of Philadelphia benefited both Franklin and his community.

By providing examples of his contributions, Franklin wants not only to inspire others to public service but also to guide them in the practice of democratic politics and rhetoric that will help to facilitate success. He often credits his success in politics to his ability to hide his true intentions and to craft his language to suit his audience. His appearance of humility was, in many ways, the virtue that contributed the most to his success in these endeavors. Initially, Franklin reports that when he tried to rally public support for one of his projects, such as starting a library, prospective subscribers met him with reluctance and outright objection. People thought him proud as though he were raising his reputation above their own. Given his difficulty in achieving success in these projects, Franklin modified his approach. Rather than claiming an idea as his own, he would suggest the idea belonged to a group of friends or some other public-spirited gentlemen. Once he removed his attachment to the project, he found others were more readily willing to support his ideas.

This counsel runs counter to much of what we think about today in terms of democratic politics. For instance, as David Mayhew has famously argued, elected representatives depend on credit claiming in order to boost their chances of reelection.[49] This mode of democratic politics is one that does not require deception or hypocrisy. In the Mayhew model, politicians can engage in the

rather straightforward practice of logrolling. Elected officials express their sincere interests, exchange votes to form coalitions, and eventually pass legislation that reflects a necessary compromise, though a compromise that does not involve deception.

What Franklin finds wrong with this system is that it does too little to play to the facts of human nature. People hate the appearance of vanity, even though vanity is required to make politics work. Credit claiming, either in proposing ideas or celebrating their implementation, can make a politician appear proud and hence make it difficult to achieve political success. Shklar underplays this aspect of Franklin's thought, and in my reading, much to the detriment of understanding Franklin's overall project. She argues that Franklin values a socially constructed ego, but not personal ego: "there is much pride of achievement . . . but no vanity at all."[50] However, Franklin was a man deeply dedicated to vanity, in terms of its personal as well as political necessity. Franklin opens his *Autobiography* with a discussion of vanity: "Most people dislike vanity in others, whatever share they have of it themselves; but I give it fair quarter whenever I meet with it, being persuaded that it is often productive of good to the possessor, and to others that are within his sphere of action; and therefore, in many cases, it would not be altogether absurd if a man were to thank God for his vanity among the other comforts of life."[51] Vanity may often be a beneficial motivator of behavior.

By playing up appearances, engaging in dissimulation, and employing some well-meaning hypocrisy, Franklin finds two benefits follow his approach to political affairs. First, he found that by lying about his projects and attributing their origin to other individuals, he could effectively recruit others to join his causes. Essentially, his act of hypocrisy helped him create political coalitions. Second, it served to reward his own vanity. Though this approach required an initial sacrifice, he believed it would be repaid: "If it remains a while uncertain to whom the merit belongs, someone more vain than yourself will be encouraged to claim it, and then even envy will be disposed to do you justice by plucking those assumed feathers, and restoring them to their

rightful owner."[52] The appearance of humility serves to further one's vanity, but as Forde duly notes, Franklin believed some degree of vanity and pride would always be necessary to motivate capable leaders to serve the public.[53] Vanity was not a detriment but an asset to democratic politics.

Franklin exploited others' vanity to achieve his own ends and meet those of his community. He recounts in the *Autobiography* his successful effort to establish a hospital in the city, which involved some manipulation of the country members of the legislature, who did not see the benefit it would have to their constituents. As Pangle says, "[T]he stinginess of the legislature put him in mind of a way to appeal to its members' vanity—their desire to seem generous— while hiding from them the likelihood of their actually having to pay the conditionally granted funds."[54] Franklin concocted a conditional matching grant program to solicit donations, giving legislators the deliberately mistaken impression that he would be unable to raise private funds and they would be off the hook for the matching public funds. He claimed this instance gave him the greatest pleasure of his political maneuvers, and he said afterward, "I more easily excus'd myself for having made some use of cunning."[55] Franklin, in short, said one thing (that he would be unlikely to raise the funds) and then did another (aggressively fundraised knowing he could raise enough to secure the match). This type of political hypocrisy is characteristic of Franklin's approach to reaching political compromise.

Although Franklin's many projects serve his interests, it is because they serve a larger common good that he finds value in them. It is not the size or extent of the project that matters as much as the project's ability to serve the community. The exercise of virtue increases personal fortune, but monetary increases do not matter as much (though Franklin would never deny the importance of gaining wealth) as the small, daily successes: "Human felicity is produced not so much by great pieces of good fortune that seldom happen as by little advantages that occur every day."[56] Virtue is consequently a means to produce the ends of happiness, but happiness is also necessarily a function of one's dedication to

the common good. By engaging in small acts of hypocrisy, such as appearing to have achieved virtues one has not yet mastered and perhaps never will or hiding the exact origins or intentions behind a political idea, democratic deliberation can be enhanced, or at least compromise that leads to action can be achieved.

Hypocrisy in an Era of Distrust

Today's hyper-partisan and polarized era may seem far removed from Franklin's own time, and his approach to seeking influence and compromise a paltry solution to recent levels of political strife. Nevertheless, Franklin's careful attention to the importance of vanity, as well as his toleration for strategic misrepresentations, provides insights into contemporary debates over democracy's deficiencies. To understand how Franklin's insights on hypocrisy can enhance our understanding of democratic leadership, it is necessary to understand how concerns about hypocrisy influence the public's perceptions of politicians and political institutions.

In a world shaped by social media and the twenty-four-hour news cycle, the appetite for political scandals is substantial. While hypocrisy may underlie many political scandals, it is the driving factor only when an elected leader has preached one thing but done another. For instance, when US House Representative Vance McAllister (R-LA-5) was caught having an affair with one of his staff members, it was predictably a scandal. Because Representative McAllister had vocally run on a platform that preached conservative, Christian family values, the scandal was not just about his lapse in personal judgment; he also faced charges of political hypocrisy. As a result, he ultimately resigned from his seat.

Charges of hypocrisy go beyond personal, marital, or sexual scandals. For example, a candidate who champions significantly raising the minimum wage but pays staff only the current minimum wage will undoubtedly face charges of hypocrisy. Likewise, a representative who will only answer media questions submitted in advance would face suspicion from the public but would be labeled a hypocrite only if transparency had been a prominent campaign commitment.

Hypocrisy can occur not only at the individual level but at the institutional level as well. The disjunction between promises and practices is especially likely to trigger such charges. A city that markets its green, climate-friendly status resulting from a successful recycling program but draws the bulk of its energy from a coal plant seems hypocritical. Differences in standards and policies are yet another common source of such charges. Sometimes such criticisms are drawn by failure to meet expectations. Ambitiously titled pieces of legislation like the No Child Left Behind Act and the Affordable Care Act are examples that have drawn criticism and critiques of hypocrisy for failures to live up to their names, given the inadequate funding in many schools and expensive health-care costs. Even though these examples may not meet the strictest definitions of hypocrisy, they nevertheless evoke a general, spiraling wariness about insincerity in politics generally that Shklar warns could result from focusing too narrowly on the gap between intentions and actions.

The additional layer of hypocrisy influences how constituents judge their representatives. Individuals negatively evaluate politicians caught in direct hypocrisy, seeing a personal transgression as a professional failing. As Monika McDermott, Douglas Schwartz, and Sebastian Vallejo demonstrate, using an innovative experimental design, individuals distinguish between hypocrisy and personal moral lapses.[57] In their experiment, an elected official who committed adultery led to negative personal judgments, but not professional ones; but a politician who had campaigned on moral values and then committed adultery faced negative evaluations in terms of both personal integrity and competence in office. Hypocritical behavior undermines individuals' confidence that an elected official will perform his or her professional duties going forward.

Moralizing politicians who preach traditional family values but who engage in sexual misconduct are easy to identify as hypocrites, but hypocrisy is not always so clear-cut. For instance, a politician may fail to live up to his or her ideals, but this may prove only political ineffectiveness, not necessarily hypocrisy. Because political decisions are collective, however, a politician may advocate for

a policy but be unable to muster enough support among fellow representatives to implement reform. As McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo helpfully distinguish, "a failed campaign promise to pass a certain type of legislation is not hypocritical action; it is a failure to accomplish something. However, voting against a piece of legislation of the kind one vowed to support would qualify as hypocritical."[58] Hypocrisy requires willful action. A gray area arises, though, when an official has campaigned on a particular issue but votes against that policy. For instance, a candidate may campaign on increased benefits for those in need but vote against a bill that includes funding for food assistance. A nay vote might occur because the representative believes the bill provides inadequate funding and needs to be higher, or because the candidate is a pandering hypocrite. Votes alone cannot tell the whole story.

A common way for representatives to avoid the charge of hypocrisy is to avoid taking stances altogether. As Peter Furia has argued, politicians "may avoid hypocrisy simply by limiting their principled utterances."[59] In a political climate dominated by the culture wars, even candidates for local offices are often expected to take stances on issues like gun ownership rights and abortion policy. These politically hot-button issues can allow candidates the ability to skirt complicated political and policy challenges facing their districts. For instance, a town council member may vote against increased spending on pothole repairs but also vote in favor of a pay raise for council members. Charges of self-interest would surely follow, but charges of hypocrisy might fall flat unless the representative had explicitly campaigned to increase infrastructure spending. By avoiding principled stances, especially on complicated points related to policy or spending, many politicians manage to inoculate themselves against accusations of hypocrisy.

Franklin's reticence to commit publicly to projects underscores a problem faced in his own time but exacerbated today by media. Once a public position has been staked, modern media make it easy to transform inconsistences into "gotcha" memes. Yet, Franklin offers a model that recognizes the need to tailor one's speech to different audiences in a way that may appear hypocritical.

For instance, a conservative city council member might find herself trapped by competing public statements, committing to one group that she will focus on essential services like infrastructure and public safety, and committing to another that she supports local businesses in the cultural economy through public-private partnerships. Zealous anti-hypocrites may call foul, attacking any public investment in small business as a violation of the promise to ensure essential services receive priority.

The earlier example of Franklin's misleading statements to promote a new hospital offers a justification for inconsistencies in political promises. To successfully promote the hospital, Franklin knowingly made competing claims to legislators and investors, manipulating his story to make his claims palatable to both groups. As McClure notes, Franklin's critics see his approach as a willingness to manipulate his audience through hypocrisy.[60]

John Adams quipped that Franklin's manipulations were so thorough that even different religious groups claimed him as their own: "[T]he Catholics thought him almost a Catholic. The Church of England claimed him as one of them. The Presbyterians thought him half a Presbyterian, and the Friends believed him a wet Quaker."[61] Presenting himself as friendly to the ideas of so many groups may have led Franklin to appear hypocritical, but it also allowed him to build support and coalitions for public projects that might otherwise have failed.

Franklin faced a similar problem when his fire company proposed building a battery of defensive arms. The company had a majority Quaker members, who traditionally opposed armed conflict. The Quakers, as it turned out, were divided on the issue, and Franklin deftly engaged in a ruse that allowed a number of the Quakers who favored the proposal to skip the meeting in order to avoid discord.[62] Franklin's experience navigating this vote demonstrates his approach to sincerity. As Alan Craig Houston notes regarding this incident, "[P]olitical theorists and public observers sometimes suggest that democracy rests on free and frank speech. . . . Franklin's experience with the Fire Company suggested a different set of ideals: flexibility, compromise, negotiations, and a measured dose of hypocrisy."[63]

In contemporary politics, hypocrisy can be similarly useful to help political actors save face. Franklin helped orchestrate a situation where the Quakers who favored defensive war were able to avoid strife but indirectly support the cause. Charging political actors with hypocrisy can cause them to dig in their heels rather than come to a compromise. For instance, a politician who resisted water safety regulations as a hindrance to the state economy may have a hard time changing course even if new evidence is convincing that regulation is needed. In such a case, the politician may vote for the new pollution restrictions and claim she has always defended clean water. Franklin's approach shows that calling that politician out for hypocrisy undermines the ultimate goal—increased water safety—and that small act of hypocrisy allows the politician a small measure of saving face.

Charges that politicians are self-interested schemers, and sometimes hypocrites, are nothing new. However, the current trends of increasing distrust of both politicians and civic institutions raise new concerns about how perceptions of hypocritical behavior among politicians affect citizens' interest and engagement in civic affairs. In a recent study of Italian citizens, individuals who self-identified as uninterested in politics were the most likely to perceive hypocrisy among politicians.[64] Similarly, those who reported their intention to abstain from the next election also perceived the highest levels of hypocrisy in politics. These findings suggest the possibility of a troubling pattern where perceived hypocrisy correlates with both disinterest and disengagement.

The connection between engaged citizens and faith in government is particularly concerning, given that distrust in American government and institutions is at an all-time low. Trust in the national government dropped precipitously in the 1960s and 1970s amid the escalation of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Although levels of trust rallied in the mid-1980s and again following the September 11 attacks, it has since fallen and remained at historically low levels since 2007. Similar declines in trust have occurred throughout the developed world in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis.[65]

As Richard Edleman has found, historical predictors of increased trust no longer hold: "In past years, good economic conditions have presaged rising levels of trust, and this link still applies in developing markets in Asia and the Middle East. But in the developed world, major violations of the social contract—corporate malfeasance, government corruption, fake news—have upended this relationship."[66] Concerns about information quality and policies that maintain or exacerbate economic inequality are among the primary drivers of distrust, according to Edleman's research.

Consequently, political cynicism marks the current era. There are two typical responses to the pervasive levels of mistrust. One is a continued tribal form of polarized politics wherein each group is quick to accuse its rivals of hypocrisy and deceit and hastily overlooks flaws among its members.[67] A second response is a reinvigoration of populist movements. In both America and internationally, populism has risen in response to the current cynical climate as a check against elite power.[68] Though populism takes many forms, a common thread is to limit elite influence and empower direct input into policy decisions as a check against misbehavior among elected officials.

Much of Franklin's moral and political project was aimed at the "middling people," an emerging economic and political class in American culture including farmers, merchants, and tradespeople from Dutch, German, and Scots-Irish backgrounds. Although Franklin had some aristocratic tastes, he rejected aristocratic hierarchies. His projects recognized the interdependence of the classes for the success and defense of the colony.[69] Franklin's writings were suited to a period of upward mobility, and he recruited immigrants to Pennsylvania with the explicit promise that they could emerge from their economic condition. His work in the printing industry, in particular, provided a new class of citizens access to political news, doing so in a climate that had its own fake news scandals.[70] By contrast, economic inequality is currently increasing in America and throughout Europe, hurting precisely the middling people to whom Franklin addressed his work.

Although today's interdependence of global political and economic institutions would have been nearly inconceivable in Franklin's world, the nature of state and especially local politics parallels the politics described in the *Autobiography*. Projects to adequately fund roads, libraries, fire departments, schools, and hospitals still dominate local town halls. And while the national trends of polarization have trickled down even to the local level, Franklin's examples of building support across diverse factions continues to inform his readers on the use of skilled cunning to influence political outcomes. While Franklin was interested in institutional design, he grounded his thoughts on leadership at the level of individual action. It is no coincidence that he is famous for popularizing the phrase, "God helps those who help themselves." In his approach to leadership, he is less concerned with reforming or policing the actions of elected officials and far more concerned with regulating one's own behavior. By starting with the self as a locus of control, Franklin sees opportunities for cultivating civic habits that can restructure a community. Though Franklin focuses on individual improvement, his primary objective is community improvement. There is no room for apathy or disengagement under Franklin's approach to democratic leadership.

Conclusion

In the face of plummeting trust in government, media, and political institutions, Franklin's example of leadership offers a promising antidote to leadership models that at one extreme tolerate narcissism and deceit and at the other insist on unfailing candor. Franklin is clear that complete candor can lead to failures of deliberation. His primary claim is that sometimes, to achieve legitimate political ends that benefit the public good, political leaders must engage in some level of hypocrisy. This may take the form of misrepresenting the origins of a political proposal or even the intentions behind it. It may also require that individuals appear to be virtuous when they are not as a means of generating political support. It is more detrimental, Franklin would argue, to eliminate these seemingly harmless acts of deception than to forgo the political benefits they bring about.

As Shklar has rightly argued of Franklin, "[He] was not a con man; he disguised his enormously superior intelligence, not some secret vice. To be sure, he did mean to dominate, but it was within the confines of the political stage, where the question isn't to rule or not to rule, but the manner in which one shall rule."[71] For Franklin, this requires politicians to engage in the art of persuasion, crafting their arguments, and modifying their tone to suit their audience. While Franklin's example may be exceptional—a superior intellect having to feign modesty—his art of virtue translates to many other political situations in which it is necessary to conceal one's vanity or feign sincerity in order to facilitate deliberation. To this degree, hypocrisy is a not-so vicious vice that can support a well-functioning democracy.

Notes

1. Dennis F. Thompson, *Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business, and Healthcare* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 209.
2. Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 45.
3. Examples of those who think it undermines accountability include Peter A. Furia, "Democratic Citizenship and the Hypocrisy of Leaders," *Polity* 41, no. 1 (2009): 113–33; Thompson, *Restoring Responsibility*, especially institutional hypocrisy. Among those who see hypocrisy as inevitable or possibly useful are Keith J. Bybee, *All Judges Are Political— Except When They Are Not* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Ruth W. Grant, *Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Elizabeth Markovits, *The Politics of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, and Democratic Judgment* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); David Runciman, *Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, from Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2008); and Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*.
4. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 67.
5. Scholars have long debated Franklin's political commitments and even whether he had a political philosophy. He was long considered to be a Whig. See Clinton Rossiter, "The Political Theory of Benjamin Franklin," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 76 (1952): 259–93. Carla Mulford has traced Franklin's withdrawal of support for the British

Empire to his submersion in early modern liberalism. See Carla J. Mulford, *Benjamin Franklin and the Ends of Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). In this article, I follow the work of Steven Forde and Lorraine Pangle in emphasizing Franklin's democratic sensibilities in terms of his work toward simple and responsive representative governmental structures and a general commitment to egalitarianism. See Steven Forde, "Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography* and the Education of America," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (1992): 358n9; Lorraine Smith Pangle, *The Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 148–55.

6. Suzanne Dovi, "'Making the World Safe for Hypocrisy'?," *Polity* 34, no. 1 (September 1, 2001): 10. Similarly, in "Democratic Citizenship," Furia describes it as a failure to practice what one preaches (115).
7. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 47; Thompson, *Restoring Responsibility*, 210–11.
8. Andrew Kohut, "The People and Their Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor" (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, April 10, 2010), 6, https://www.people-press.org/2010/04/18/distrust-discontent-anger-and-partisan-rancor.
9. Grant, *Hypocrisy and Integrity*, 52.
10. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*; Runciman *Political Hypocrisy*, 1.
11. Thompson, *Restoring Responsibility*, 209.
12. Alan Kennan, *Democracy in Question: Democratic Openness in a Time of Political Closure* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 180.
13. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 48.
14. Thompson, *Restoring Responsibility*, 214.
15. Bybee, *All Judges Are Political*, 72.
16. Bybee's norm of courtesy can be contrasted with Teresa Bejan's more demanding account of the virtue of civility, which requires sincerity but not agreeableness. See Teresa M Bejan, *Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).
17. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 93.
18. Arendt, *On Revolution*, 95.
19. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 72.
20. See, e.g., Dale Carnegie, *How to Win Friends & Influence People* (New York: Pocket Books, 1936); Stephen Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989).
21. See Mark Twain, "The Late Benjamin Franklin," in *The Galaxy* 10 (July 1870): 1, in *Benjamin Franklin's "Autobiography," An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Criticism*, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay and P. M. Zall (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 272; D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American*

Literature (1923; repr., New York: Viking Press, 1961), 9–21; and Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

22. Douglas Anderson, "The Art of Virtue," in *The Cambridge Companion to Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Carla Mulford, Cambridge Companions to American Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 24–36; Forde, "Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography* and the Education of America;" Alan Craig Houston, *Benjamin Franklin and the Politics of Improvement* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); J. A. Leo Lemay, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. 2, *Printer and Publisher, 1730–1747* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Christopher S. McClure, "Learning from Franklin's Mistakes: Self-Interest Rightly Understood in the 'Autobiography,'" *Review of Politics* 76, no. 1 (2014): 69–92; Pangle, *The Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin*; and Michael Zuckerman, "Doing Good While Doing Well: Benevolence and Self-Interest in Franklin's *Autobiography*," in *Reappraising Benjamin Franklin: A Bicentennial Perspective*, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), 441–51.
23. Anderson, "The Art of Virtue," 27.
24. Zuckerman, "Doing Good While Doing Well," 443; McClure, "Learning from Franklin's Mistakes."
25. Hiram Caton, *The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic, 1600–1835* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988), 374–81.
26. Ralph Lerner, "Dr. Janus," in *Reappraising Benjamin Franklin: A Bicentennial Perspective*, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), 421.
27. Jerry Weinberger, *Benjamin Franklin Unmasked: On the Unity of His Moral, Religious, and Political Thought* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
28. Kevin Slack, "Benjamin Franklin's Metaphysical Essays and the Virtue of Humility," *American Political Thought* 2, no. 1 (2013): 58.
29. Steven Forde, *Locke, Science and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 238. I also read the *Autobiography* as a drama aimed at providing a model, one that may depart form Franklin's actual actions. I do not attempt to verify Franklin's stories against the historical record; rather, I am interested in the way Franklin wants to use these stories as instructive examples.
30. Benjamin Franklin, *The Autobiography and Other Writings*, ed. Peter Shaw (New York: Bantam Books), 75.

31. McClure argues Franklin inserted stories of significant life mistakes—"errata"—in the final copy of the *Autobiography* to show that moral perfection is impossible and that "one could bend the rules of virtue for the sake of happiness only if one had understood that service to others is the surest means to true happiness." See "Learning from Franklin's Mistakes," 92.
32. Benjamin Franklin, *Benjamin Franklin's "Autobiography," An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Criticism*, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay and P. M. Zall (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 224.
33. Pangle, *Political Philosophy*, 72–73. See also, Lemay, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin*, 2:43.
34. See esp. Lawrence, "Benjamin Franklin," 15–27.
35. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 76–77.
36. Forde, "Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography* and the Education of America"; Clinton Rossiter, "The Political Theory of Benjamin Franklin," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 76 (July 1952): 259–93.
37. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 76.
38. Pangle, *Political Philosophy*, 53.
39. Lemay, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin*, 2:45.
40. Lerner, "Dr. Janus," 417.
41. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 77.
42. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 85.
43. Although he was adamant in his advice, as Caton puts it, "[t]he exceptional Franklin did not necessarily practice what his spokespersons preached." See *Politics of Progress*, 376. For details on some of Franklin's squabbles resulting from party politics in colonial Pennsylvania, see Gary B. Nash, "The Transformation of Urban Politics, 1700–1765," *Journal of American History* 60, no. 3 (1973): 605–32.
44. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 84-85.
45. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 84.
46. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 84.
47. Forde, *Locke, Science and Politics*, 238.
48. McClure, "Learning from Franklin's Mistakes," 91.
49. David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
50. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 73.
51. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 4.
52. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 72.
53. Forde "Benjamin Franklin's *Autobiography*," 365–66.

54. Pangle, *Political Philosophy*, 122.
55. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 114.
56. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 118.
57. Monika L. McDermott, Douglas Schwartz, and Sebastian Vallejo, "Talking the Talk but Not Walking the Walk: Public Reactions to Hypocrisy in Political Scandal," *American Politics Research* 43, no. 6 (November 2015): 952–74.
58. McDermott, Schwartz, and Vallejo, "Talking the Talk," 7.
59. Furia, "Democratic Citizenship," 126.
60. McClure, "Learning from Franklin's Mistakes," 71.
61. John Adams, Extract from the *Boston Patriot,* May 15, 1811, in *The Works of John Adams,* ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston, 1856), 1:661.
62. Franklin, *Autobiography*, 104-105.
63. Houston, *Benjamin Franklin and the Politics of Improvement*, 69.
64. M. Irene Prete et al., "Age-Related Differences When Measuring Political Hypocrisy," *Journal of Public Affairs* 18, no. 4 (2018): e1707.
65. Edelman Intelligence, "20th Annual Edelman Trust Barometer," January 19, 2020, https://www.edelman.com/trustbarometer.
66. Richard Edleman, "The Evolution of Trust," January 19, 2020, https://www.edelman.com/research/evolution-trust.
67. Jamie Barden et al., "Order of Actions Mitigates Hypocrisy Judgments for Ingroup More than Outgroup Members," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 17, 5 (2013): 590–601.
68. Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker, "Political Trust in a Cynical Age," *Annual Review of Political Science* 21 (2018): 49–70.
69. Franklin's attempts to work among these groups did involve some political quarrels. See Nash, "Transformation of Urban Politics."
70. Jerry Weinberger, "Benjamin Franklin and Fake News," accessed May 31, 2020, http://www.hudson.org/research/13133-benjamin-franklin-and-fake-news.
71. Shklar, *Ordinary Vices*, 74.