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Myth, Moderate, or Machiavellian? Democratic Statesmanship and the Military Mind

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By April of 2016 the Republican primary race for the presidential election had taken a turn unforeseen by a preponderance of political scholars, journalists, and commentators. Donald J. Trump established himself as the frontrunner and was rapidly gaining momentum, much to the chagrin of "establishment" Republicans who sought a more traditional candidate. Meanwhile the presumptive Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, also appeared sufficiently polarizing to keep many voters home on Election Day. Among the many unique propositions floated in the media for the possibility of a breakthrough third candidate, one in particular captured a recurring theme in American politics. The proposal that the country should "draft" a military leader such as General James Mattis to serve as president in the vein of George Washington, Zachary Taylor, and Dwight Eisenhower reflected an underlying American theory that when democratic uncertainty abounds, a moderate military statesman provides stabilization and

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a steady hand on the ship of state.[1] The military moderate image is that of a public servant above the fray of party politics and capable of translating his or her life's commitment to the defense of the US Constitution into safe civilian political leadership—in other words, political leadership without all the politics. While neither General Mattis nor any other generals made a late entry into the 2016 race, the Trump administration deemed it prudent to appoint him as secretary of defense, placating, at least temporarily, those seeking the moderation of a military leader in the civilian side of the executive branch.

This essay examines a distinctive and recurring American appeal for a military leader to maintain, stabilize, or restore a republic. Americans are particularly attracted to certain characteristics of military professionalism and have an aversion to, if not disdain for, partisan politics. These characteristics are particularly in demand under certain national conditions, specifically periods of stabilization and potential single-party domination. It further proposes that democratic statesmanship and the American military mind work together in a different way than the public perhaps expects. By briefly outlining some key ideas associated with the concept of the military moderate statesman, offering a few examples, and overlaying two relevant clarifying concepts from Machiavelli, the essay intends to open a new dialogue about this phenomenon and its place in American political thought.

The American Military Moderate Statesman

In his seminal work on civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington characterized the military mind and ethic as one of "conservative realism." The particular features of this ethic that seem to resonate with the type of moderation Americans expect from professional soldiers are obedience to civil authorities of the state combined with its belief in "the limitation of state action to the direct interests of the state, the restriction of extensive commitments, and the undesirability of bellicose or adventurous policies."[2] Yet Huntington also claims this ethic "emphasizes the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature."[3] Such an ethic goes beyond

the pessimism of Publius's *Federalist Papers* on human nature, and even further beyond what a contemporary politician could say without incurring public censure. As a starting point, then, the American conception of the ideal military moderate seems grounded in military professionals' caution regarding foreign affairs and respect for the civilian offices of political leadership rather than in their outlook on human nature.[4]

Huntington claimed the combination of liberal ideology combined with a conservative US Constitution significantly delayed the incorporation of military professionalism in America. As a result, until the mid-twentieth century it was not moderate military professionals for whom Americans were calling in particular times but rather military heroes, usually nonprofessionals, who "became men of the people rather than men of the military."[5] Regarding those who did meet the definition of military professional, Huntington claims, "Their military service enabled them to be presented as the servants, not of party or faction, but of all the people. . . . These factors also enabled them to avoid commitment upon most of the issues of the day. They appealed to the public not because they had a definite program, military or otherwise, but because they had so little program."[6] The historical trend, readers may infer from Huntington, is that American military professionals hold the ability to understand the distinctions between the military and political spheres and can transition from the former to the latter in what might be called a democratically safe manner. In other words, they retain respect for the division between military and civil service and skepticism of partisan democratic politics, but they relinquish their primary identity as military professionals.[7] The expected product is an amalgam of a military mind and a moderate democratic statesman.

Some qualities of military virtue, especially courage, lead to popularity but do not necessarily indicate a public call for the military moderate. This especially applies to those whose service is characterized by their bold deeds as junior officers rather than by their leadership of large military organizations. No doubt, John F. Kennedy's brave exploits in World War II increased his electability,

but it was his predecessor's election that more closely aligned with a call for a military moderate—one who had carried out and perhaps completed the role to which the country had called him. While heroic virtue may be welcome in any era, the American public places a higher premium on the characteristics of military professionalism, with its commitment to the service of the state and its constitution and deliberate distance from democratic partisanship during certain tense political conditions.[8]

Among the potential political conditions that lead to American public approbation for a military moderate, periods of required stabilization and potential single-party domination bring this model of statesmanship into higher demand. Four brief sketches of military statesmen who were called to serve during such eras may suitably illustrate the general concept of this model: George Washington and George C. Marshall were welcomed as stabilizing statesmen, whereas Dwight D. Eisenhower and Zachary Taylor served as moderate restraints on a dominating party. Unlike the proverbial "man on horseback" model, Americans reject any notion of electing a military leader who would put public safety above the Constitution and the rule of law. The presidents who have arguably gone the furthest in extending constitutional executive power for national security, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, were not military men. The military moderate is expected to preserve the gains of the constitutional republic while remaining bounded by constitutional limitations. The examples offered in this essay are meant to sketch out ideas on the conditions that seem to invite military moderates to higher civil service and the desirability of their special characteristics, but these examples should not be viewed as comprehensive of all possible examples and conditions.[9] That caveat aside, a first such set of conditions is the perceived necessity for stabilization of a new political consensus.

In the experience of the United States since 1787, the idea of political stabilization is integrally tied to the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton once remarked to George Washington that his inauguration marked the completion of the organization of the Constitution as a structural fact, but it also served as a public display showing that

the most trusted military man in the United States had also been entrusted with overseeing the execution of the new Constitution as a stabilizing figure.[10] As general, Washington had subordinated himself to the congresses that preceded the Constitution and willingly laid down his arms when the civil political authorities no longer required his service. When he was called back to serve as president of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, it was his moderation more than his military service that was required.[11] His political career up to that point had been relatively brief, yet he was elected to this new post with all the authority of an experienced statesman and given the chance to reaffirm his commitment to the nascent republic as a democratic statesman who would defer to the will of the people. His reputation was likewise indispensable in garnering support for the Constitution, which had significantly altered the form of government and required broad consensus to establish it firmly. His subsequent election to the presidency of the United States came as no surprise to those who had been delegates to the Convention or to the public in general. Because of the many factors that made Washington the "first man" in his country, it is difficult to pull apart whether Washington the general, Washington the military hero, or both are proper categories in which to place his ascension as a military statesman. The deep desire for lasting political order and consistency, however, suggests that his organization of the army and strategic experience as general would have been difficult for a fledgling nation to ignore.[12]

An American military hero can just as easily emerge from the ranks of the militia as from a professional military, but the moderate military statesman requires the kind of military administrative leadership qualities that the militiaman will be unlikely to hold. Washington's strategy of selective battle engagement in order to build a more professional force combined with his obedience to civil authorities were the traits in high demand after the war was over and a new government was formed. As Don Higginbotham notes, "[H]is most glaring weaknesses as a field-grade officer were to be corrected in time and were to become the sources of his greatest strength. His respect for and understanding of superior

authority—that is to say civil control of the military *and all that it meant*—became his most admirable soldierly quality in the War of Independence and his foremost contribution to the American military tradition."[13]

Washington's military virtue made him a new kind of Cincinnatus for a new kind of republic—one who was not given the unbounded powers of a dictator but who first had to prove his deference to the civil powers before being granted executive political authority. Gordon Wood has focused on his characteristic demonstrations of "disinterestedness" as vital to his reputation, which aligns well with the public concept of the military moderate statesman.[14] This disinterestedness enabled him to put himself above politics, not merely outside it. It allowed for a certain type of republican greatness that would be necessary for a unitary executive who would have to maintain the dignity and responsibility of the executive office against a powerful Congress. Although aloofness can be a liability for democratic representatives, it can actually be an asset for a democratic chief executive or department head, as the case of Washington demonstrated.[15]

President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, his slow and steady strengthening of the federal government, and his management of an ambitious set of executive officers all appear in conformity with the expectation of the military moderate statesman.[16] That image has secured itself in American public memory as the quintessential example of the model. As Wood notes, up through Eisenhower the American people have "periodically elected military leaders, Washingtons manqué, to the presidency."[17]

The military moderate statesman need not always be a president, of course. George C. Marshall served as a powerful statesman-strategist in the executive bureaucracy. His moderation drew heavily from a realistic approach to grand strategy that incorporates "the constant and intelligent reconciliation of ways, means, and ends," as the editor of a recent volume on Marshall noted.[18] Marshall's focus on national grand strategy began during his military career, and in that sense he was a military moderate statesman

as both a military and a civil officer.[19] Marshall's aversion to partisan politics led to his appointment to high civil office as an alternative to the presidency. Biographer Mark Stoler writes, "Upon arrival in Washington on 21 January 1947, Marshall moved to reinforce his bipartisan and apolitical image, as well as squelch some recent rumors, by being 'explicit and emphatic' in announcing to the assembled press that he was not a candidate for any political office and could under no circumstances be drafted to run."[20] Marshall's disinterestedness in political office, however, did not equate to a lack of political skill. In a recent biography Debi and Irwin Unger claim it was his ability to persuade Congress and the American people on the key issues of the day that prompted President Truman to appoint him secretary of state. As they further explain, "Marshall's dignity, rectitude, nonpartisanship—his very austerity—commanded respect from Congress. Except for a small circle of erstwhile isolationists and professional red-baiters, his views were usually accepted as disinterested and irreproachable."[21]

Marshall succeeded as a lobbyist of strategy for Truman. As the Ungers conclude, "Standing above the bitter partisan political fray of those years, in collaboration with Senator Vandenberg he had helped forge an American foreign policy consensus that, for good or ill, would last through the rest of the century."[22] More important, the Ungers point out, is that although whether Marshall deserved the extent of the public accolades laid upon him at his death remains an open debate (based on their assessment of his record of failures and successes), it was his model of military statesmanship that the American citizenry praised: "The discrepancy may well have originated in Americans' yearning for a platonic ideal of a triumphant military leader above politics, deceit, and selfish ambition—in a word, a George Washington—which they located in a fallible man of sterling character but unremarkable powers."[23]

A second set of conditions that seems to induce a call for the moderate military statesman occurred when the two-party system, which grew organically out of the Constitution, began to ossify into a dominant single party and renewed American concerns of tyranny of the majority. In these cases the military moderate is

sought after in order to renew debate and rebalance the electoral system, but not necessarily to erect a radical new party. As two examples consider the cases of Zachary Taylor and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The strength of the Jacksonian Democratic Party, broken up only occasionally by Whigs, had steadily entrenched itself as the single party equipped to deal with the problems of the nation. The first Whig president, William Henry Harrison, had been elected under the military hero model, but his early death and his successor's drift into strengthening the Democratic Party did not do enough to assure the durability of the Whigs as a political force.[24] Taylor's election signified the revival of the military moderate as a nonpartisan servant of the people—one who by being above party could limit either party's reach. He had deep credibility as an apolitical candidate because unlike Washington and every other president with military experience up to 1848, Taylor had never served in any civil office until the presidency.[25] The political environment of late 1847 was changing rapidly. Taylor's publicly nonpartisan, almost antipartisan image, which would once have been a political liability, was now an advantage.[26] As biographer Holman Hamilton explains, "[S]uddenly the warrior who never voted became the masses' favorite candidate for the highest office in the land."[27] When Taylor publicly made known he would accept the nomination of either party but be beholden to none, the Whigs begrudgingly nominated him, allowing their party to live another day and preventing a national notion that the Democratic Party would bring Americans into a second "Era of Good Feelings," this time permanently.[28]

With the instability of the federal, state, and constitutional status of slavery, a military moderate such as Taylor would be unlikely to take a strong stance on free-soil policy. His election did not strengthen the Whigs so much as preserve them while checking Democratic ambitions. Taylor's Washingtonian ideal of exemplifying the image of "President of the whole people" was intrinsically tied to his appearance as a military moderate statesman.[29] In another recent biography, John Eisenhower notes that "Taylor had

insisted that he would accept the presidency only if drafted by all the people. In the end it was not quite so. He had been drafted only by the Whigs, who were desperate for a winner."[30] Taylor's presidency may have served its purpose, but after Dred Scott, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the Lecompton debacle made the future of slavery an unavoidable political topic, the people no longer looked to a military moderate but to a new Republican Party that had the ability to check the Democratic Party in a way the Whigs had failed to do.[31] The stakes were not quite as high a century later when Eisenhower was called to the presidency.

By the end of the 1940s Franklin D. Roosevelt's Democratic Party had once again pushed the boundaries of single-party domination with New Dealers in every corner of government and a satisfactory political descendant in Harry Truman. Like Taylor, Eisenhower appeared to be above party. Unlike Taylor, he was clearer about his alignment with Republicans when finally pressed into declaring his affiliation shortly before he was "drafted" into the 1952 presidential race. Although any candidate can appeal to the call of public "duty," the term flows more naturally when coming from a soldier, especially generals like Eisenhower and Washington who were continually called back into the public sphere after attempts to retire to private life.[32] Eisenhower drew great strength from independent voters who would necessarily become at least temporary Republicans in order to vote for him.[33] This suggests not a national shift toward just *any* Republican candidate but a call for Eisenhower as a nonpartisan military moderate who could stave off single-party rule without overly strengthening the Republican Party.

Eisenhower believed that office-seeking by high-ranking military officers had the potential to damage civil-military relations. As one biographer has quoted, "Dwight was convinced that 'the necessary and wise subordination of the military to civil power will best be sustained, and our people will have greater confidence that it is so sustained, when life-long professional soldiers, in the absence of some obvious and overriding reason, abstain from seeking high office.'"[34] When this same biographer later states that

Eisenhower "was also aware that the American voter prefers the candidate to be a reluctant aspirant," he fails to note that this seems to be particularly the case for the military moderate statesmen.[35] After all, since the twentieth century the public has accepted more unveiled ambition from pure civilian candidates.

The advantage in calling forth Eisenhower as a military moderate is that he both served as a public model of citizenship and pushed for the reinvigoration of programs to build and enhance dedication to citizenship as an idea. This allowed Republicans to use him to break the momentum of the Democratic agenda gently and without raising effective mass opposition.[36] As mentioned, once his moderating task was complete, it paved the way for a Kennedy to build on those ideas of citizenship in a Democratic Party less ambitious than Roosevelt's to rule as a single party.

These sketches suggest a certain kind of image the democratic military moderate statesman holds in the American historical canon. While the US Constitution is exceptional in its scope, its longevity, and especially its powerful, almost sacred hold on its military leaders, it does not free the military statesman from all the difficulties of democratic statesmanship. Niccolò Machiavelli understood that military experience and professionalism do not exempt such leaders from the challenges that the people and fortune will raise in democracies. He argued that his Florentine republic was at its best when it was governed by wise civil and military orders with a "Captain" who understood both types of orders standing at the head of its council of representatives.[37]

Machiavelli and the Military Moderate

Machiavelli offers two interrelated concepts useful for understanding the American tradition of calling for a military moderate. First, the call for a moderate military statesman, as opposed to a military dictator, provides evidence of an uncorrupted democratic citizenry that has not lost its taste for liberty. Second, the military statesman may be required to undertake great actions to preserve or maintain the republic, but when doing so he must remain clothed in the appearance of moderation. Machiavelli's concepts may help temper

the faith Americans put in the military moderate statesman model and provide a clearer eye to see why the policy outcomes from these statesmen are not always as expected. The generals noted in this essay were adept at incorporating this second concept into their statesmanship and therefore might be characterized as Machiavellian in this particular limited aspect. Arguably, American military moderate statesmen incorporate other Machiavellian concepts in their political strategy and foreign policy in a limited manner, but in the overall record of their words and deeds they come nowhere close to embracing or endorsing Machiavelli's full-scale rejection of traditional virtue. Neither do they accept the necessity of nearly unlimited means to achieve the security of the state. They are, at best, merely limited Machiavellians.[38]

Throughout Machiavelli's works, especially the *Art of War* and the *Discourses on Livy*, runs the theme of the immense difficulties of democratic statesmanship when a republic's citizens are corrupt. This idea of corruption is not moral but political. As Catherine Zuckert explains, "By corrupt or corruption Machiavelli consistently refers to the loss of the ability and willingness of people to defend themselves from oppression either internal or external."[39] If we apply this idea to the theme of this essay, the appointment of a military moderate statesman may indicate less about the moderation of the general and more about the moderation of the citizenry who look to appoint such a general to high office. A free citizenry who have lost their reverence for the rule of law that protects their liberty are willing to empower a Caesar or Napoleon.[40] An uncorrupt citizenry, in contrast, will appoint a Washington or Taylor and in doing so retain its ability to defend itself and its liberties. Such appointments are praiseworthy, and Abraham Lincoln offers just such praise at Taylor's death by remarking, "Nor can I help thinking that the American people, in electing Gen[eral] Taylor to the presidency, thereby showing their high appreciation, of his sterling, but unobtrusive qualities, did their country a service, *and themselves an imperishable honor*."[41] These are statesmen who knew how to appear moderate even when such moderation belies remarkably bold decisions, whether issuing a Neutrality Proclamation, as did

Washington, or breaking a balance between free and slave states, as will be shown in the case of Taylor. From a Huntingtonian perspective, therefore, it may actually be the individual's military mind (ostensibly a crucial element in attracting the public mandate to become a civil political leader) that must be altered for that individual to be an effective democratic statesman.[42]

When Machiavelli looks to the ancient republics, he rediscovers a few characteristics of the relationship between an uncorrupted democratic people and their military leaders that help preserve liberty. One of these is the importance of the proper conveyance of gratitude from citizens to their military leaders and the danger of public ingratitude. As one example, he reassesses the case of the Roman general-turned-traitor Coriolanus. While recognizing ingratitude as a sign of corruption, Machiavelli nonetheless explains in the *Discourses* that Rome was "the least ungrateful" of the many great republics he referenced and specifically exonerates the citizens from the charge of ingratitude in the case of Coriolanus. He argues that Coriolanus "was not pardoned because he had always reserved a hostile spirit against the people."[43] Rather, his pride and his misunderstanding of the importance of the relationship between the two humors in Rome (the plebeians and the nobles) was the cause of the tumults, not the ingratitude of the people.[44]

Machiavelli expands his analysis of Coriolanus in the *Discourses,* in which he describes two "useful effects for a republic" that emerge from "being able to accuse citizens to the people, or to some magistrate or council, when they sin in anything against the free state."[45] The first is fear of accusation as a deterrent to conspiracy, the second "an outlet . . . given by which to vent, in some mode against some citizen, those humors that grow up in cities."[46] He makes no remark on the former, as it is self-explanatory; but for the latter he states there are many examples, Coriolanus being one of them. The irony here is that the public accusations against Coriolanus were in fact instrumental for maintaining safe relations between the two humors. The public trial avoided his murder in a tumult, which Machiavelli states would have led to the following

destructive path: "offense by private individuals against private individuals, which offense generates fear; fear seeks for defense; for defense they procure partisans; from partisans arise the parties in cities; from parties their ruin."[47] On the contrary, Machiavelli notes, because the affair was governed through public authority, "all those ills came to be taken away that could have arisen."[48] Just as the appointing of a military moderate to high office in a time of partisan rancor demonstrates the lack of corruption in the people, the rejection of an immoderate military statesman such as Coriolanus gives evidence of the same.[49]

Machiavelli's remedy or inoculation against ingratitude in republics is more nuanced than the solution for principalities. As more captains had opportunities to demonstrate their military virtues, they served as a check on one another, each wanting to avoid much suspicion of ambition. As he summarizes, "They kept themselves so upright, and so hesitant to cast a shadow of any ambition or give cause to the people to offend them for being ambitious, that when one came to the dictatorship he carried away from it the greater glory the sooner he laid it down. And so since modes such as these could not generate suspicion, they did not generate ingratitude."[50] It is not surprising, then, that Wood asserts that Washington's resignation as commander in chief after the American Revolution was the "greatest act of his life."[51] The act was recognized as such in his own time as the legacy of his greatness and the evidence of his disinterestedness and proper understanding of republican gratitude that citizens and their statesmen must display.[52] It is a sort of stage play in which the people, knowing a Washington, Taylor, or Eisenhower to be ambitious but safe, require that he publicly demonstrate his safety by maintaining the appearance of moderation. These generals, in return, whose ambition may truly be said to be limited to high service to a free government, by a clear demonstration of their safe and moderate aims help the public remain uncorrupted. The free republic is the beneficiary of the exchange.

Machiavelli's approach suggests there is a certain version of the military moderate statesman model that ancient Rome

exemplified, but the model was not of military statesmen who were moderate so much as military statesmen who knew when to appear moderate, or at least no more ambitious than their peers.[53] The glory gained in a republic from laying down power (once the cause of its granting is complete) satisfies the ambition of the statesmen while simultaneously protecting against the disease of ingratitude. In the *Discourses* Machiavelli further shows that the Romans, not unlike the Americans, offered their "captains" great deference in military policy, accepting that military decision-making is complex and unintended missteps are an unavoidable consequence of such enterprises.[54]

Machiavelli's model of military statesmen draws out another feature that seems at odds with the American model but might satisfactorily explain why military moderates are able to transition between the two worlds more easily than expected. While Americans put military moderates into power precisely because they believe them to live a life apart from politicians, Machiavelli suggested long ago that this common belief has carried undue weight. In the preface of *Art of War* Machiavelli strongly contends against the opinion "that there are not things less in agreement with one another or so dissimilar as the civilian and military lives."[55] Instead he claims, "But if ancient orders were considered, nothing would be found more united, more in conformity, and, of necessity, as much inclined toward one another as these."[56] When neither the civil nor military orders of a republic are corrupt, the military and civil lives are not so different as they may appear.[57] Whereas the *Discourses* investigates the corruption of the civil side of republics, *Art of War* focuses on the military corruption. As becomes apparent in Book I of the work, the opportunity for the keen-eyed military statesmen to arise in a republic is stifled by the lack of a well-ordered national military.[58]

Unlike the city-states of Machiavelli's Italy, the prudence of a purely citizen-militia model for a state the size of the United States has long since passed. The principles of a healthy republic managing its own arms and using its own citizens from a variety of classes or social groups, however, remain useful for the model of the military

moderate statesmen.[59] The professional soldier who manages only mercenaries will not be able to adapt to a position of republican civil rule easily because such a soldier will be unable to grasp fully the political factions and dynamics at work.[60] In the United States, however, the lack of corruption (in the Machiavellian sense) made possible by its structural design has led to a workable model for a military moderate statesman. This being said, what seems to be necessary is not actual moderation but the appearance of moderation that is accepted both by the statesman and by the public. That is to say, to make clear this essay's final proposal, even if both the public and the statesmen realize that the task at hand requires bold leadership and innovation, it is important that the statesman meeting this task appear clothed in moderation, not merely when accepting high office, but when executing the duties of that office.

As illustrative of this proposal, consider the case of Zachary Taylor and his policy positions during the Compromise of 1850 negotiations.[61] Admittedly, determining what should count as the true "moderate" position during these negotiations is subject to serious debate. If we grant that the final outcome as championed by Henry Clay was billed and generally received by the public as moderate, then Taylor's opposition to several of its components should have been at least a small stain on his robe of moderation. Taylor, however, saw the dangers in trying to settle the slavery question in what would be yet another ultimately disappointing grand attempt. That question could be resolved only once a final binding decision on the extension of slavery in territories was, if ever, answered. Instead, Taylor bypassed this question, recognizing the appearance of moderation that three guiding themes could offer in this crisis. First, a transition from military government to full-fledged statehood in California and New Mexico held the promises of self-government, federalism, constitutionalism, and union that the American public-at-large holds as the essence of liberal moderation. It had the additional exemplary benefit of demonstrating that General Taylor, who had been partly responsible for the safety of those regions, would not as President Taylor maintain a military form of rule in disputed areas.

Second, the question of the extension of slavery would be firmer and safer for perpetual union if the controversial question of slavery in the territories were obviated by a shorter path to statehood. Taylor, like others including Stephen Douglas, contended that slavery would not naturally go in these western areas. Unlike Douglas, however, Taylor's push for immediate statehood in California *ensured* that slavery would not go there and would prevent debacles such as the Lecompton affair that would come long after his death.

As a third theme, which at least for a few years appeared the mark of moderation, Taylor vigorously defended the concept of union and crafted a tough stance to deter Texas from taking any rash and aggressive actions in New Mexico. He did this not as General Taylor defending his own troops, but as President Taylor the civilian commander in chief defending federal authority as Washington had done in the Whiskey Rebellion. Taylor's constitutionalism allowed him to defend the union where he had a lawful right to do so. Robert Remini states that as the debate over Henry Clay's omnibus compromise bill intensified, "the president, both publicly and privately, assured all Americans that he was prepared to save the Constitution and the Union—even if it necessitated the shedding of blood."[62] In context, just as a Texas incursion into New Mexico would have been tantamount to rebellion, so would an unlawful federal incursion into the South to free slaves while the institution of slavery still held clear federal statutory and constitutional protections in the states. Taylor as a potential presidential candidate, therefore, could assure Jefferson Davis of his willingness to defend southern states' rights.[63] This was an assurance that surely carried more weight coming from a southerner than it did when Lincoln would offer the same guarantees a decade later.

By clothing himself in ideas that represented American consensus—self-government, constitutional federalism, the rule of law, and union—Taylor was able to hide the magnitude of the potential radical impact of his policies. Compromise, however, is another hallmark of moderation in the American eye, and a public veto of the Compromise of 1850 might have tarnished that

reputation beyond recovery. His untimely death may have had the unforeseen consequence of preserving his place in the line of military moderate statesmen.

As should be clear to contemporary readers, Taylor's path forward during 1850 would have had a radical impact on the future of slavery and the union. Had he been able to secure enough votes from a coalition of Whigs, Free-Soilers, and pro-union Democrats, the United States may have seen California, New Mexico, Utah, Kansas, and Nebraska all be admitted as free states.[64] Potentially, though unlikely, he may have been able to fend off the almost certain threat of secession after such events thorough a combination of his standing with the southern states in a post-Calhoun era and his willingness to use federal force to maintain the union. Furthermore, he could have left the most radical aspect of settling the slavery question to William Seward as the designated Taylor heir to the presidency.[65] Taylor could then remain a model military moderate statesman while having essentially constructed the framework for putting slavery back on the path to ultimate extinction (to borrow Lincoln's words). One can almost hear a counterfactual set of Lincoln–Douglas debates in which it is Douglas who raises a conspiracy theory against Lincoln for devising a house of antislavery in which "Zachary, William, Martin, and Abraham" have all carved niches for the laying of timbers.[66]

Ironically, Lincoln's own rather strange eulogy of Taylor focuses mainly on his military career and willingness to go against accepted opinions on strategy. He says very little of Taylor's opposition to the Compromise of 1850 or his defense of California's and New Mexico's free-statehood aims.[67] Although more could be said on this eulogy with regard to Lincoln's own political strategy in this speech, for the purpose of this essay it is enough to observe that he ends on a note that echoes the idea of the public's trust in Taylor as a military moderate. In assessing the political effect of Taylor's death, he remarks, "I will not pretend to believe all wisdom, or all the patriotism of the country, died with Gen[eral] Taylor. But we know that *wisdom* and *patriotism*, in a public office, under institutions like ours, are wholly inefficient and worthless, unless they are

sustained by the confidence and devotion of the people. And I confess my apprehensions, that in the death of that late President, we have lost a degree of that confidence and devotion, which will not soon again pertain to any successor."[68] It was public confidence in the Taylor model that Lincoln believes would have led to a better chance of sectional acquiescence to an end to the unnamed but unmistakable "*great* question of the day."[69]

Taylor's death in office protected the public image of the American military moderate statesman, but such a blow from fortune is not always necessary to keep the robes of this model unstained. Ulysses S. Grant, George Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower each had similarly powerful projects for which they were responsible. Although more can and should be said about each of these cases, this essay intends only to present the theory as a path forward for further investigations. One such line of research could assess whether the theory holds up under deep analysis of military moderate statesmen, two of whom have received more attention as of late from authors finding serious national strategies underneath the traditionally held view that their presidential aspirations and accomplishments were average at best.[70]

Conclusion: The Military Moderate in the Uncorrupted Republic

It stands to reason that when Americans looked to James Mattis in 2016, they also looked to George Washington. Whether accurate or not, the election of Donald Trump and the expectation of major reforms in foreign affairs and the executive bureaucracy demonstrates a different kind of call for stabilization. In this case, the hope seemed to be that someone like Mattis would have the military professional dedication to ensure continuity in the defense realm combined with a moderate approach to national strategy in foreign affairs. Leveraging the nation's high level of trust in the military by appointing a nonpartisan, recently retired, and highly respected general seemed to show at least some deference from the Trump administration that such stability was desired by the general citizenry. Mattis was expected to be not merely the leader of a large bureaucracy but also a statesman who would have a heavy

role in determining national strategy. His pre-administration stance of a strategy that matched national strategic ends with the correct means was appealing to both an administration that aimed at revising overseas commitments and a war-weary American public. As the head of the largest department in the executive, he could serve as a de facto first among equals in the administration and devise a strategy equal to the tasks he faced with regard to Russia, China, and the Middle East. If he could not be a Washington, perhaps he would be a second George Marshall, it was hoped, who had been put to the task of solving strategic problems from within an administration that faced the post–World War II and Cold War international environment. Interestingly, after two years of service in their first senior civil posts, both statesmen resigned when they determined that because of an increasing misalignment of views on strategy, they could no longer serve the president in the capacity required of them.[71]

It is worth considering how the public reaction to Mattis's departure from the office of secretary of defense and his reputation as a military moderate statesman might settle over time. Months before Mattis's resignation, media outlets picked up on a story that the president had allegedly made a reference to Mattis having transformed from "Mad Dog" to "Moderate Dog."[72] Regardless of the veracity of the claim, it highlights the interesting case of a secretary of defense who was appointed with much public approbation based on a belief he would serve as a military moderate statesman. Yet it was also a certain kind of moderation that seemed attractive to the administration's goals. A little more than a year before his appointment Mattis had written a short but influential essay on grand strategy that would realign national security ends with a realistic appraisal of available means. This approach included, among other things, stronger alliances capable of burden sharing and increased caution when considering "changes to military rules, traditions and standards that bring non-combat emphasis to combat units."[73] Arguably, the president hired the "Mad Dog" to boldly bring a moderate end to the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq-Syria—a moderation in foreign policy for which the public

also seemed anxious. The story, however, suggests that a moderate strategy perhaps required willingness for extreme measures that a "Moderate Dog" might not agree with as prudent. For those who believed the public call for Mattis's appointment was to temper the chief executive, "Moderate Dog" may actually have been the most praiseworthy name the president could have bestowed on him and enshrined his reputation as an exemplary military moderate statesman.[74]

The Mattis public resignation letter should not be misunderstood as a repudiation of ends, for it explicitly affirms the agreement on strategic ends. The careful reader must then investigate closely the closing upshot: "Because you have the right to have a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position."[75] The misalignment of views, if not on ends, must refer to the means of accomplishing those ends. As this essay has suggested, the public call for a military moderate statesman also includes bold tasks the statesman is expected to undertake while remaining clothed in the appearance of moderation. If a public resignation risked this appearance, the president may have intentionally or inadvertently salvaged it by leaking the idea that Mattis was essentially fired. These events are far too near to categorize the long-term public and scholarly assessment of General Mattis as a military moderate statesman. Like Eisenhower and Marshall, his statesmanship and foreign policy influence while still in uniform was incredibly significant and will likely garner as much, if not more, attention than his civil service statesmanship. The inclusion of his story in this essay is meant to demonstrate that the theme of military moderate statesmanship continues into the present and is not limited to the first two centuries of the nation. Furthermore, it calls for reflection on the roots of the phenomenon.

In closing, a tentative answer to the question of this essay's title is that the moderate military statesman in the United States is part myth, a certain kind of moderate, and a limited Machiavellian. The moderate military statesman is part myth because though we have examples of such statesmen as sketched in this essay, they have

taken on an appearance and legacy that upholds a particular aspect of the idea of American exceptionalism—that its citizens require the appearance of moderation even when great political tasks are demanded of its leaders. In holding this requirement the people may be said to have maintained themselves as uncorrupted. The military moderate statesman can also fairly be called moderate, but only insofar as he understands there are limitations on his public actions but not nearly as tight as one would expect. It is the moderation of a general who understands the written and unwritten rules of warfare and will push hard on their limits without breaking them. In their actions these statesmen may push the bounds of moderation, but never in their reverence for the Constitution and civil order of the American republic.

Finally, the moderate military statesman is a limited Machiavellian in the sense that he has not been blind to the nature of the citizens he serves. Certainly this essay makes no claim that the statesmen sketched here rejected traditional moral virtue, had deeply hidden political designs, or were squarely motivated by their desires to acquire or dominate. Neither, however, were they classical republicans who attempted to instill in the citizenry an unassailable patriotic virtue as the means of preserving order and organizing defense. They were democratic statesmen with a certain kind of military mind that allowed them to appreciate the reliance of liberty on order while also appreciating that a liberty-loving people are not always amenable to instilling that order when it is necessary. Washington understood this when moving steadily but cautiously to solidify Federalist goals while acquiescing to the rising tide of Democratic-Republican ideas when possible. Marshall understood this when accepting public blame for disciplining MacArthur.[76] No American political leader, military or otherwise, is likely to publicly declare himself or herself in favor of any teaching of Machiavelli. Even a leader's ideas that align closely with American traditions, such as the strong recommendation for a citizen-based military force, appear safer when they come from other sources. When the call for the next moderate military statesman comes, he or she may find that a legacy of "Hero of the

Republic" or "Disappointment of the Republic" will depend largely on the ability to maintain a moderate image, undertake great tasks, and tame fortune in a manner that Machiavelli would have found worthy to include as an anecdote in one of his works. He might rightfully characterize the phenomenon of the American military moderate statesman as an example of a republic that has found a healthy way to stave off its corruption for a few centuries. But before Americans immoderately celebrate this accomplishment, they should not forget Machiavelli's grave assertion "that it is impossible to order a perpetual republic, because its ruin is caused through a thousand unexpected ways."[77]

Notes

1. Tim Mak, "The Secret Movement to Draft General James Mattis for President," *The Daily Beast*, April 8, 2016, https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-secret-movement-to-draft-general-james-mattis-for-president; David Ignatius, "Five Military Leaders Republicans Could Draft for a Run for President. (Hint: It Worked Before)," *Washington Post*, April 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/04/11/five-military-leaders-republicans-could-draft-for-a-run-for-president-hint-it-worked-before/. On Eisenhower's receptiveness to being "drafted" for the presidency, see William B. Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 154, 211–12. See also Joseph M. Dailey, "The Reluctant Candidate: Dwight Eisenhower in 1951," in *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman*, ed. Joan P. Krieg (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 1–9.
2. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 79.
3. Ibid.
4. An assessment of Huntington's overarching theory of civil-military relations and its criticisms are beyond the scope of this paper. It is worth noting, however, that while scholars such as Peter Feaver have demonstrated that the history of the Cold War did not necessarily generate greater civilian sympathy for all aspects of "conservative realism," it does not follow that the public disassociated military officers from this ideological disposition. Furthermore, acknowledgment of a continued civil-military "gap" would be compatible with a public that calls for a distinctively different type of statesman when it calls for the

military moderate. For Feaver's critique see Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 16–53. For an expansive analysis of the broader civil-military gap see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

5. Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 159.
6. Ibid., 160.
7. Ibid., 143–62.
8. The literature on the American "military hero" model seems to live mainly in the biographies of its general-statesmen. Outside of this realm, theoretical studies are surprisingly slim. Huntington's reference points, for example, are works such as Dorothy Burne Goebel and Julius Goebel Jr.'s *Generals in the White House* that explore the disconnect between the traditional American prejudices and fears of military power and American willingness to elect generals to high office. They conclude that parties have at times had a "false reliance on a public taste for generals. If there is anything proved by the campaigns in which soldiers figured, it is the absence of any factors of predictability common to them all" (266–67). More important for this study, they note, "In the face of enduring prejudice against the profession of arms the gage of virtue in civil office has been found in the belief that the general's service has been not for party but for country and thus for the people themselves" (268). Such an assessment seems more compatible with the contentions of this essay on characteristics and conditions of the military moderate statesman than a "military hero" model. Huntington also refers to one of the few explicit studies on the subject, Albert Somit's 1948 article "The Military Hero as Presidential Candidate." As Peter Karsten has recently noted, this study seemed to stand for a half century without any major attempts to expand or critique the theory. Karsten broaches the subject with a new methodology that indicates far less significance of military heroism in presidential elections. Karsten's article demonstrates room for new ideas on determining when military qualities might matter more in electing or appointing statesmen. In addition, Karsten ends his study by reminding his readers of the substantial evidence found by Christopher Gelpi and Peter Feaver that policy makers with military experience tend to "be cautious about entering into military disputes" but also use more force when the decision to enter conflict has been made (496). This seems to tacitly acknowledge the usefulness of Huntington's "conservative realism" description of military leaders. In sum, the military hero model misses

that the call for a military leader to enter the political realm is more complex than a set of virtues. As this essay argues, it is a combination of particular characteristics and political circumstances that lead to the call for a military moderate statesman and not merely a military hero. See Dorothy Burne Goebel and Julius Goebel Jr., *Generals in the White House* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1945); Albert Somit, "The Military Hero as Presidential Candidate," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 192–200; Peter Karsten, "Veteran Electability to the Presidency: A Critique of the Somit Thesis," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 3 (July 2012): 486–99.

9. Ulysses S. Grant, though not addressed in this paper, also fits the category of military moderate statesman during a period of stabilization in his efforts to complete Reconstruction. Although Eric Foner's overall assessment of Grant's capacity for effecting Reconstruction is low, he notes that New York in particular assessed that "a Grant Presidency promised moderation, fiscal responsibility, and stable conditions for Southern investment." Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*, updated ed. (New York: HarperPerennial, 2014), 337. Capturing the broad idea of the task, "On January 11, *Harpers Weekly* said that the people expected and required General Grant to be the President for his 'wise and temperate touch' would heal the nation's wounds." Charles H. Coleman, *The Election of 1868: The Democratic Effort to Regain Control* (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 86.
10. Alexander Hamilton, "Hamilton to Washington, May 5, 1789," in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, digital ed., ed. Harold Syrett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2011), 5:335.
11. For a broader look at moderation and its appeal and place in America, see Paul O. Carrese, *Democracy in Moderation: Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and Sustainable Liberalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 50–77; and for Washington in particular, ibid., 143–72.
12. Gordon Wood, in fact, contends that "Washington was not really a traditional military hero"; rather, it was his moral character that set him apart from the other men of his time. See Gordon S. Wood, *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 34.
13. Don Higginbotham, "Washington and the Colonial Military Tradition," in *George Washington Reconsidered*, ed. Don Higginbotham (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 61.

14. Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 42–45.
15. Edmund S. Morgan, "George Washington: The Aloof American," in *George Washington Reconsidered*, ed. Don Higginbotham (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 287–308. George Marshall received a similar appraisal from a reporter during an interview in 1955. See Debi and Irwin Unger with Stanley Hirshon, *George Marshall: A Biography* (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 483.
16. On the difficulty Washington encountered in balancing energetic executive foreign policy power, moderation, and public perception, see Gary J. Schmitt, "Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality: Executive Energy and the Paradox of Executive Power," *Political Science Reviewer* 29 (2000), EBSCO Discovery Service.
17. Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 63.
18. Charles F. Brower, "George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation," in *George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation*, ed. Charles F. Brower (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7. See also the expansion of this idea in Paul L. Miles, "Marshall as Grand Strategist" and Nicolaus Mills, "The Marshall Plan and American Modesty," in the same volume, pp. 35–57, 69–78.
19. Eisenhower may rightly be put in this category as well.
20. Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1989), 154.
21. Unger, *George Marshall*, 390.
22. Ibid., 452.
23. Ibid., 490.
24. President John Tyler's subsequent expulsion from the Whig Party and expanded use of formal and informal executive powers presented a significant setback to Whig aspirations. See also Jordan T. Cash, "The Isolated Presidency: John Tyler and Unilateral Presidential Power," *American Political Thought* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 26–55.
25. Heroism, however, was also clearly a factor in Taylor's electability, as some biographers have emphasized. See, e.g., Holman Hamilton, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier in the White House* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1951), 52.
26. John S. D. Eisenhower, *Zachary Taylor* (New York: Times Books, 2008), 79, 86; See also Joel H. Silbey, *Party over Section: The Rough and Ready Presidential Election of 1848* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 108–15; and Elbert B. Smith, *The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor & Millard Fillmore* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 39–41.

27. Hamilton, *Zachary Taylor*, 13.
28. As biographer Brainerd Dyer noted, Taylor himself "was convinced that a few more years of Democratic rule would leave nothing of the Constitution but its name." Brainerd Dyer, *Zachary Taylor* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), 277. Lincoln and the Republicans recognized that the move toward national slavery would be a vital part of Democratic single-party rule.
29. See Silbey, *Party over Section*, 108–15; see also the unusual "Statement of Principles" the Whigs released on their selection of Taylor that Silbey includes as an appendix on pp. 162–63. Also consider Dyer's concluding characterization of Taylor as a "hard-working successful officer rather than a military genius; an honest servant of the people rather than a great statesman." Dyer, *Zachary Taylor*, 410.
30. Eisenhower, *Zachary Taylor*, 87.
31. As Joseph Rayback notes, in the 1848 election "the electorate had provided a clue. It wanted a moderate solution to the problem of slavery in the territories." Joseph Rayback, *Free Soil: The Election of 1848* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 307.
32. See, for example, Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower: In War and Peace* (New York: Random House, 2012), 509.
33. Steve M. Barkin, "Eisenhower and Robinson: The Candidate and the Publisher in the 1952 Campaign," in *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman*, ed. Joan P. Krieg (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 15.
34. R. Alton Lee, *Dwight Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), 131.
35. Ibid., 146.
36. Julia Azari's recent work assesses the 1952 election as a landslide that curiously did not carry with it a party mandate, or at least not one Eisenhower thought prudent to use in his rhetoric. See Julia Azari, *Delivering the People's Message* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 83–100, 108–10.
37. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Florentine Histories*, trans. Laura F. Banfield and Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 57–58.
38. An extended look at other Machiavellian advisories to statesmen, especially republican statesmen, while potentially valuable, is beyond the scope of this essay.
39. Catherine H. Zuckert, *Machiavelli's Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 146. Machiavelli's Fabrizio also notes,

"But that virtue which the writers do not celebrate in particular men, they celebrate in peoples, where they exalt all the way to the stars the obstinacy that was in them for defending their liberty." Niccolò Machiavelli, *Art of War*, trans. and ed. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 59.

40. Abraham Lincoln, "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions," in *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings*, ed. Roy P. Basler (Cleveland, OH: Da Capo Press, 2001), 79–83.
41. Abraham Lincoln, "Eulogy on Zachary Taylor," in *The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, vol. 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 89, my emphasis added.
42. This includes not only the professional military mind but even Huntington's description of the distinctively American military mind. Neither is quite fit to understand the necessity of the appearance of moderation combined with actual boldness. See Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 59–62, 254–69.
43. Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 66.
44. Shakespeare's Coriolanus perhaps follows Machiavelli's in that he seems to mistake the people's nuanced form of gratitude as ingratitude. This is explicitly brought out in a conversation between citizens determining whether they should support Coriolanus for consul. The desire of the plebeians to see him humbled and scarred was so that they could be justified in honoring him appropriately. As Shakespeare's plebeian notes, "So if he tell us his noble deeds, we must also tell him our noble acceptance of them. Ingratitude is monstrous, and for the multitude to be ingrateful, were to make a monster of the multitude; of the which we being members, should bring ourselves to be monstrous members." William Shakespeare, *Coriolanus*, ed. Philip Brockbank (New York: Routledge, 1996), 179–80.
45. Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 23.
46. Ibid., 23–24.
47. Ibid., 24.
48. Ibid.
49. Coriolanus, however, also recognizes that factional strife has made Rome vulnerable and uses the tumults as his main strategy in his attempt to punish Rome by leading the Volscian invasion. See Machiavelli, *Art of War*, 134. See also Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. John Dryden, ed. Arthur Hugh Clough, vol. 1 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2006), 340.
50. Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, 68.

51. Wood, *Revolutionary Characters*, 41.
52. For examples of the accounts of these qualities in his lifetime, see John P. Kaminski and Jill Adair McCaughan, eds., *A Great and Good Man: George Washington in the Eyes of His Contemporaries* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 16–17, 22–24, 91, 94–99, 101, 184–87.
53. In *Art of War*, Fabrizio also reminds his young interlocutors of the importance of the military captain's rhetorical skills and persuasion that would serve a military moderate statesman just as well out of uniform. Although given in the context of persuading fleeing soldiers to rejoin the fight, Fabrizio's description goes much further: "To persuade or dissuade a few of a thing is very easy. For if words are not enough, you can then use authority or force. But the difficulty is in removing from the multitude a sinister opinion that is also contrary either to the common good or your opinion. There one can use only words that are heard by all, wishing to persuade all of them together. For this, excellent captains need to be orators, because without knowing how to speak to the whole army, [only] with difficulty can one do anything good." Machiavelli, *Art of War*, 98.
54. Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 68–69.
55. Machiavelli, *Art of War*, 3.
56. Ibid., 3–4.
57. This claim differs from and contrasts with J.G.A. Pocock's thesis on the soldiers carrying over their civic virtue to the citizenry in an almost educative sense. Although this might be a happy byproduct of military service, it is not clear that the military moderate statesman's main role is to promote civic virtue any more than it is clear that Eisenhower put his project of reinvigorating civic education ahead of Cold War grand strategy. For more on the scholarly debate on the former subject, see Christopher Lynch's introduction in Machiavelli, *Art of War*, xix–xxi.
58. Machiavelli, *Art of War*, 7–32.
59. Higginbotham prefaces his important discussion of Washington's ability to unify as a central part of his statesmanship by describing Machiavelli's lament that there was no statesman who seemed capable of such a desirable feat for the Italian city-states. See Don Higginbotham, *George Washington: Uniting a Nation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 1.
60. See also Zuckert's discussion on "Why the Art of War Entails the Art of Governing" in Zuckert, *Machiavelli's Politics*, 323–29.
61. K. Jack Bauer, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 289–313.

62. Robert V. Remini, *At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise That Saved the Union* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 89. See also the closing paragraphs of Zachary Taylor, "Annual Message to Congress, December 4, 1849," *The American Presidency Project*, University of California, Santa Barbara, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/201873.
63. Bauer, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman*, 226.
64. Remini, *At the Edge of the Precipice*, 58–61, 118.
65. On the idea of setting up a Seward presidency, see Bauer, *Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman*, 308.
66. On the "conspiracy" argument as it actually unfolded, see esp. Lincoln's "House Divided" speech and the first and second debates in Robert W. Johannsen, ed., *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18, 71–73, 81–86.
67. Lincoln, "Eulogy on Zachary Taylor," 83–90.
68. Ibid., 89.
69. Ibid.
70. See, e.g., Chernow's recent revitalization of Grant and an insightful work on Eisenhower's commitment "total Cold War" during his presidency. Ron Chernow, *Grant* (New York: Penguin Press, 2017); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). As for Marshall, his reputation as the quintessential military moderate was solidified by clear contrast with MacArthur's public radicalism and his role in dismissing him.
71. See full text of the Mattis resignation letter posted by PBS at https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-james-mattis-full-resignation-letter.
72. Leo Shane III, "From 'Mad Dog' to 'Moderate Dog': Mattis-Trump Tensions Grow," *Military Times*, September 13, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2018/09/13/from-mad-dog-to-moderate-dog-mattis-trump-tensions-grow/.
73. Jim Mattis, "A New American Grand Strategy," *Defining Ideas: A Hoover Institution Journal*, Hoover Institution, February 26, 2015, https://www.hoover.org/research/new-american-grand-strategy.
74. See, e.g., the reaction to his resignation in *The New York Times*: Helene Cooper, "Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump's Worldview," *The New York Times*, December 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/politics/jim-mattis-defense-secretary-trump.html.

75. James Mattis, Resignation Letter, available at PBS News Hour, December 20, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-james-mattis-full-resignation-letter.
76. As Stoler notes regarding the MacArthur incident, "[T]his most apolitical of soldiers became himself politicized and for the first time a target of serious partisan attack. To refuse to run for political office or even to vote, Marshall was forced to realize, did not mean that a soldier could avoid politicization. To the contrary, if war and politics were inseparable, so were soldiers, statesmen, and politicians" (Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 175–76). It might also be said that Grant understood this when devising a Reconstruction that would both ensure federal sovereignty as an unescapable fact while at the same time displaying a certain type of moderation toward that South that relied on the long game for social change.
77. Machiavelli, *Discourses*, 257.