

Dawson and Communism: How Much Did He Get Right?

Mattei Ion Radu
Villanova University

As recent scholarship has shown, Christopher Dawson wrote much about communism and Nazism, two forces he regarded as grave threats to Western Civilization.¹ Dawson lived to see the end of the fascist specter and had the chance, if he wished to take it, to assess the validity of his theories on Nazism. Indeed, large amounts of captured German documents were available to scholars almost at once following the end of the Second World War.² However, Dawson died when the Soviet Union was still a superpower, and Communist archives were largely closed to historians not loyal to the various regimes that controlled them.³ While the West was not completely ignorant of conditions inside the Soviet empire, Dawson left the world stage without having had the ability to test his hypotheses on communism in a systematic way.⁴ Though unfortunately not all archival materials from 1917–1991 have been released, the vast amount of information acquired since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union has placed us in a position to make certain judgments on the accuracy of Dawson's contentions and predictions about communism.⁵

During his career as a historian, Dawson approached Marxism-Leninism from a number of different perspectives.⁶ Assessing the veracity of each of Dawson's claims in this wide area is beyond the scope of this article. There are, however, several themes in Dawson's scholarship that lend themselves particularly well to analysis employing the recently released archival documents. These include Dawson's belief in the absolute conflict between Christianity and communism, his thoughts on unity in the Western

and communist worlds, and his prescription for how responsible citizens ought to respond to the totalitarian menace.⁷

An inquiry into the evidence indicates that Dawson certainly did not have a perfect record in his quest to understand Marxism-Leninism. For example, Dawson averred that

Totalitarianism, at least in its Communist form, is a united force, while the forces of justice are weak and divided. We must face the fact that we have failed to put across the ideology of Natural Law which is the only possible basis of unity, whereas the totalitarians, both Communist and Fascist, have been the masters of all the arts of propaganda and psychological warfare.⁸

In *The Gods of Revolution*, published posthumously, Dawson made a similar claim: "[T]he communist world ... forms a single totalitarian power system and it also forms a united area for technological and industrial planning. The western world, on the other hand, is essentially pluralist and multiform in political power, in ideology, and in industrial and technological planning."⁹ Undoubtedly, there were instances of disunity among both noncommunist and anticommunist countries.¹⁰ However, the period of the Cold War also witnessed the formation of a number of important military and economic agreements and alliances between and among Western and noncommunist countries.¹¹ Moreover, far from being completely unified, the various communist states had at times far more serious divisions among each other than anything seen among Western nations.¹²

However, in his treatment of communism and religion Dawson has been substantially vindicated by the historical record. This article will focus on that relationship and Dawson's analysis of it. Among other reasons, this is appropriate because Dawson concentrated more of his efforts on the interplay between Marxism-Leninism and Christianity than on any other single aspect of the communist phenomenon.

Christianity and Communism

For Dawson, Christianity and communism were antithetical.¹³ This concept, and its related issues, is perhaps the most prominent strand in Dawson's writings on Marxism-Leninism and the world situation.¹⁴ According to him, communism "demand[ed] everything—absolute loyalty, absolute obedience to the state and the utter subordination of the individual to the community."¹⁵ The ascendancy of communism in a country constituted a grave threat to Christianity and Dawson worried that the faith in such lands would not weather a century of communist indoctrination.¹⁶ From the vantage point of current historical knowledge, this is the area where Dawson got the most right in his investigation of communism.

In 1935, Dawson offered a central statement of his views on Christianity and Marxism-Leninism in *Religion and the Modern State*. This book expanded on articles that Dawson had published the previous year on the topic.¹⁷ Dawson began his treatment with the qualification that a believer may still possess spiritual freedom even if he is denied economic and political freedom: "[T]here is no fundamental reason why the passing of parliamentary democracy and economic individualism should be opposed to Christian principles.... It is at least theoretically possible that the limitation of political and economic freedom by the extension of social control should be actually favourable to the cause of spiritual freedom."¹⁸ In the abstract, therefore, Lenin's curtailment of political and private property rights in the Soviet Union did not necessarily challenge Christianity.¹⁹

Nevertheless, Dawson made the following overall judgment of communism:

Consequently it is in Communism that the latent opposition between the new state and the Christian religion attains its full realization in the social consciousness of our age. For the first time in the world's history the Kingdom of Antichrist has acquired political form and social substance and stands over against the Christian Church as

a *counter-church* with its own dogmas and its own moral standards, ruled by a centralized hierarchy and inspired by an intense will to world conquest.²⁰

Dawson did not reach this conclusion because of any particularly anti-religious statement by Marx or Lenin, although such statements undoubtedly existed and were known before the collapse of the Soviet Union.²¹ In fact, Dawson contended that, to Marx, Catholicism was a dying force that did not possess the vitality to seriously compete with communism. "The real enemy in Marx's eyes was not Catholicism or Christianity, but the power that had, so Marx believed, already dethroned God and set up a purely secular culture and new secular standards of value—the power of Capitalism."²² However, even if Marx did not identify the coming rivalry, Dawson saw the contest between Christianity and communism as hugely important:

The conflict between Christianity and Marxism—between the Catholic Church and the Communist Party—is the vital issue of our time. It is not a conflict of rival economic systems like the conflict between Socialism and Capitalism, or of rival political ideals—as with Parliamentarianism and Fascism. It is a conflict of rival philosophies and of rival doctrines regarding the very nature of man and society.²³

For Dawson, the battleground of the twentieth century included not only the forces of Christianity and communism but also those of capitalism. Dawson stressed that a natural alliance did not exist between Catholicism and capitalism: "It is not a straight fight between communism and Catholicism or between communism and capitalism. It is a fight of each against all."²⁴ However, while both communism and Christianity took issue with pure capitalism, the chasm that existed between the two ideologies was precisely illustrated in their respective critiques: "Marxism condemns in Liberalism just the element that we can approve, namely, its partial acceptance of Christian moral standards; and it

approves just what we condemn, that is to say, the secularization of life and the entire subordination of man to economic ends.”²⁵

If Marx did not regard Christianity as a significant rival, whence the total conflict between Catholicism and communism? Dawson’s answer was two-fold. The first reason had to do with Christianity’s role as an impediment to the realization of Marxism-Leninism’s designs. In Dawson’s understanding, the “vital issue” of communism was “the subordination of man, body and soul, to the economic machine of the secular State.”²⁶ To illustrate this point, Dawson pointed to the rural terror that took place in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s, where we now know as many as fourteen million peasants died from state-enforced dekulakization and the artificial famine that accompanied the collectivization campaign.²⁷ Dawson averred that “the greatest obstacle to the fulfillment of [Communism’s] end is not Capitalism, nor the bourgeois culture, but the Christian faith.”²⁸

The second reason for the clash was found in the makeup of Marxism-Leninism. Dawson argued that Soviet communism, while vigorously atheistic, shared important characteristics with religion:

Its attitude to the Marxian doctrines is not the attitude of an economist or an historian towards a scientific theory; it is the attitude of a believer to the gospel of salvation; Lenin is more than a political hero, he is the canonized saint of Communism with a highly developed cultus of his own; and the Communist ethic is religious in its absoluteness and its unlimited claims to the spiritual allegiance of its followers.²⁹

Consequently, Marxism-Leninism could not tolerate Christianity because, with its sweeping universalism and declarations of historical inevitability, it could not tolerate any rival faiths.³⁰ In 1956, Dawson went so far as to submit that communism had “a creed and a dogma ... an ideology and a social philosophy, and a code of ethics and moral values. [It forms] a secular church, a community of believers with its own very highly organized hierarchy of institutions

and authorities.” Its “opposition to Christianity is clear, consistent and complete.”³¹

What was the nature of communism’s threat to Christianity? Dawson presented it as follows:

The great danger that we have to meet is not the danger of violent persecution but rather that of the crushing out of religion from modern life by the sheer weight of a State-inspired public opinion and by the mass organisation of society on a purely secular basis. Such a state of things has never occurred before because the State has never been powerful enough to control every side of social life. It has been a State with limited functions, not a Totalitarian State. Moreover, in the past, public opinion recognised the validity of the religious category and the autonomy of the religious life, even when it opposed and persecuted particular forms of religion. Today the conflict is a deeper and a wider one. It goes to the very roots of life and affects every aspect of human thought and action. One might even say that the very existence of religion itself is at stake.³²

While in this passage Dawson rejected the idea that Catholics would suffer violent persecution in totalitarian lands, elsewhere he acknowledged that if a state pursued a plan of complete and fanatical secularism and went so far as to wage war on Christianity, the sole viable solution for the faithful would be to retreat to the catacombs.³³ It should be noted that while Dawson frequently devoted his scholarly attention to the particular phenomenon of communism, he included it in the general category of totalitarianism.³⁴ In a 1933 letter to the *Cambridge Review*, Dawson contended that “every moral or religious element that may conflict with the realization of this aim is ruthlessly eliminated ... such a system [totalitarianism] is irreconcilable with religion in general and with Christianity in particular.”³⁵ In sum, Dawson believed that communism, like the other strands of totalitarianism, aimed at the absolute destruction of Christianity.³⁶

The Fate of Christianity in the Communist World

The historical record indicates that Dawson was quite correct in his judgment that communism was inimical to the Christian faith.³⁷ Indeed, if anything, Dawson understated the matter.³⁸ Not only did Communist leaders advance atheistic and anti-religious theories, but the history of communism in practice is replete with examples of the government actively persecuting Christians.³⁹ This reality is perhaps best illustrated by a survey of the Communist Party's policies toward religion in the Soviet Union, which had the longest history of Marxism-Leninism of the countries that have substantially released archival materials.⁴⁰

The Communist regime showed its animosity toward Christianity virtually from its outset.⁴¹ Unlike other aspects of Lenin's life,⁴² his disdain for, even hatred of, religion was not hidden by Communist officials:

Every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness ... vileness of the most dangerous kind, "contagion" of the most abominable kind. Millions of sins, filthy deeds, acts of violence and *physical* contagions ... are far less dangerous than the *subtle*, spiritual idea of a God decked out in the smartest "ideological" costumes.... *Every* defence or justification of the idea of God, even the most refined, the best intentioned, is a justification of reaction.⁴³

Such an anti-religious outlook was shared by other prominent Bolsheviks.⁴⁴ For example, Emelian Iaroslavskii, with whom Trotsky apparently agreed, averred that religion was merely ignoble superstition utilized by the dominant class.⁴⁵ Commissar of Enlightenment Anatolii Lunacharskii, who perhaps had a more nuanced understanding of religion than other atheists, nevertheless claimed: "Here one needs pliers. Religion must be grabbed, squeezed from below: you do not beat it, but pull it out, pull it with its roots. And this can be achieved only by scientific propaganda, by the moral and artistic education of the masses."⁴⁶

Though for tactical reasons the Bolsheviks waited until 1922 to commence a full-scale attack upon religion, already in 1917–1918 the Communist government published decrees that formally separated church and state, took all schools, including seminaries, away from religious authorities, subjected all church property and lands to nationalization, and effectively abolished the legal rights of religious bodies to protest assaults upon them.⁴⁷ At the same time, the regime also refused to recognize the legitimacy of baptisms, marriages, and divorces carried out by the Russian Orthodox Church.⁴⁸ The November 1917 Declaration on the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, from the Communist Party, nominally did away with all religious privileges.⁴⁹ In 1919, Communist leaders ordered that those younger than eighteen could no longer receive religious education.⁵⁰ The government also directed that atheism classes be taught to all students, from kindergarteners to those in college.⁵¹

On December 4, 1920, the head of the Cheka's Secret Department, T. P. Samsonov, communicated the following in a top-secret letter to Cheka (predecessor to the KGB) chairman Feliks Dzerzhinskii:

Communism and Religion are mutually exclusive and ... no other apparatus is capable of destroying religion apart from the apparatus of the [Cheka].... Up till now the [Cheka] has concerned itself only with the destruction of the orthodox church as the largest and most powerful, but this is not enough as there are on the territory of the Republic a whole range more of no less powerful Religions, like Islam etc., where we also have to bring the same destruction step by step that was brought to the orthodox church.... The work of dispelling the religious darkness is extremely difficult and great and for this reason one must not rely on speedy success.⁵²

On the whole during the early Russian Revolution, rather than harassing individual believers, the Soviet government placed its emphasis on legally dividing church and state, undercutting the

institutional structure of churches and weakening the economic foundation of the various churches.⁵³

Nevertheless, there is evidence of violence and hostility against religious groups and clergy members from 1917 to 1921.⁵⁴ Indeed, as early as December 30, 1918, Metropolitan Platon of Odessa reported to Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, that orthodox clergy members had undergone ordeals "before which the persecutions of the Christians in the first three centuries ... pale."⁵⁵ The Communists admitted that, between February and May 1918, 687 believers died while taking part in religious processions or trying to defend church properties.⁵⁶ In 1919, for example, the Communist authorities arrested and eventually deported Archbishop de Ropp, leader of the Catholic Church in Russia.⁵⁷ During the Civil War (1918–1920), most of the higher clergy in the Russian Orthodox Church openly allied themselves with the anti-Bolshevik White armies. During the course of the war, the Communists arrested and executed many clergy.⁵⁸ From 1918 to 1919, the Bolsheviks sacked and closed most of the monasteries and cloisters in the areas they controlled.⁵⁹

The regime's all-out assault upon Christianity began in earnest in March 1922. In 1921, a terrible famine hit Russia and the Ukraine.⁶⁰ Substantially caused by Communist policies toward agriculture, the famine affected as many as 33.5 million people. Between 1920 and 1922, approximately 5.1 million people in the Soviet Union died from starvation and attendant diseases.⁶¹ In the face of such horror, Lenin in fact viewed the famine as an opportunity to wage a more effective war against Christianity.

In 1921, Patriarch Tikhon of the Russian Orthodox Church offered to donate non-consecrated church items to be used for famine relief. He did not include consecrated vessels in his proposal. Tikhon's reasoning had nothing to do with monetary considerations because the non-consecrated vessels were mostly made of valuable metals but was instead grounded in the fact that Russian orthodoxy deemed the employment of consecrated items for secular ends a sacrilege. For political, not humanitarian, reasons, Lenin paid no attention to the Tikhon's offer. Instead,

Lenin attempted to compel the Church into an untenable position in which it would look both uncharitable and defiant toward Soviet authority by demanding that the Church give up consecrated items for famine relief—something about which Lenin knew Tikhon could not comply. In reality, Lenin and the Communist leadership cared not about the plight of the starving peasants but rather about the chance to finally crush the Russian Orthodox Church.⁶²

Acting preemptively, Tikhon offered to pay the amount equivalent to the consecrated vessels' value but was refused by Bolshevik officials.⁶³ In February 1922, the regime ordered the confiscation of all church treasure, including sacramental vessels.⁶⁴

In multiple locations, believers put up determined resistance.⁶⁵ Press accounts from the time point to approximately 1,400 violent confrontations.⁶⁶ Following one particularly bloody clash between Christian faithful and Red Army troops in Shuia in March 1922, the Politburo, with Lenin absent, decided to postpone further seizures. Voiding the resolution in a top-secret letter, Lenin wrote the following:

I think that here our enemy is committing an enormous strategic mistake in trying to drag us into a decisive battle at a time when it is ... particularly disadvantageous for him. ... [F]or us this moment is not only exceptionally favorable but generally the only moment when we can, with ninety-nine out of a hundred chances of total success, smash the enemy and secure for ourselves an indispensable position for many decades to come. It is precisely now and only now, when in the starving regions people are eating human flesh, and hundreds if not thousands of corpses are littering the roads, that we can (and therefore must) carry out the confiscation of church valuables with the most savage and merciless energy, not stopping [short of] crushing any resistance.⁶⁷

As to the specific incident in Shuia, Lenin added that “the trial of the Shuia rebels resisting aid to the hungry [i.e., those defending

the Church] [will] be conducted with the maximum of speed and [will] end in execution by firing squad of a very large number ... and to the extent possible ... also in Moscow and several other clerical centers.”⁶⁸

The following day, March 20, the Politburo adopted an appropriate protocol to match Lenin's directions. It resolved to form secret steering commissions that would be charged with the seizure of church valuables. In the most significant regions, such confiscations were to take place in the shortest periods of time. The Politburo was determined to cover the regime's actions in the cloak of acting for the famine victims: “Everywhere it is possible, in churches, at meetings, in barracks, etc. present representatives of the starving demanding the speedy confiscation of valuables.” As for clergy members, the Communist leadership advised: “Try not to touch prominent priests until the end of the campaign, but secretly warn them officially ... that in the case of any excesses they will be the first to answer for them.”⁶⁹

The trials against clergy and other believers that Lenin referred to in his letter commenced soon after the March 20 Politburo meeting. The regime arrested clergy members throughout the country.⁷⁰ Many of those detained were condemned to execution.⁷¹ Show trials against clergy members were held in Moscow, Petrograd, Smolensk, Ivanovo, and Shuia.⁷² On April 13, death sentences were handed down to three Shuia defendants.⁷³ On May 8, the Politburo voted 5–2 to let stand a Moscow court verdict sentencing eleven people, including some laity, to death.⁷⁴ From June 11 to July 5, 1922, 86 members of the Christian faithful were placed on trial in Petrograd.⁷⁵ Following the proceedings, the authorities secretly executed Metropolitan Benjamin and three co-defendants.⁷⁶ The regime sent 77 priests from Petrograd and 148 priests and laypeople from Moscow to prison camps.⁷⁷ In May 1922, Tikhon himself was placed under house arrest.⁷⁸

Lynchings and arrests by the secret police constituted the bulk of the violence against the clergy during this time period.⁷⁹ Communicating to the Politburo, Dzerzhinskii expressed the opinion that “all priests resisting the confiscation of church goods

should be designated enemies of the people and exiled to one of the Volga regions most affected by the famine.”⁸⁰ Leading churchmen were tortured and maimed before being killed. For example, Archbishop Andronik of Perm suffered the horror of having his cheeks hollowed, his eyes gashed, and his nose and ears severed. To magnify the humiliation, the Bolsheviks drove him around Perm before drowning Andronik in the river.⁸¹ Russian Orthodox Church records indicate that the Communist authorities killed 2,691 priests, 3,447 nuns, and 1,962 monks in 1922 alone.⁸² In 1925, Tikhon estimated that 100 bishops and 10,000 priests were in jail or in forced exile.⁸³ In the midst of such carnage, Lenin apparently wished to be updated daily about the number of priests put to death.⁸⁴

The Russian Orthodox were not the only Christians to suffer at the hands of the Communist regime. In December 1922, the Bolsheviks shut down every Catholic church in Petrograd except one. The following March, the authorities brought the Catholic clergy to trial, where they were pronounced guilty of an assortment of crimes. The High Revolutionary Tribunal condemned to death Bishop Cieplak and his assistant, Monsignor Budkiewicz. Thirteen other Catholic clergy members received various punishments, including imprisonment. While Cieplak’s sentence was ultimately commuted to ten years confinement following international protests, the Soviet government consummated the rest of the court’s orders.⁸⁵

Lenin and his fellow Bolshevik leaders failed of course in their attempt to use the famine to totally annihilate Christianity in the Soviet Union.⁸⁶ However, any believers who thought that their lot might be substantially improved by Lenin’s death in January 1924 would be quickly disabused of such notions. Indeed, a top-secret OGPU communication from the Ukraine issued a month after Lenin’s death included the following persons as “Hidden Enemies of Sov[iet] Power:” “All servants of religious cults: hierarchs, [Orthodox] priests, [Catholic] priests, rabbis, deacons, church elders, precentors, monks etc.... All belonging to religious sects and communities (baptists are especially in mind).” The OGPU, a

successor to the Cheka, issued these instructions “[w]ith the aim of a universal settling of accounts, and [the establishment of] suitable surveillance ... on politically unreliable and socially alien elements of the population.”⁸⁷

In 1925, the Communist authorities launched the League of the Militant Godless to advance their goal of atheism. The League’s activities included protests, theatrical productions, “wall newspapers” in public areas, speeches, “godless corners,” discussion “circles,” “evenings,” radio broadcasts, and lectures. In Moscow, the League’s Central Council ran a principal anti-religious museum. Such museums were also seen in other parts of the country, sometimes set up by League councils in former houses of worship. At various times during the 1920s, churches were subject to vandalism by Komsomol activists.⁸⁸ By 1928, the regime had closed approximately 15,000 Russian Orthodox churches.⁸⁹

Stalin’s rise to power ushered in a new wave of particularly severe measures against Christians.⁹⁰ On April 8, 1929, the Soviet government issued “On Religious Associations,” a decree that required religious groups consisting of twenty or more adults to register with, and to receive approval from, the regime prior to meeting. It also revoked the right to distribute propaganda of a religious nature while retaining the prohibition on religious education in state schools. In sum, the law made the spreading of the faith outside the home a criminal offense, except when done in government-approved classes.⁹¹ The decree also provided that “any use of the religious prejudices of the masses ... for destabilizing the state [was punishable] by anything from a minimum three-year sentence up to and including the death penalty.”⁹² In August 1929, the Communist authorities proscribed Sundays as days of worship and mandated that they be treated as normal workdays.⁹³

In the years leading up to the Second World War, the closure of churches in the Soviet Union proceeded apace. As of April 1, 1936, only twenty-eight percent of pre-1917 Orthodox churches remained in use.⁹⁴ By 1941, this number dropped to roughly eight percent.⁹⁵ Government attempts to shut down churches frequently met vigorous local opposition. For example, according to a

top-secret communication by the OGPU, in August 1929 in the Dyatkovsky district, the following scene transpired:

Department travelled to the site of the closure of the church with the CID agent and head of the departmental militia on the guard of the Dyatkovsky crystal factory. On arrival it was envisaged that the churchwarden would give them the keys of the church—the warden refused to hand over the keys and the priest of the church, by then called, appeared in a drunken state accompanied by hysterical women. As a result, a heated dispute arose around the handover of the church during which two of the crowd who arrived with the priest ... climbed up the bell tower and sounded the alarm. At the alarm call people ran in from the fields with sickles and stakes, up to 300–350 women, who drove away the representatives who had come to close the church.⁹⁶

Having already gone after the precious church vessels in 1922, the Communists also sought to remove church bells and use the metal for other purposes. A top-secret 1925 OGPU communication from the Ukraine explained the newest attack on Church property as follows:

The defence of the Soviet state and the equipping of the Red army ... demand a great quantity of non-ferrous metals.... In connection with this the government ordered and instructed the OGPU to collect the necessary information on the number and weight of church bells and other metal utensils of the churches.⁹⁷

In the place of the true rationale for the confiscation of church bells, the government offered the spurious justification that “the sound of bells disturbs the right to peace of the vast majority of atheists in the towns and the countryside.”⁹⁸ In October 1929, instructions were given for the commandeering of all church bells.

In 1930, almost fourteen percent of disturbances and peasant uprisings were triggered by bell removals or church closings.⁹⁹

Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior, infamously blown up by the regime in December 1931, was thoroughly pillaged for all items of potential value to Soviet authorities before the final detonation. Any clergy who protested the sacking faced execution.¹⁰⁰ Not surprisingly, clergy strength suffered enormously under the Communist onslaught. Total registered priests fell from 112,629 in 1914 to 70,000 in 1928 to 17,857 in 1936.¹⁰¹ Whereas the Mogilev Roman Catholic Archdiocese alone had 400 priests in 1921, by 1924 there remained only 116 active Catholic priests for all of the Soviet Union.¹⁰²

Christians suffered as a result of their faith during Stalin's dekulakization and collectivization campaigns as well as his Great Terror.¹⁰³ In carrying out dekulakization, Soviet authorities killed, or sent to the far north with their families, millions of peasants. While in theory these were the so-called rich peasants, in reality they were most powerful and the most intractable to the Communists' plans.¹⁰⁴ In an OGPU order of February 1930 about the dekulakization drive, Genrikh Yagoda, then deputy chairman of the OGPU, said the following: "Above all the blow must be directed at the active kulak elements of the first category [including] Kulaks who are active members of church councils and all kinds of religious and sectarian communities and groups actively manifesting themselves." Those kulaks in the "first category" were to be "liquidat[ed]," not deported. Yagoda called for "the anti-Soviet active kulak group of church-people and sectarians" to be deported with their families "to the remote northern districts of the USSR" and to have their property seized.¹⁰⁵ Officially, the Communist Party considered the church to be "the kulak's agitprop."¹⁰⁶

While the evidence is not totally clear on this point, it appears that at least 13,000 priests suffered the fate of dekulakization in 1930.¹⁰⁷ It is reported that, in 1931 near the closed Theological Seminary in Maryupil, 4,000 priests were incarcerated and forced to perform difficult manual tasks with woefully inadequate

nutrition. Priests died every day from such miserable conditions.¹⁰⁸ Dukulakization and the Great Terror did particular damage to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Between 1928 and 1938, thirteen of its archbishops and bishops died as Communist captives. Only two Ukrainian Orthodox bishops survived the Stalin era. Overall, 1,150 priests and approximately 20,000 believers serving on Ukrainian church councils, at the district or parish level, met their end in Soviet prison camps. Between 1934 and 1936, the regime laid waste to roughly seventy-five to eighty percent of the churches in the Ukraine not previously touched by the government. Such devastation left only two churches still in operation in 1935 in Kiev, which at one time had been home to hundreds of churches.¹⁰⁹

During Stalin's Great Terror of the 1930s, the authorities invariably suspected Christian priests of having committed capital crimes, and trials of clergy were held throughout the country.¹¹⁰ At one proceeding in Orel in 1937, the defendants were charged with, among other offenses, "publishing prayers in Old Slavonic." In February 1938, three bishops were convicted of "agitat[ing] for the opening of previously closed churches" and sabotage.¹¹¹ The evidence against Mikhail Yedlinsky, who was executed in late 1937 and even had his passport destroyed for good measure, included the following: "In 1931 he collected and passed on a range of material on the closures of monasteries in Ukraine. ... He made use of the church for slanderous sermons directed against Soviet power."¹¹²

As with so many of Stalin's other victims, Christians targeted by the regime suffered through the horror of internment in the Gulag.¹¹³ For example, in 1930, one group of religious believers, who out of principle refused utterly to cooperate with the Communist authorities, were incarcerated in a prison camp at Solovetsky. Because they would not deal with Soviet money or passports, coming as the materials did from what they regarded to be the "Anti-Christ," the camp officials exiled the Christians to a deserted island. The guards informed the believers that they would not receive rations until they signed for them. The faithful rebuffed and within two months all had died from starvation. An eyewitness

recalled that the next mission to the island “found only corpses which had been picked by the birds.”¹¹⁴

Following the Politburo’s July 2, 1937 telegram on Anti-Soviet Elements, which instructed the NKVD at once to arrest and execute or exile enemies of the government, the NKVD issued Operational Prikaz 00447. This important directive included “Churchmen [and] members of sects” in its list of “former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements” to be “repress[ed].” This Prikaz, and other such operational orders, targeted segments of the Soviet population simply for who they were or what they believed. Christians thus suffered for the fact of their faith, not because they had committed any particular crimes or political offenses. Prikaz 00447 provided the number of victims to be immediately shot or incarcerated in each administrative unit enumerated. Unfortunately, such figures regularly increased, frequently upon Stalin’s instructions, over the next fifteen months. The Soviet leadership had legal tribunals provide the actual criminal charges after the victims had already been selected. Wives of the arrested were also to be punished.¹¹⁵ One historian, on the basis of archival data, estimates that during the Stalin era the Communist regime killed approximately 700,000 Christian clergy and religious, mostly Russian Orthodox, because of their beliefs.¹¹⁶

Acknowledging that “the population won’t fight for us Communists, but they will fight for Mother Russia,” Stalin, among other measures, relaxed the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church somewhat during the Second World War.¹¹⁷ At the close of hostilities, the Soviet people hoped that their tremendous sacrifices on behalf of the government would be rewarded with, at the very least, moderated behavior on the part of the Communist regime.¹¹⁸ For the Christian faithful, the next forty years of Soviet history showed that such hopes were substantially misplaced.¹¹⁹

Although strongly linked with de-Stalinization, during the latter part of his reign Khrushchev in fact oversaw the worst attacks on Christianity, and religion in general, since the 1930s.¹²⁰ The campaign would not be formally launched until 1959, but as early as July 1954 a Central Committee resolution asserted that

“[r]eligious prejudices and superstitions undermine the consciousness of a part of the Soviet people and reduces their active participation in the building of communism.”¹²¹ Apparently, in Moscow in the summer of 1957, the Communist Party held a secret meeting where 350 activists and theorists conferred about religion’s continuing influence in the Soviet Union and the party’s failures in atheistic and anti-religious propaganda and education.¹²²

Once again, the closing of churches figured prominently in the Communist authorities’ battle against the Christian faith. Of 17,500 open Russian Orthodox churches in 1958, only 7,500 remained in 1966.¹²³ Armenian Orthodox worshipers saw sixteen of their forty-eight churches closed between 1958 and 1964.¹²⁴ Monasteries and convents were also targeted. As with the previous anti-religious initiatives of Lenin and Stalin, violence at times accompanied the execution of party policy. For example, a secret July 1959 report for the Central Committee described the following scene in connection with the attempt to close a monastery in Moldavia:

The nuns of the monastery ... announced to their relatives and acquaintances in the nearby villages that they were being oppressed, driven out of the monastery etc., and as a result of this many inhabitants from villages surrounding the monastery ... organised in the monastery church a round-the-clock watch of 50 people armed with pitchforks, sticks and stones.... After the explanatory work was conducted, the majority of the population returned to their villages, but in the following days right up to 2 July groups of 20–25 people continued to remain in the monastery church, and they began to terrorise the representatives of power and society. They brutally beat up an agronomist ... and bodily injuries were sustained by several other people. On 1 July militia lieutenant Dolgan suffered serious pitchfork wounds in a murder attempt by one of the organisers of the assault ... and the lieutenant shot this bandit in self-defence. The organisers of the disorder and hooliganism—eleven in number—were arrested and an investigation is going on.

By way of a coda, the author of the memorandum added that “On 3 July it was reported from Moldavia that the Rechulsky monastery has been liquidated, the church closed and the incident brought to an end.”¹²⁵

The campaign against religion carried out during Khrushchev’s leadership of the Communist Party took other forms as well.¹²⁶

Editor’s Note

The article manuscript leaves off at this point, left unfinished at the time of the author’s death.

Endnotes

1. Adam Schwartz, “Confronting the ‘Totalitarian Antichrist’: Christopher Dawson and Totalitarianism,” *The Catholic Historical Review* 89 (2003): 464–488.
2. Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Guide to Captured German Documents* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1952).
3. Richard Pipes, *Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 223.
4. For one of the most perspicacious pre-*Glasnost* examinations of the Stalinist Russia, see Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).
5. James G. Hershberg, “Report from Moscow: Soviet Archives: The Opening Door,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (“CWIHP Bulletin”) 1 (1992): 1; Jonathan Haslam, “Stalin’s War or Peace: What If the Cold War Had Been Avoided?” in *Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals*, ed. Niall Ferguson (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 350–352; and Donald J. Raleigh, “Doing Soviet History: The Impact of the Archival Revolution,” *Russian Review* 61 (2002): 16.
6. See, e.g., Christopher Dawson, “Catholicism and Economics, Part III, the Economic Problem of the Present Age,” *Blackfriars* 5 (1924): 210; “Catholicism and Class War: ‘A Living Question for the Whole of Western Civilisation,’” *Sunday Referee*, May 24, 1931; “The Significance of Bolshevism,” *The American Review* 1 (1933): 36; “What Is Russia?” *Changing World Series* 1 (n.d.): 3–6; “Religion and the Totalitarian State,” *The Criterion* 14 (1934): 1; “The Yogi and the Commissar,” *Blackfriars* 26 (1945): 366; “Christianity and the Orient: The Problem of Oriental Nationalism, II,” *The Tablet* 208 (1956): 196; and “Karl Marx

- and the Dialectic of History,” in *Dynamics of World History*, ed. John J. Mulloy (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002), 369–380.
7. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1935); *The Gods of Revolution* (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 164–166; and “Religion in an Age of Revolution, VI,” *The Tablet* 167 (1936): 549–551.
 8. Christopher Dawson, “S.O.S.,” *The Sword*, April 1946: 4.
 9. Dawson, *Gods of Revolution*, 164.
 10. See, e.g., Richard Pipes, *Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America’s Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 248–259; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
 11. According to one prominent historian of the Cold War, “By the time he left office, Truman’s administration had concluded formal alliances with forty-one countries through the Rio Treaty (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the ANZUS Treaty (1951), and the Japanese and Philippine security treaties (1951).” John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American Security Policy during the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 150n. See also *The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era*, eds. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); and John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Writing after the conclusion of the Second World War, Dawson stated: “Is it possible that the war that has just ended will have achieved some definite advance towards the organisation of Europe as an organic unity? ... [T]he logic of events is pointing increasingly in that direction.” Christopher Dawson, *Europe: A Society of Peoples* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1946), 15.
 12. See, e.g., John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 189–220; Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 163–164; *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79*, eds. Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (London: Routledge, 2006); and Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Documents on intra-Communist conflicts can be found in *The Prague Spring 1968*, ed. Jaromír Navrátil (New York: Central European University Press, 1998); *Brothers in*

- Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain*, ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001); *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, ed. Csaba Békés (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002); and *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, eds. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005).
13. Christopher Dawson, "Marxism and Catholic Sociology," 1935, Christopher Dawson Collection, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN (hereafter "Dawson Collection"), Box 8, Folder 6.
 14. See, e.g., Christopher Dawson, "The Tragedy of Christian Politics," *The Sign* 18 (1938): 7; *Beyond Politics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1939), 61–92; "The Threat to the West," *Commonweal* 31 (1940): 317; "A Century of Change: 1840–1940," *The Tablet* 175 (1940): 470; and "Catholics in the Modern World: A Survey at Pentecost," *The Tablet* 195 (1950): 419–421.
 15. Christopher Dawson, "Civilization in Crisis," in *Christianity and European Culture*, ed. Gerald J. Russello (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 69.
 16. *Ibid.*, 73; see Schwartz, "Dawson," 480.
 17. Christopher Dawson, "Catholicism and the Totalitarian State," *Catholic Times*, May 11, 1934: 4; and "Religion and the Totalitarian State."
 18. Dawson, *Modern State*, 51.
 19. On the Soviet Union during Lenin's reign, see Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); and *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
 20. Dawson, *Modern State*, 58.
 21. See, e.g., Robert Conquest, *Religion in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Praeger, 1968).
 22. Dawson, *Modern State*, 59.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. *Ibid.*, 61; see Dawson, "Civilization in Crisis," 71.
 25. Dawson, *Modern State*, 65.
 26. *Ibid.*, 67.
 27. A trailblazing account of these events is provided in Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Important archival materials

- are presented in *The War against the Peasantry, 1927–1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside*, ed. Lynne Viola (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). The accuracy of Dawson's interpretation of Stalin's subjugation of the peasantry has been confirmed by released documents. In November 1932, Dnepropetrovsk party secretary Mikhail Khatayevich wrote to the Kremlin "that in order to ensure the state's production future, we must take into account the minimum needs of the *kolkhozniks* [Soviet agricultural workers], for otherwise there will be no one left to sow and ensure production." Molotov, Stalin's foreign minister, replied, "Your position is profoundly incorrect, unBolshevik. We Bolsheviks cannot put the needs of the state—needs precisely defined in party resolutions—in the tenth or even the second place." Robert Conquest, *The Dragons of Expectation: Reality and Delusion in the Course of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 102.
28. Dawson, *Modern State*, 67.
 29. *Ibid.*, 58; see Christopher Dawson, "Christianity and Ideologies," *Commonweal* 64 (1956): 139. On the origins of the Lenin cult, see Pipes, *Russian Revolution*, 812–815.
 30. Schwarz, "Dawson," 480.
 31. Dawson, "Civilization in Crisis," 71.
 32. Dawson, *Modern State*, 57.
 33. Dawson, "Religion in an Age of Revolution," 551.
 34. See, e.g., Dawson, "Catholicism and the Totalitarian State, 4; and "Civilization in Crisis," 71.
 35. Schwartz, "Dawson," 480–481.
 36. *Ibid.*, 480.
 37. Robert Royal, *The Catholic Martyrs of the Twentieth Century: A Comprehensive World History* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000).
 38. According to the noted authority on Russia Richard Pipes, "The [Soviet] regime persecuted religious practices and beliefs with a ferocity not witnessed since the time when the late Roman Empire attempted to crush Judaism and its offspring, Christianity." *Communism: The Vanished Specter* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 62.
 39. *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, ed. Stephane Courtois (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), passim; and Warren H. Carroll, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Revolution* (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, 1995), passim.
 40. For information about Christian religions in Eastern Europe during the era of the Soviet Bloc, see, e.g., J. S. Conway, "The 'Stasi' and

- the Churches: Between Coercion and Compromise in East German Protestantism, 1948–89,” *Journal of Church and State* 36 (1994): 725; M. Monshipouri et al., “The Christians in Socialism—and After: The Church in East Germany,” *Journal of Church and State* 38 (1996): 751; Bernd Schafer, “State and Catholic Church in Eastern Germany, 1945–1989,” *German Studies Review* 22 (1999): 447; G. Besier, “The German Democratic Republic and the State Churches, 1958–1989,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 50 (1999): 523; Lavinia Stan and Lucian Tucescu, “The Romanian Orthodox Church and Post-Communist Democratisation,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (2000): 1467; Paul Froese, “Hungary for Religion: A Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40 (2001): 251; C. Vasile, “The Suppression of the Romanian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church,” *East European Quarterly* 36 (2002): 313; R. M. Ediger, “History of an Institution as a Factor for Predicting Church Institutional Behavior: The Cases of the Catholic Church in Poland, the Orthodox Church in Romania, and the Protestant Churches in East Germany,” *East European Quarterly* 39 (2005): 299; Stephen Schwartz, “Broken Promises,” *First Things* 162 (2006): 11; and L. N. Leustean, “Between Moscow and London: Romanian Orthodoxy and National Communism, 1960–1965,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 85 (2007): 491.
41. Dennis J. Dunn, *The Catholic Church and Russia: Popes, Patriarchs, Tsars, and Commissars* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 72–101; Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 337–368. For a review of recent scholarship on Church-State relations in the Soviet Union during this period, see I. D. Thatcher, “Communism and Religion in Early Bolshevik Russia: A Discussion of Work Published Since 1989,” *European History Quarterly* 36 (2006): 586.
 42. See, e.g., *The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive*, ed. Richard Pipes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
 43. Conquest, *Religion*, 7.
 44. Daniel Peris, *Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 22.
 45. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 339.
 46. *Ibid.*, 338.
 47. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 74.
 48. Nathaniel Davis, *A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 2.
 49. William B. Husband, “*Godless Communists*”: *Atheism and Society in Soviet Russia 1917–1932* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), 46.

50. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 344; see Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 76.
51. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 76.
52. Samsonov to Dzerzhinskii, December 4, 1920, in *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, ed. Felix Corley (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 23–24.
53. Husband, *Atheism and Society*, 46, 48.
54. Paul Froese, “Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43 (2004): 35, 40; see Davis, *Long Walk*, 3.
55. Charles M. Edmondson and R. Barry Levis, “Archbishop Randall Davidson, Russian Famine Relief, and the Fate of the Orthodox Clergy, 1917–1923,” *Journal of Church and State* 40 (1998): 619, 622.
56. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 344.
57. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 74–75.
58. Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 25–26.
59. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 344.
60. See Nicholas Werth, “A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union,” in *Black Book of Communism*, 108–131.
61. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 410–419.
62. *Ibid.*, 347.
63. *Ibid.*, 348; see Davis, *Long Walk*, 3.
64. Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 26.
65. Husband, *Atheism and Society*, 56–57.
66. Davis, *Long Walk*, 3.
67. Letter from Lenin to Molotov for Politburo Members, March 19, 1922, in *Unknown Lenin*, 152–153.
68. *Ibid.*, 154.
69. Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC ACP(B), March 20, 1922, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 27–28.
70. Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 26.
71. *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 33.
72. Werth, “State against Its People,” 126.
73. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 353.
74. Urgent. Secret, May 8, 1922, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 33–34.
75. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 354.
76. *Ibid.*, 355; Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 26.
77. Werth, “State against Its People,” 126.
78. See Peris, *Storming the Heavens*, 26; Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 360.
79. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 355.
80. Werth, “State against Its People,” 126.

81. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 355.
82. Werth, "State against Its People," 126.
83. Pipes, *Bolshevik Regime*, 355–56.
84. Richard Pipes, "Introduction," in *Unknown Lenin*, 11 n17.
85. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 79–80.
86. See, e.g., Andrew Greeley, "A Religious Revival in Russia?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33 (1994): 253; Mikhail V. Shkarovskii, "The Russian Orthodox Church versus the State: The Josephite Movement, 1927–1940," *Slavic Review* 54 (1995): 365; Edward E. Roslof, "The Heresy of 'Bolshevik' Christianity: Orthodox Rejection of Religious Reform During NEP," *Slavic Review* 55 (1996): 614; William B. Husband, "Soviet Atheism and Russian Orthodox Strategies of Resistance, 1917–1932," *Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998): 74; and Jennifer Wynot, "Monasteries without Walls: Secret Monasticism in the Soviet Union, 1928–39," *Church History* 71 (2002): 63.
87. To all DRs of Lubensky District, Chernukhi District Comr. Sharevsky, February 1924, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 44–45.
88. Peris, *Storming the Heavens*.
89. Froese, "Forced Secularization," 41.
90. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 88; *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 75; see also Dennis J. Dunn, Review of *The Religious Policy of the Stalinist State: A Case Study: The Central Standing Commission on Religious Questions, 1929–1938* by Arto Luukkanen & *Church under the Pressure of Stalinism: The Development of the Status and Activities of the Soviet Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church during 1944–1950* by Jouko Talonen, *American Historical Review* 103 (1998): 1658; Conquest, *Reflections*, 97. For some information on religion in the daily life of Soviet citizens during this time period, see Orlando Figes, *The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).
91. Husband, *Atheism and Society*, 66.
92. Werth, "State against Its People," 172.
93. Ibid.; Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 89.
94. Werth, "State against Its People," 173.
95. Froese, "Forced Secularization," 41.
96. Davydov & Groisman to the Inform. Department of OGPU, Moscow, August 19, 1929, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 82.
97. Dvianinov & Segal to all DRs of the OGPU for Lubensky District, Chernukhi District Comr. L-y, March 1925, in Ibid., 61.
98. Werth, "State against Its People," 172.
99. Ibid., 173.

100. David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 169–177; see Petition of the Economic Department of the OGPU to the Secretariat of the Chairman of the ACEC for Permission to Remove the Gold from the Cupolas of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, February 24, 1930, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 94–96.
101. Werth, “State against Its People,” 174.
102. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 75, 82.
103. See Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, especially 199–213; and *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Invaluable archival documents on the Great Terror are presented in J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939*, trans. Benjamin Sher (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
104. Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 4.
105. Order of the Unified State Political Directorate, No. 4421, Moscow, February 2, 1930, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 86–87.
106. Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 203.
107. Werth, “State against Its People,” 172.
108. Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 204.
109. *Ibid.*, 210–213.
110. Conquest, *Great Terror: A Reassessment*, 273; *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 112; see, e.g., Special Report of the Directorate of the USSR NKVD for Voronezh Region on the Unsatisfactory Conduct of the Report Campaign of the Rural Soviets, October 14, 1936, in *Ibid.*, 106–108.
111. Conquest, *Great Terror: A Reassessment*, 273.
112. Extract From Record No. 109 of the Meeting of the Troika of the Kiev Regional Directorate of the UkrSSR NKVD, November 13, 1937, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 114–15.
113. See Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History* (New York: Anchor Books, 2004); Oleg Khlevniuk, *The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror*, trans. Vadim Staklo (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
114. Applebaum, *Gulag*, 305–306.
115. Conquest, *Great Terror: A Reassessment*, xiv–xv.
116. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*, 89. According to Robert Conquest, perhaps the finest chronicler of Stalin’s Soviet Union: “*The Great Terror* was only peripherally concerned with the total casualties of the Stalin epoch. But it reckoned the dead as no fewer than twenty million. This figure is now given in the USSR. And the general total

- of 'repressed' is now stated (e.g., in the new high-school textbooks) as around forty million, about half of them in the peasant terror of 1929 to 1933 and the other half from 1937 to 1953." Conquest, *Great Terror: A Reassessment*, 486; see Walter Laqueur, *The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 131–46; *Black Book of Communism*.
117. Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 288; see Conquest, *Great Terror: A Reassessment*, 457; Steven Merritt Miner, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); see, e.g., "Stalin and the Orthodox Church," in *A Documentary History of Communism in Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev*, ed. Robert V. Daniels (London: University Press of New England, 1993), 228–229.
 118. See Robert Conquest, "The Stalin Era," in *The Collapse of Communism*, ed. Lee Edwards (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 67.
 119. Dunn, *Catholic Church and Russia*; Steven Merritt Miner, *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945*; Froese, "Forced Secularization," 154; see Greeley, "Religious Revival;" Conquest, *Harvest of Sorrow*, 199–200; and John Anderson, *Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
 120. Anderson, *Religion, State and Politics*, 6; *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 184; Andrew B. Stone, "'Overcoming Peasant Backwardness': The Khrushchev Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union," *Russian Review* 67 (2008): 296.
 121. Anderson, *Religion, State and Politics*, 11.
 122. Davies, *Long Walk to Church*, 34.
 123. Froese, "Forced Secularization," 42.
 124. Anderson, *Religion, State and Politics*, 55.
 125. Karpov to the CPSU CC, July 6, 1959, in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 207–208.
 126. William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 512.